

**“Aurel Vlaicu” University of Arad
L’Association Française de Psychologie Politique
Romanian Association of Political Ecology**



Globalization and crises

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Globalization and crises: interdisciplinary vision

On the beginning, historians had associated the word of “Globalization” with Americanism: faith, ideal and vision who dominated the end of Cold War”. Thinking in a positive and pragmatic manner, globalization urged the promotion of universal human rights by eliminating cultural borders, capital and trade. The schemes of economical convergences included implicitly the systems of values, norms and options of the communities.

The perverse effects of the new planetary policy have generated unforeseeable crises such as the redistribution of power or the increased offset between rich and poor. A human crisis, at the scale of community and individual, deeply marks the age. Is psychology or the other socio-human sciences, prepared to battle their symptomatic?

Some theories that recognize and reproduce the necessities of political research on psychological entities make

their way back in the present of the unifying paradigms of socio-human sciences.

Identity, memory, thinking or political actions reset, combine and originate in values, aspirations, attitudes and motivations of the individual and social psychic. The researches of the political scientist, sociologist, historian or economist on the immediate past find a result by appealing to political psychology.

We have decided that starting with this number of the Societal and *Political Psychology International Review*, which is dedicated to the phenomena of globalization and crisis, to add political psychology studies and “related expectations” on the theme from the researches of other socio-human specialists. A globalizing background of a variety of theories, experiments and models of approach.

Editors

Mondialisation et crise dans une perspective interdisciplinaire

Dès le début, les historiens ont associé le terme de mondialisation (globalisation) avec l'américanisme: croyance, idéal et vision qui ont dominé la fin de la "guerre froide". En termes positifs et pragmatiques, la mondialisation signifiait la promotion des droits universels de l'homme par la suppression des frontières culturelles, du capitale et du commerce. Les schémas des convergences économiques intégraient, de manière implicite, les systèmes de valeurs, de normes et les options des communautés.

Les effets pervers de la nouvelle politique planétaire ont généré des crises «imprévisibles» comme la rédistribution du pouvoir ou l'approfondissement du décalage entre les riches et les pauvres de la planète. Une crise humaine, à l'échelle de la communauté et de l'individu, marque profondément l'époque. La psychologie, et les autres sciences du socio-humaine sont elles prêtes à une confrontation avec les symptômes de cette crise?

Des théories qui reconnaissent et qui répondent à la nécessité des recherches du

politique et ses fondements psychologiques reviennent actuellement dans des paradigmes unificateurs des sciences socio-humaines.

L'identité, la mémoire, la pensée ou l'action politique jalonnent et génèrent des valeurs, des aspirations et des motivations psychiques individuelles et sociales. Les études du politologue, du sociologue, de l'historien ou de l'économiste sur le passé immédiat s'enrichissent par les apports de la psychologie du politique.

Par conséquence ce numéro de la *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Politique Sociétale*, consacré aux phénomènes de la mondialisation et de la crise, se propose de rassembler les études de la psychologie politique et les «perspectives connexes» qui ont comme source commune les recherches sur la société et l'homme. En somme, un panorama globalisant de la diversité des théories, des expériences, des modèles et des approches.

La rédaction

Globalizare și criză în viziune interdisciplinară

Dintru-început istoricii au asociat termenul de “mondializare” (globalizare) cu americanismul: credință, ideal și viziune ce-au dominat sfârșitul “războiul rece”. În termeni pozitivi și pragmatici, mondializarea îndemna la promovarea drepturilor universale ale omului prin desființarea frontierelor culturale, capitalului și comerțului. Schemele convergențelor economice integrau, implicit, sistemele de valori, norme și opțiuni ale comunităților.

Efectele perverse ale noii politici plane-tare au generat crize imprevizibile precum redistribuirea puterii sau creșterea decalajului între bogații și săracii planetei. O criză umană, la scară comunității și a individului, marchează profund epoca. Este psihologia, sunt celelalte științe ale socio-umanului, pregătite de confruntarea cu simptomatica ei?

Teoriile care recunosc și redau trebuințele cercetării politicului pe temeiul entităților psihologice revin astfel în actualitatea

paradigmelor unificatoare ale științelor socio-umane. Identitatea, memoria, gândirea sau acțiunea politică se reculeg, întrețes și își au originea în valori, aspirații, atitudini și motivații ale psihicului individual și social. Studiile politologului, sociologului, istoricului sau economistului asupra trecutului imediat se împlinesc prin recursul la psihologia politicului.

Ne-am propus, la rându-ne, ca începând din acest număr al *Revistei Internaționale de Psihologie Politică Societală*, dedicat fenomenelor globalizării și crizei, să alăturăm studiilor de psihologie politică și “perspectivele conexe” ale temei, provenite din cercetările specialiștilor din alte domenii ale socio-umanului. O panoramă cuprinzătoare a diversității de teorii, experimente și modele de abordare.

Redactia

Globalización y crisis en una perspectiva interdisciplinaria

Los historidores han asociado desde sus comienzos el termino de mundializacion (globalizacion) con el (norte) americanismo: creencias, ideal y vision que han dominado el fin de “la guerra fria”. Lo que significa, en terminos positivos y pragmaticos, la promocion de los derechosuniversales del hombre, a traves de la supresion de las fronteras de las culturas, del capital et del comercio. Los esquemas economicos convergentes integran de manera implicita, los sistemas de valores, las normas y las opciones de las comunidades.

Lo efectos perversos de la nueva politica planetaria han generado crisis “imprevisibles” como la redistribucion del poder o la profundizacion de la distancia entre ricos y pobres del planeta. La crisis humana, a escala de la comunidad y del individuo marca profundamente la época. La psicologia y las otras ciencias socio-humanas se encuentran dispuesta a una confrontacion con los sintomas de de la crisis?

Las teorias que reconocen y responden la necesidad de una necesaria busqueda de lo

politico y de sus fundamentos psicologicos vuelven actualmente en los paradigmas unificadores de las ciencias socio-humanas.

La identidad, la memoria, el pensamiento o la accion politica jalonan y generan valores, aspiraciones, y motivaciones psicologicas individuales y sociales. Los estudios de politologos, sociologos, historiadores o economistas sobre el pasado inmediato se enriquecen con los aportes de la psicologia de la politica.

En consecuencia, este numero de la *Revista Internacional de psicologia politica societal* consagrada a los fenoemenos de la mundializacion y de la crisis propone de reunir los estudios de psicologia politica y de las “perspectivas conexas” que tienen como fuente comun las investigaciones sobre la sociedad y el hombre. En otras palabras, una vision panoramica globalizando la diversidad de las teorias, las experiencias, los modelos y aproximaciones.

La redaccion

Globalization and crises

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY PERSPECTIVES

La psicología política: el retorno de los orígenes

Alexandre Dorna

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La crisis global actual contiene números ingredientes que hacen posible el retorno de la psicología política luego de casi un siglo de ausencia. Grandes arreas del conocimientos psicológico han sido engullidas por las arenas del tiempo de la hiper- especialización y la fragmentación de las ciencias humanas y sociales (SHS). Las razones son metodológicas y políticas. La necesidad de un retorno a las fuentes mismas del conocimiento (en este caso psicológico y político) hace parte del síndrome de la postmodernidad.

El debilitamiento de los valores comunes, la falta de proyecto alternativo, la desaparición del debate público (doxa), la perdida del deseo de vivir juntos, la ausencia de conciencia histórica y una profunda amnesia política. Además, habría que agregar : una demisión del pensamiento crítico y la aceptación tácita de una sociedad sin alma dominada por referencias ideologías de inspiración individualista y tecnocrática. El espectro del mercantilismo recorre el mundo. De allí que algunos especialistas hayan hablado de la “sociedad bloqueada” (Crupier 1970)

Se trata de una crisis de civilización, compleja, crónica y asolapada, cuyo diagnóstico sociológico fue propuesto por Durkheim a comienzos del siglo XX,

quien habló de “anomia” social, a lo cual hay que agregar una anomia “ideológica y política”, que se traduce en un conformismo generalizado y un statu-quo frustrante.

Si la ciencia hace unos siglos fue ensalzada como fuerza objetiva de verdad, la realidad presente es otra. La duda ontológica se ha introducido en la epistemología moderna. En el fondo la verdad científica es cuestionada. Las teorías generales han prácticamente aparecido bajo una multitud de micro-teorías. Y así la investigación se ha vuelto gris y monótona. Las grandes “catedrales” de la filosofía de la historia se encuentran cubiertas de arenas y de cenizas. Algunos pensadores actuales han llegado a proclamar con mucho ruido el fin de la historia.

El “mundo imago”, optimista y racional, del hombre renacentista, artista y científico (Leonardo de Vinci fue el prototipo) se ha desfigurado y se ha vuelto una caricatura: funcionarios y operadores de computadoras inteligentes forman la élite tecnocrática del poder. Tal vez la causa se encuentra en la perdida degusto por la cultura, y el retraimiento delante las cuestiones históricas, seapor omisión u olvido, sea por vanidad o ignorancia. Probablemente la poderosa burocracia tecnocrática y la presencia de una tecno cultura uniforme han

destruido los puentes que antes unían las fuerzas creadoras, los sueños de grandeza, las cualidades espirituales y la búsqueda científica de un mundo mejor para los hombres del futuro.

En la medida que las actividades científicas se atomizan, la tradicional separación entre ciencias “duras” y ciencias blandas” se agudiza. Así los acuerdos metodológicos de base se pierden bajo la proliferación de nuevos contenidos teóricos (micros) y nuevas técnicas omnipresentes. La tecnología ha invadido la ciencia como la hierba que asfixia las plantas.

Peor aun, los lazos entre científicos de un mismo dominio se quiebran y los caminos se bifurcan. La falta de un marco de referencia común se hace cada vez más evidente. Estamos en presencia de una “balkanización” de la ciencia moderna y de una verdadera epidemia de micro-teorías. La competencia entre ellas es ruda y la voluntad de sobrevivir las vuelve agresivas, dogmáticas y conflictivas. En suma: son pequeñas ideologías con intereses propios que pululan en los campus universitarios y cuya finalidad consiste en reproducirse en una cadena sin fin.

La psicología social: insuficiencias teóricas e institucionales

La historia reciente de la psicología (social en particular) ilustra perfectamente lo que hemos descrito. Pero como dice E. Crespo (1995) no es la insatisfacción “de una historia que esté siempre empezando, sino de una reflexión que nunca termina”. Algunos psicólogos sociales (Billig, Gergen, Ibañez, Fernandez) han abordado el tema desde perspectiva distinta. Pero si muchos de sus argumentos me parecen compatibles con los míos, pienso que las soluciones epistemologías que proponen aun distan mucho de ofrecer un lugar de encuentro pluralista y transversal. Bien entendido se trata de búsquedas valiosas que pueden servir de puente con la nueva psicología política aun en fase de refundación.

La psicología social se desarrolló durante todo el siglo XX bajo la tutela del enfoque experimental (primero conductista, luego cognitivista) y elaboró un conjunto complejo (muchas veces confuso) de procedimientos, teorías, y técnicas. Los resultados parecieron a primera vista espectaculares. Se crearon departamentos de psicología social en todas las universidades del mundo, la profesión se desarrolló y sus aplicaciones tuvieron una significativa influencia. Pero el costo de ese éxito es alto. Los objetivos iniciales se han abandonado paulatinamente. Casi nadie habla, hoy, de utilizar el conocimiento para cambiar las condiciones de vida de las gentes y buscar la solución a los problemas concretos de la sociedad.

Que hace verdaderamente la psicología social académica? En pocas palabras: crea objetos cada vez más abstractos de estudio y teorías asombrosamente virtuales que poco o nada tienen que ver con la realidad concreta. La mayor parte de los investigadores pasan su tiempo a la buscar de prueba del valor empírico de sus hipótesis de laboratorio. Lo importante es la validez de su micro-teoría de laboratorio. Y así de hipótesis en hipótesis los hombres de laboratorio pasan sus mejores años en laberintos artificiales que se transforman en círculos viciosos autónomos, hasta que por la usura del tiempo, y a veces por la desaparición física de los creadores, otra micro-teoría será propuesta como “paradigma” de referencia. Y así sucesivamente en una cadena de cursos y coloquios, publicaciones para iniciados y discursos cerrados.

Las tensiones internas (metodológicas y epistemologías) no se formulan abiertamente. Los conflictos existen, pero sin debate de fondo. Cierto, aquí y allá, se viven las pequeñas luchas entre los partidarios de unas u otras micro-teorías, y del uso de los métodos cuantitativos y aquellos otros que prefieren los cualitativos. Pero pocos son los que se atreven a proponer alternativas frente al statu-quo. En cambio, muchos adoptan estrategias individuales de evitación que remedian la famosa política del aveSTRUZ.

Que podemos hacer?

Lo peor es permanecer dentro del círculo cerrado de las imposturas. De allí la necesidad de un pensamiento positivo y crítico, para plantear seriamente las cuatro necesidades imperativas para salir del “impasse”:

- a) la necesidad de una re-evaluación crítica del enfoque científico clásico
- b) la necesidad de volcarse al estudio de las perversiones que paralizan la sociedad humana, incluyendo los sectores que nos son más cercanos.
- c) la necesidad de tomar una posición frente a la auto-reproducción de las microteorías psicosociales
- d) la necesidad de observar nuevamente la problemática social concreta.

De hecho, desde sus orígenes, ha comienzos del siglo XX, la psicología social ha escamoteado su doble inspiración: “individualista y colectiva”. En los años 30, bajo la tutela norteamericana, estas tendencias se desarrollan de manera desigual y combinada, pero lentamente los enfoques “individualistas” lograron imponerse completamente hasta ocultar la perspectiva de una psicología de masas. Bien entendido, esta transformación se produce dentro de un contexto epistemológico dado y una realidad social e ideológica determinante.

La posición “colectivista”, la más antigua cronológicamente, y de origen europeo, había postulado la existencia de una supra-individualidad. Ross (1912) lo dice de la manera siguiente: “las ideas convergentes de los miembros de un grupo se transforman y devienen una estructura espiritual. La individualidad del grupo reemplaza la personalidad individual”. También lo afirma Le Bon como punto de partida para una psicología política. Y otros cuyos rastros se han esfumado con el tiempo: H. Berr, A. Hamon, I. Meyerson y varios otros.

La segunda posición, “individualista”, mucho más reciente, desplaza la primera gracias al formidable impulso dado por los trabajos experimentales iniciados en los años 40 por los universitarios norteamericanos.

Allport lo dice de manera perentoria: “no existe una psicología de grupos que no sea una psicología individual”. De hechos los autores postulan que los comportamientos individuales son sociales únicamente porque responden a estímulos institucionales.

Por cierto, entre ambas corrientes extremas se ubican una serie de autores que juzgan severamente la oposición entre individuo y sociedad, individualidad y colectividad. Esta tercera posición es la de Sherif (1936) quien lo expresa claramente; “la psicología individual es psicología social y viceversa. No hay dos psicologías, sino una sola”. Otros como Mead (1935) y Linton (1936) desarrollaron una argumentación mas amplia para insistir sobre el carácter cultural de la relación entre personalidad y sociedad. Sin embargo, veremos mas adelante que la aceptación de una posición intermedia no logra resolver los problemas epistemológicos planteados hace un siglo. Nunca las terceras vías han resultado los impasses, solo sirven para aliviar el peso del statu-quo.

Mas tarde, la investigación experimental de laboratorio se apodera prácticamente de la totalidad del espacio académico de la psicología social universitaria y su influencia se extiende fuera de las fronteras de los EEUU una vez terminada la 2^a guerra mundial. Los universitarios europeos seincorporan, por “la force des choses”, primero lentamente y luego de manera acelerada. La “imbricación” de la investigación en ciencias sociales reduce y condena al olvido los aportes cumulados por lustros de reflexión. La adhesión a los enfoques teóricos y a los métodos de trabajo de la psicología experimentalnorteamericana se vuelve hegémónica.

Los estudios de Sherif y de Asch sobre las normas y la presión de las mayorías, forman la base del “éxito” de la psicología social académica: actitudes y cambio de actitudes. K. Lewin y sus discípulos tratan de sobrepasar la psicología social individual, pero no lo logran. Peor aun: refuerzan la metodología cuantitativa y la voluntad de construir teorías extraídas de

la experimentación de laboratorio. Luego, la celebre experiencia de Lewin, Lippit y White sobre el liderazgo provoca una serie de aplicaciones prácticas (entrenamiento de supervisores, cambio de actitudes, psicoterapia, etc.) y algunas teorizaciones puntuales en torno a la dinámica de grupos. Paralelamente, los trabajos de Havland, y de sus colegas de la Universidad de Yale, proporcionan las bases para la emergencia de un nuevo “paradigma”: la influencia social.

El enfoque cuantitativo gana así en credibilidad y se expande al resto de las universidades del mundo occidental.

En los años '60, una nueva ola de investigaciones experimentales perpetua la supremacía de los enfoques cognitivos y comienza la era de las micro-teorías en psicología social. La teoría del equilibrio cognitivo de Heider dará origen a una gran variedad de trabajos experimentales sobre la coherencia, la congruencia y la persistencia de “patterns socio-cognitivos”. Posteriormente, es el turno a la teoría de la disonancia cognitiva de Festinger (discípulo de Lewin) que marca profundamente la investigación de laboratorio. Numerosas teorías vendrán mas adelante. A su vez Kelley explica la mediación de los mecanismos cognitivos en las situaciones de racionamiento y juicio social. Mientras que Kiesler aportan la teoría del “compromiso” (commitment) según la cual son nuestros propios actos (en lugar de las ideas o los sentimientos) que nos hacen adherir psicológicamente a una acción. Otros enfoques se suceden: la teoría de la internalidad-externalidad el “locus de control” propuestos por Rotter. Y hay más, pero por razones de espacio las pasaremos por alto.

Mientras tanto, en Europa, Tajfel y otros promueven un enfoque sobre la categorización social que reformulan en términos cognitivos los estudios sobre el prejuicio, la categorización, la identidad, los estereotipos y el socio centismo. La micro-teoría parcial de la identidad lograra ganar audiencia dentro del medio académico anglo-americano. Por su parte, en Francia,

Moscovici y sus seguidores, buscan un puente entre la tradición europea y la experimentación norteamericana. Se trata de un esfuerzo por reorientar la epistemología psicosociología. Sin embargo, la vorágine experimental “jivariza” su reflexión teórica original y sus partidarios la transforman en una “escuela” donde el pensamiento” original se dogmatiza a través una proliferación de experiencias repetitivas en serie y un arsenal de técnicas cada vez mas sofisticados (y una fuerte dosis de “retórica” estadística) que sirven para justificar y mas que evaluar las hipótesis de la (micro) teoría de las representaciones sociales.

Hasta aquí esta descripción rápida del “síndrome de la formación de las micro-teorías”. Veremos ahora lo sustancial de la crítica, que espero sea entendida como constructiva. La consecuencia es similar a la que observamos en el conjunto de ciencias sociales: la pérdida de inter-inteligibilidad en el seno de misma disciplina. Cada micro-teoría se trasforma en un asunto de iniciados, hasta el extremo que una misma palabra (la famosa clave de los catálogos informáticos) adquiere una poli-significación tan grande que la comunicación se reduce cada vez mas.

En palabras mas directas: la proliferación de las micro-teorías, estimulada por la astucia de teoría global y la ingeniosidad de los procedimientos de laboratorio, ha hecho perder de vista la utilidad social del conocimiento psicológico social y estructurado a su alrededor un verdadero sistema de “clanes” académicos. La laboriosa actividad experimental de los primeros tiempos provoca un enorme entusiasmo, y una expansión institucional. Vale decir: la formación de discípulos. Luego los resultados empíricos forman un formidable y multicolor fuego de artificios que ilumina el cielo de la investigación para el gran placer de los seguidores. Toda virtud posee sus defectos. En este caso, la luminosidad localizada del micro-teoría nubla la visión del conjunto de la realidad. Al mismo tiempo, la memoria histórica se debilita y los aspectos culturales son omitidos. Lo virtual

reemplaza lo real. Lo importante deja de ser la predicción generalizable de los hallazgos significativos. Lo urgente cubre el horizonte académico y se convierte en una carrera de obstáculos para producir publicaciones y obtener las primas de investigación. En suma: la notoriedad se vuelve efímera, pero terriblemente atractiva en un mundo en el cual los esfuerzos académicos no se miden en función de sus aportes a la humanidad sino mas bien a su capacidad de suscitar imagos lo mas cercanas posibles de un producto publicitario. Así la consagración se produce cuando son difundidas por la televisión.

Algunas observaciones críticas sobre los hallazgos de la psicología social

Primera observación crítica: El oficio del psicólogo social se ha impuesto empírica y técnicamente. Pero, paradójicamente, pese a la multiplicación de las teorías, la formulación de leyes generales se encuentra en un impasse. Matalon (1996), uno de los mejores metodólogos en ciencias sociales, en Francia, lo escribe en forma lapidaria: “no existe un cuerpo de conocimientos que sea aceptado por todos los investigadores de una misma disciplina”. Se trata entonces de un serio bloqueo teórico del conjunto de las ciencias sociales.

En un registro mas irónico, Bem y McConnell, decían hace algún tiempo: “en el momento actual la elección de una (u otra) de las teorías, se reduce a una cuestión de gusto o de estética”.

Cabe una vez mas preguntarse: Que (nos) paso? En que momento la brújula de la investigación social dejo de funcionar? Para que sirven los artefactos de la investigación?

Las respuestas hay que buscarlas en múltiples direcciones:

- La super-especialización con sus efectos paradojales de rigidez intelectual y celotipias de grupos.

- La decepción provocada por las macro-teorías históricas: Hegel y Marx, Spengler y Toynbee, etc.

- La influencia del pensamiento único impuesto por la ideología tecnocrático-liberal.

- La presión de los “lobbies” en el seno de los centros decisiones de las universidades y las instituciones de tutela.

- La super-racionalización a la cual la realidad virtual de laboratorio no es ajena.

- La tendencia ha “formalizar” (matematizar dirían los ortodoxos) la investigación, que si bien es una aspiración legítima de las ciencias “duras”, se ha transformado en una suerte de “feticismo estadístico”, cuya utilización sirve de justificación y de seriedad científica en las ciencias “blandas”.

- La irrupción en las universidades de la mentalidad gestionaria que hacen de la “producción ciencia” una actividad asimilable a una producción industrial.

Segunda observación crítica: cuando algunos tratan de buscarle aplicaciones prácticas a las micro-teorías, la fórmula de Zimbardo sirve de coartada: “la mayoría de técnicas estudiadas nunca han sido probadas en la realidad, y en consecuencia puede que no funcionen”. En resumen, la magia del laboratorio hace que su secreto se exprese en dos palabras: “todo depende ...” !!! Así se realiza la autonomía funcional del trabajo universitario y su alejamiento progresivo de la realidad del mundo social y político que lo rodea. Poco importa entonces que los resultados sean útiles o no, lo que cuenta es la creación de un espacio independientemente de sus consecuencias, pero altamente valorado por los grupos representantes del poder académico e indirectamente del poder político. Curiosa amalgama que produce investigadores creativos, pero ciudadanos socialmente individualistas y políticamente neutralizados.

Tercera observación crítica: el enfoque “liberal” en ciencias sociales (individualismo metodológico) ha acentuado tres rasgos típicos de la psicología de nuestro tiempo: su carácter “a-histórico”, su postura “a-cultural” y la omisión del rol que juegan los elementos emocionales en la formación

de los comportamientos sociales complejos.

Cuarta observación crítica: las muestras experimentales en la investigaciones de laboratorio sufren de varios sesgos anti-científicos: el nº limitado de sujetos, su poca representatividad (estudiantes), la simplificación de los protocolos, las condiciones artificiales del control de las variables, y sobretodo el uso abusivo y la manipulación obsesiva de las pruebas estadísticas. A lo cual cabe agregar lo poco que se toma en cuenta el peso de la infinita variedad de aspectos culturales, ideológicas, e históricas que generalmente son expulsados del análisis de la “situación” investigada.

Quinta observación crítica: la notoriedad de algún micro-teoría obedece más a sus efectos de “charme” y a la habilidad persuasiva de sus promotores que a sus reales competencias científicas. Las redes de influencia hacen que la “verdad científica” se haya vuelto “democrática”. El numero de partidarios cuenta. Un clima de “in grups” domina las eventuales infidelidades teóricas o metodológicas, y una actitud de desconfianza (out-grups) reina frente a los otros grupos de investigación. Los laboratorios recuerdan esos viejos “castillos” feudales, en torno ha ciertas figuras intelectuales fuertes que administran la carrera de “sus” investigadores (generalmente antiguos estudiantes) y determinan los temas de investigación de los nuevos. Aun más cuando el “maestro” ocupa una posición importante en alguna universidad prestigiosa del primer mundo. Así se logra crear una red internacional en los países dependientes y cuyo cordón umbilical difícilmente se corta.

Sexta observación crítica: el mundo exterior poco influye en las problemáticas teóricas. Hay muchas teorías pequeñas, pero ninguna verdaderamente aplicable a una escala social. La “ciencia” se hace en medio de luchas abiertas que transforman los campus en zonas de conflictos y de enfrentamientos para imponerse dentro del mercado del conocimiento. Se trata de una caricatura? De ningún modo, pues

en momentos agudos de revoluciones científicas la tendencia es a las rupturas incluso personales. La multiplicación de encuentros, congresos, seminarios y coloquios permiten la difusión planetaria de las micro-teorías y la consolidación de redes internacionales a través de asociaciones que juegan a la geopolítica académica.

Séptima observación crítica: utilizando una metáfora, podríamos decir que los investigadores se han convertido en “topos” de jardín, cuya laboriosa y rutinaria actividad consiste en construir galerías subterráneas cada vez mas intrincadas y de difícil acceso. Y que de tanto vivir en la oscuridad se han vuelto miopes y torpes. Hasta tal punto que al salir a la superficie y a la luz del día son incapaces de reconocer sus verdaderos objetos de trabajo y sus utilidades sociales. La vieja expresión de “rata de biblioteca” “aplicada a los filósofos de antaño, hoy puede transformarse en la de “topo” de laboratorio respecto a todos aquellos que ejercen una actividad de investigación.

Psicología social o psicología política?

Algunos piensan que entre la psicología política y la psicología social existe una rivalidad de fondo. Otros hablan de un verdadero pleonasmico. Para clarificar estas interpretaciones, vale la pena recordar tres hechos históricos básicos que deben ser reincorporados a la perspectiva común:

Primer hecho histórico: contrariamente a una creencia impuesta por la vulgata académica, la psicología social no es la “madre” de la psicología política. Los hechos muestran más bien lo contrario. La razón de este equívoco tiene sus antecedentes en sus orígenes ideológicos: la psicología política tiene un origen popular, tumultuoso y a veces hasta sulfuroso. En efecto, ninguno de sus principales representantes hacia parte del mundo académico establecido: ni Le Bon ni Tarde, tampoco Sighele, mucho menos Hamon cuyo romanticismo libertario lo ubica fuera de las normas de la época. Comentario similar merecen otros

pensadores cercanos: Sorel, Canetti, Rossi, Draghicesco, Cattaneo y otros que han sido enterrados en las arenas del olvido.

El rasgo común de estos pioneros es escuchar sin filtros institucionales los dolores y las pulsaciones de la sociedad. Su virtud: poseer una mirada penetrante y un pensamiento refractario a las modas teóricas de la época. Otro elemento común: hacer cohabitantes, sin jerarquía, las diversas disciplinas que componían las llamadas “ciencias humanas”: la historia, la moral, literatura, el derecho, la sociología, la economía política, la antropología y la psicología general. Probablemente estas características determinaron la singular marginalidad del enfoque psico-político. Pero, paradójicamente, la marginalidad de ayer esta más cerca de la realidad presente.

Segundo hecho histórico: La investigación en psicología social y en parte por extensión las ciencias humanas y sociales que se interesan en el hombre se ha contentado de explorar los comportamiento individuales. Mientras que la psicología colectiva de los pioneros ha perdido formalmente vigencia. Los procedimientos de laboratorio se han extendido como un inmenso lago artificial alimentado por las lluvias de la demanda social y la crecida de los ríos académicos, pero pese a su extensión considerable solo tiene unos cuantos centímetros de profundidad.

Tercer hecho histórico: la metodología psico-política en sus origines contiene un sello indeleble: la transversalidad metodológica y la pluralidad teórica. En consecuencia, una de las tareas de las psicosociologías interesadas en el estudio del hombre y de las sociedades políticas actuales consiste en rescatar el legado cultural común. La psicología política tiene sobradas razones para exigir una mayor autonomía y proponer un diálogo (intra y extra científico) a fin de poder enfrentar los grandes desafíos de la sociedad contemporánea.

De la psicología política

Que la psicología social vuelva a sus fuentes

primeras o no, la polémica parece bizantina. No se trata del regreso de la hija prodiga. Al contrario se trata de saber dejar atrás, aquello que causa obstáculo. Pero eso no quiere decir ni olvidar ni destruir, sino integrar. La psicología política posee una larga vida anterior y las herramientas intelectuales como para retomar su lugar dentro del conjunto de las ciencias sociales (Dorna 1998). Más aun: puede convertirse en el centro de la re-integración y en su motor esencial.

Por su pasado, la psicología política es portadora de un método tolerante donde lo cuantitativo conlleva lo cuantitativo, mientras que la visión transversal le permite recomponer el puzzle problemático de la realidad humana tanto en su dimensión “holística” e individual. Y otro elemento juega un rol importante: la psicología política mantuvo los lazos entre lo emocional y lo racional, pese a la fuerte tendencia a la separación que las corrientes neo-positivistas impusieron al conjunto de las ciencias sociales y humanas.

Cuando ciertos pensadores de ciencias sociales se reclaman de un retorno a lenfoque psicológico.

La masa de psicólogos sociales por falta de dialogo con otras disciplinas de las ciencias humanas y demasiado absorbidos en los trabajos experimentales, se han aislado de una problemática cultural y política que ha evolucionado rápidamente en los últimos años. Resulta curioso observar como la gran mayoría de los pensadores contemporáneos han reconsiderado el lugar que ocupa la psicología dentro de la problemática social moderna.

Aquí y allá, de manera más o menos explícita pensamos que un regreso a la cuestión del sujeto abre las posibilidades de un reencuentro interdisciplinario. Por cierto no se trata de un sujeto puramente individual, sino de una integración de la parte histórica, política y social del hombre con su vida psíquica. Esta idea está latente en los trabajos de Alberoni (1977) Touraine (1984) y desde hace varios años en el redescubrimiento de

los escritos de Elias (1939), así como en los planteamientos de Foucault (1969) a propósito del poder y del individuo en tanto práctica social y concepto filosófico. Sin olvidar la obra de E. Morin. Estos enfoques, como muchos otros, muestran una tendencia que ha desembocado en un cuestionamiento epistemológico de fondo, frente al cual las ciencias humanas han reaccionado en forma desordenada y atomista, demostrando en forma redundante el síndrome de nuestra época: la fragmentación del “mundo *imago*” de lamodernidad.

La falta actual de una teoría general de la sociedad contemporánea no hace más que agravar el sentimiento de malestar en el seno de las ciencias sociales. Pero se trata de un momento que puede conducir a re-evaluar las interrogaciones que estaban en el centro de la psicología política clásica: lo colectivo, la masa, la soledad de la muchedumbre. En suma, el alma de la humanidad y sus crisis, sus perturbaciones, y sus patologías explícitas.

A fin de razonar estas cuestiones se puede ir al encuentro de la ideo-lógica que se estructura en los orígenes del pensamiento político greco-latino pre-y-post-socrático. Y allí, de buena fe y buscando para ver, (nos) encontramos ante la matriz del saber en plena ebullición. En ese sentido hay una hipótesis heurística de los fundamentos comunes, bajo una forma genealógica, de la manera como se gesta la psicología política en sus inicios.

Una hipótesis heurística de la psicología política

Se trata de rescatar una evidencia que se pierde en la noche de los tiempos. Debemos recordar con Aristóteles que el hombre es un animal social que llega a transformarse en un ser político. Su transformación es el producto de una experiencia cuyo epicentro es su propia relación subjetiva con la realidad externa a través del tiempo. Y en su dimensión práctica es el creador de una cultura que lo trasforma a su vez. De esa acción nace la invención del sujeto y la creación de la “naturaleza” humana, la invención de la política y la creación de

las formas de gobierno. A través de errores y ensayos, los primeros hombres acumulan un saber positivo y una cierta idea de la trascendencia de la especie humana, así como una cierta idea de la necesidad de lo colectivo y más adelante de la autonomía individual pese a la compleja madeja de relaciones afectivas y utilitarias.

En consecuencia, no nos parece exagerado decir que la primera matriz epistemología construida por el hombre es de inspiración profundamente psicológica. La psiquis juega un rol primero. Hace parte del antropomorfismo primitivo. Así, el hombre se piensa y piensa el mundo en términos psicológicos. Las diversas mitológicas son verdaderas canteras de interpretaciones psicológicas. Los usos culturales son posteriores a la elaboración de creencias y representaciones colectivas. Pero, la cultura es la consolidación de las habilidades comunes.

De hecho, la política, tal cual la entendemos hoy, es una invención “psicológica” que se manifiesta en el seno de la cultura griega en un momento dado de su evolución. Se trata de una herramienta de mediación entre los hombres frente a sus propias violencias. Luego de un largo proceso de ensayos y errores, la colectividad construye una lógica y una racionalidad (el logos de los griegos donde lo emocional y lo racional forman un todo) a fin de proponer una realidad humana alternativa, con otras reglas de convivencia, que aquella realidad “salvaje” impuesta por la naturaleza.

En suma: la política sintetiza la experiencia social y la psicología colectiva como mediación y puente entre los múltiples mundos posibles (almas individuales) para formar un conjunto de reglas comunes que se transformaran en normas y roles, los cuales serán mas adelante leyes y constituciones que regirán las relaciones inter-personales de los miembros de las comunidades humanas.

Hipótesis (in)verosímil dirán algunos? Probablemente, pero plausible si recordamos la significación remota de las palabras de Protagoras : “el hombre es la medida de

todas las cosas”.

Por cierto se trata de una cuestión permanece evidentemente abierta al debate contradictorio y a la cual se asocian las diversas interpretaciones de la naturaleza

humana que están en los orígenes de todas las ideologías políticas y las metafísicos religiosas.

Un modelo descriptivo para la psicología política (Fig. 1)




Fig. 1. Esquema heurístico de la psicología política.

A modo de síntesis, les propongo un esquema sobre el cual nos detendremos solo unos instantes, puesto que nuestro objetivo era hablar mas de la psicología social que de la psicología política. Sin embargo, puesto que de reflexión en reflexión hemos avanzado algunos pasos, tal vez la esquematización permita dar una visión rápida del conjunto.

La percepción ocupa un lugar central en la perspectiva que hemos denominado psicología política. Se trata de una cuestión capital, pues detrás de cada hecho hay una construcción individual y colectiva en base a los mecanismos sociales de la percepción. Por cierto lo esencial consiste en recordar

sus características sociales, selectivas, constructivas y culturales. Al mismo tiempo que una “normalización” de lo percibido dentro y fuera del marco ahora y aquí de la situación. Otros elementos mayores concurren a la formación de percepciones: los antecedentes lejanos y cercanos (la historia y sus memorias) y las consecuencias de los actos posibles (las expectativas) dentro de una situación cultural. Habría que agregar una explicación sobre los mecanismos de cohesión, pero nos es el caso de hacerlo en este contexto. Solo haré notar que todo diagnóstico político exige plantearse los elementos que mantienen la cohesión y dan

coherencia a las acciones.

**La convergencia de los enfoques:
Meyerson**

La reflexión de Ignace Meyerson, (ampliamente comentada por Bruner 1996), psicólogo histórico, juega un papel de primer plano en nuestra demostración.

Retengamos, por ahora, algunas de sus principales tesis:

a) La paradoja humana: el hombre, contrariamente a otros animales, acuerda un enorme valor a una serie de actividades superflas a la luz de la actividad fundamental común: la sobrevivencia. Una enorme energía es empleada para producir, conservar, transmitir y transformar la naturaleza y cambiar las conductas humanas. De allí han nacido: el arte, el derecho, las religiones, la guerra, la ciencia, la especulación, y evidentemente la política. Resulta conveniente entonces interrogarse como los seres humanos invierten tanto esfuerzo en proyectos colectivos que van mas allá de la pura sobrevivencia.

b) Lo humano se empapa de sus obras. El mundo del hombre es el mundo de sus obras: la civilización es la obra. De allí que sea parcial querer comprender lo psicológico sin comprender la significación de las obras humanas. La memoria juega aquí un papel irremplazable. La psicología política se alimenta del recuerdo.

c) Los psicólogos sociales han demostrado en forma ejemplar que la percepción es: selectiva, construida y cultural. Meyerson se adelanta a todos ellos cuando muestra lo ambiguo de la realidad humana. La cuestión de las obras permite encontrar un nexo de continuidad, puesto que son ellas las que justifican la existencia humana, no solo porque prueban su continuidad, sino porque forman una sólida estructura de referencia. Así, el hombre es historia en la medida que actualiza sus recuerdos.

d) La memoria como la percepción se forman y se transmiten socialmente. El mundo humano se humaniza con la mediación de los sistemas de signos que la técnica ha permitido conservar y trasmitir:

desde el alfabeto a la computadora, pasando por la imprenta. Axioma: la obra humana (colectiva por definición) no es susceptible de ser desecada en laboratorio.

e) Otro rasgo del hombre: supreocupación por el avenir. Mas aun, tendencia ha proyectarse en el futuro tanto en lo personal que en la historia. Todas sus obras se hacen en relación a una percepción del y en el tiempo. Los proyectos colectivos que los hombres conciben (por ejemplo el proyecto de la modernidad), refuerzan esta orientación de expectativa. He allí el zócalo histórico que nos ayuda a comprender algunos aspectos de la interacción social, y evidentemente de la política. Los actos tienen necesidad de una justificación colectiva: "unidas múltiplex".

Algunas palabras finales para no concluir

La psicología política, Dorna (1998) postula su vocación científica sin caer en el círculo vicioso de las micro teorías y de sus prácticas institucionales. Al mismo tiempo permite reexaminar los postulados impuestos por la psicóloga individualista, la ideología liberal, a fin de retomar contacto con el conjunto de la realidad, incluyendo los fenómenos afectivos, dentro de una perspectiva metodológica transversal.

La tarea urgente es proponer un modelo heurístico abierto y un pluralismo metodológico, capaz de ubicar el estudio de la cultura y de la historia en un lugar central, única manera de pensar en una coherencia global (razón y emoción, universalidad y concretizaron) en la cual los sujetos y la realidad percibida formen una nueva síntesis abierta.

La crisis de la modernidad se refleja en todos los planos intelectuales, y en particular en la espiritualidad y en la ciencia. De allí que la psicología se encuentre maniatada por los excesos del cientismo y del reduccionismo racionalista que se apoderó de la ciencia en un momento de exaltación de nuestra historia, existen numerosos territorios de conocimiento que es necesario

re-visitar. Para ello debemos reconstruir los puentes que nos unían a otras disciplinas: la historia, la sociología, la antropología, etc.

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Virtualization of Social Violence: a sign of our époque?

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Abstract: *An upward trend in social violence is an illusion conditioned by the basic mechanisms of attention, perception and memory. In fact, social violence is becoming more indirect and symbolic. Its displacement into virtual reality is perhaps one of the most remarkable trends in the development of civilization. The author argues that the problem indeed is the insufficient dynamics in decreasing multiple forms of physical violence, which is fraught with global catastrophe in the context of more and more sophisticated technologies. Some assumptions are made about probable developments in the next decades.*

Keywords: physical violence, moral violence, virtual violence, sublimation, technohumanitarian balance, retrospective aberration, mass media, Gresham's Law in information, anthropological constant, recreation zone.

Elimination of all forms of physical violence is a crucial challenge for the modern civilization: its further destiny may conclusively depend on the ability to solve this problem. It goes without saying that a constructive discussion of the issue on all levels, ranging from school education to global policy, requires adequate assessments of the current situation, trends and real threats. Meanwhile, the issue has created a set of myths in public and even in the academic literature. As a result, sober analyses are substituted by declarations, the causal links are distorted, and instead of reasonable projects we see endless cries about "this horrible world", or naïve appeals

to somehow "prohibit" cruelties, etc.

Here, we address the two most popular myths. One is that violence has escalated in contemporary society and continues to escalate. Another is that (supposedly) escalating violence is boosted by the abundance of cruelty in mass media.

Historical dynamics in violence and nonviolence: the pattern of technohumanitarian balance

To begin with, I briefly outline here the results of a long-term interdisciplinary survey on the mechanisms of man-made crises and catastrophes, which involved both historical

and modern time case studies [Nazaretyan 2004, 2008, 2009]. The survey has revealed a systemic relation between three variables – technological potential, cultural regulation quality, and social sustainability. Namely: *the higher the power of production and war technologies, the more advanced aggression-regulation means is required to enable the self-preservation of society.*

This pattern – *the law of technohumanitarian balance* – helps to understand in causal terms both the cases of unexpected collapse of flourishing states and civilizations and the cases of revolutionary breakthrough in world history, which remain even more mysterious till now. The generic model demonstrates how the spread of new technologies entailed the superiority of instrumental intelligence (human capacity to handle energies) over humanitarian intelligence (the capacity to forecast the delayed consequences and control aggressive impulses, which is embodied in cultural values and norms).

Imbalance between the two attributes of intelligence provokes bursts of ecological and/or geopolitical aggression accompanied by a typical set of mass psychological symptoms that have been surprisingly repeated in various cultures and epochs: euphoria, sense of omnipotence and impunity, irrational thirst for “small victorious wars”, and so on. Non-restrained aggression has often subverted natural or organizational foundations of social sustainability: the accumulation of destructive effects led to a phase of catastrophes.

At those dramatic phases, the selection of social systems, values, norms and mindsets compatible with the grown technological might was intensified. Advanced regulation means could balance the new technologies so that humans learned to handle more powerful instruments avoiding catastrophic aftereffects. As a result of cultural and psychological *fitting*, society “tamed” more and more potentially destructive tools, which thanks to that became relatively safe. *As soon as the dramatic fitting process was*

over, even most potentially destructive weapons became a life-protecting factor: our calculations show that after fitting, the more potentially threatening a weapon was the less sanguinary it turned out in fact.

We see a similar situation in the modern society as well. There has not been a single human victim of the intercontinental ballistic missiles that threatened the very humankind’s existence half a century ago. The atom bombs of the first generation, yet relatively low-powered, killed (including also the delayed victims) about 300 thousand people. Tanks, artillery and bombers have taken millions of human lives. Tens of millions have fallen victim to small arms. Meanwhile, kitchen knives and other home utensil used sporadically in everyday conflicts are continually killing more people than the professional weaponry altogether.

To verify one of the non-trivial corollaries of the techno-humanitarian balance pattern, a comparative cross-cultural index was used – *Bloodshed Ratio (BR)*, i.e. the ratio of the average number of killings per unit of time $k(\Delta t)$ to the population size during that period $p(\Delta t)$. Rough calculations (carried out by the author together with military historian V. Litvinenko and clinical psychologist S. Enikolopov) demonstrate that in a long-term historical retrospective, while demographic densities and technical capacity for mutual destruction have been increasing throughout millennia, violent death rate has had a downward trend. The trend has been highly non-linear – bloodshed splashes correspond to the escalation of anthropogenic crises – but as we consider long time periods, the decline is rather distinctly manifested.

This paradox cannot be explained by the assumption that the humans have been decreasing their aggressiveness: on the contrary, growing population density most probably stimulated aggressive impulses. Nevertheless, culture, while passing through the crucible of man-made crises and catas-

trophes, has been perfecting and multiplying its mechanisms of aggression-sublimation. Were it not so, neither consecutive growth of population and its density nor progressively increasing technological power would have been possible in history. Moreover, humankind could hardly have lived till our time had it been unable to develop more and more advanced means of self-control to balance progressively growing means of destruction.

Thereby, the evolution of behavior-regulation has not been driven by humans' or heavens' arbitrary will but has followed the logic and pragmatics of sustainability. The perfection of moral and other values and norms was an indirect, mediated and usually delayed response of cultures to the challenges of dangerously growing instruments of violence.

For instance, the 20th century, with its two world wars and multiple civil wars, the nightmare of genocides and Hiroshima, had lower *BR* than previous centuries and excelled them in many other indicators of the quality of human relations. The appraisals of it as an extraordinarily cruel epoch are based on a set of sociologically and anthropologically incorrect premises. First, much higher humanistic standards are applied to this epoch as compared to the previous ones (which is due to the optimistic expectations the Europeans had in the beginning of the century). Second, the relative criteria are substituted for the absolute ones, and war and political victims are over-emphasized while the rate of victims in everyday violence is ignored. Third, the estimations are traditionally Eurocentric: in the 20th century, the European military losses made up about 65% of the total sum of world losses, whereas in the 19th century they made up no more than 15%. As to the current situation, I would refer here to a competent paper. The calculations of the World Health Organization show that the general number of people perished in the armed, everyday conflicts and political repressions on Earth in the year 2000 was about half a million [Krug et al. 2002]. The figure is monstrous by itself. However, it

makes up 0,008% of 6 billion population (the same paper informs us that even more people, 815000, fell victim to suicides). To be compared: in our calculations, average annual violent death rate in the 20th century was 0.15%; in the Paleolithic tribes it was about 5%¹.

In the large, we can single out two series of facts: empirically obvious growth in virtual violence and sociologically provable decline in physical violence. Is this coincidence accidental or are the two circumstances causally linked? I will argue that the second assumption is more reliable (although certainly, the links cannot be either linear or one-dimensional) and will demonstrate that the problem that is topical and global indeed is not the increase but *insufficiently dynamic decrease* in all forms of physical violence. Before that, however, it is time to clear up why the illusion of growing violence is that persistent.

Retrospective aberration

Political psychologists are well aware of this effect described in particular by the J. Davis's [1969] graph. As soon as the situation in certain significant sphere (economy, political freedoms, or vertical mobility, etc.) improves, it becomes outpaced by public needs and expectancies, in the light of which the collective consciousness perceives the dynamics contrariwise. This paradoxically entails mass dissatisfaction and a belief that living conditions are getting worse. The analysis of multiple social explosions, riots and revolutionary situations has demonstrated that they are usually preceded by the improvements in the objective indicators and respectively, by the growth in expectations. Then, while the expectancies continue increasing, a relative descent in objective opportunities (compared to the peak) provokes frustration and aggression, which can end up in mass disturbances.

Retrospective aberration is one of the mechanisms distorting the evaluation of social dynamics. Most of the facts qualified

as blatant violence by modern Western individuals were not perceived in the same way by people of traditional and, all the more, archaic cultures.

To describe the ordinary life of our not remote ancestors, I consider mostly the data about Russian history, although any other country or region might serve as well. Wars followed one another regularly: for instance, during the 304 years of Romanovs' dynasty (1613 – 1917) Russia waged 349 years of war (sometimes two or three wars were simultaneous) [Burovsky 2003], while during 1500 years since Kievan Rus, the country has lived in peace for about 150 years in aggregate². Class, confessional factions, police repressions and commonplace crimes complete the picture. Still, all of those calamities were exceeded by everyday violence. Regular wife battering and children beating (sometimes to death), public executions and whippings in the streets, everyday conflicts and mass fisticuffs in the holidays (a kind of entertainment; although it followed certain rules, it normally resulted in individuals being killed and crippled) made the background of morals and manners [DeMause 1982, Burovsky 2008, Flier 2008, Nazaretyan 2008].

We may easily find evidence of this all not only while studying biographical and ethnographical sources but also reading classical belles-lettres. A well-known rhyme by the Russian poet N. Nekrasov (1821-1877) describes an ordinary episode on the central square of the Russian capital: a young peasant woman, while being given a public flogging, is not even crying or groaning, and the idea to intervene and stop the execution does not cross the minds of the passers-by (among them the poet himself) – the event is quite normal and accustomed [Nekrasov 1953, p.13].

The masterpieces by L. Tolstoy, F. Dostoevsky, A. Ostrovsky, N. Leskov, M. Gorky and other outstanding writers show us incidentally abundant and impressing sketches of everyday violence in families,

in the streets and in the educational institutions.

Up to the 20th century, the experience of bringing up children without corporal punishment had been scarce. The English saying teaches us: "Spare the rod and spoil the child". Not only little commoners but also princes' and kings' children were subject to flogging. The Russian Household Management Code (*The Domostroy*) of the 16th century regulated the means of wives' "upbringing" in the noble (*boyar*) families: it did not recommend to cane the (noble!) wife, punch or beat her in front of the servants and children – the punishment was meant to be done in private and by means of a lash; commoner women did not deserve such ceremonies. In Western Europe, *Hexenhammer (Malleus Maleficarum)*, 1486) was more severe: bad wives and sometimes just good-looking women (who diverted the males from the sacred thoughts) could be burned at the stake. There is still a law in London that prohibits beating a wife after 21-00, because her yells can disturb the neighbors' rest.

The traditional attitudes to women and children look even more horrific in the Eastern countries. It is enough to mention here the *suttee* tradition in India, by which the wife regardless of her age is obliged to drown herself or burn herself after her husband's death – otherwise, she must be stoned to death by her own relatives – or astonishingly multiform and sustainable tradition of children's sacrifices. In the Confucian philosophy, a baby does not have consciousness and so, is not yet a human being within three days after his (her) birth. Therefore, the mortification of a new born baby by its parents is not condemned either legally or morally.

Not only in India and China but in all cultures of the world, until contraception and medical intrauterine abortion began to spread, endless practices of postnatal abortion were popular as well: parents

used to get rid of the “excess” or unhealthy babies. Hunger, poisoning, supercooling, primitive smothering and other means were used for that (primitive tribes behave even simpler: some of them sacrifice their babies, especially female, others leave them alone in the camps to be eaten by the predators and neophron beasts). Such actions were and somewhere still are normative and do not arouse protest.

Again, we can gather information about infanticide not only in special ethnographic papers (see for instance [Clastres 1967, DeMause 1982, Kanevsky 1998]) but also in the classical belles-lettres, including the Russian ones. “Resurrection” by L. Tolstoy tells us in the very beginning “how this is usually made in the villages”: after a baby is baptized, mother ceases feeding him (her) and the child quickly dies of hunger [Tolstoy 1993, p.7]. A typical episode has been described in the biography of the great Russian general Alexander Suvorov (1729-1800). After his military career was over, the old general went to his ancestral estate to care about his peasants and their children as “prospective king’s soldiers”. Following the army habit, he governed the village in an original way – by means of written decrees. One of those says: “We found out that some parents did not protect their sick children from cold and fed them purposely with bad food (to accelerate their death – A.N.). The negligent fathers are to be whipped mercilessly in public and then they will teach properly their wives” [Osipov-Kuperman 1961, p.68].

In the beginning of the 20th century, the famous writer and professional physician V. Veresaev (1867 – 1945) told a story about how the peasants protested against urban doctors’ efforts to treat their sick children. He quoted a striking public saying: “Lord, give us more cattle litter and more children’s deaths” [Veresaev 1988, p.274].

By the way, as far as we know, Christian, Muslim or other clericals who actually organize PR-campaigns with philippics

against artificial interruption of pregnancy never objected to postnatal abortions in the past, nor did they protest against public executions (which still in the first half of the 19th century were the favorite entertainment of the European mob) or against war per se [Contamine 2003; Kornev 1987]. Christianity, like most other religions, has known the only peacemaking technique: reconciliation of the enemies by indicating a new common enemy; since the 5th century AD, the church repressed pacifists as dangerous heretics. Warfare was regularly “sanctified” and genocide of the unfaithful population was often declared a sacred duty of a good Christian (Muslim). Family violence was also encouraged by the official documents or by direct quotations of the sacred texts. It is not by chance that the sociologists have more than once demonstrated a positive relation between population’s religiousness and violent crimes [Gannushkin 1964].

Apart from physical violence, which is primarily discussed in this section, an individual was subject to most cruel moral and psychological violence. Regular intimidation by anticipated social and heavenly penalties is a separate topic (see [Dawkins 2008] about that). Here, I would give only one rather unexpected and almost funny example.

In the town Alcala near Madrid, my Spanish colleagues told me how negligent students had been traditionally punished in this oldest university (founded in 1499) in the 16th century. A young man who failed an exam was to leave the room through the special door marked “Exit for the donkeys”. A cap with donkey’s ears was put on his head and the guy was not allowed to get out his home without this cap on until he improved the score (sometimes he had to wait for this chance for a year). When passers-by saw a fellow with donkey’s ears on his head, they spat on him; this was called “Alcalian snow” in the intrinsically graceful Spanish language...

A typical manifestation of retrospective

aberration is that a modern Western individual as compared to his or her not remote ancestors has become exceptionally sensitive and intolerant to violence, as well as to pain, death, dirt and bad smells. Some people tend to equate intrauterine abortion with murder, and the very concept of violence has shifted essentially.

A mother who spans her playful son to prevent his dangerous activities in the street runs a risk of prosecution. A presidential candidate of the Humanist party in Chile in 2006 was wrathfully condemning the growth of political violence at the party meeting; as the most glaring example, he mentioned a newly inaugurated elite university where “not all comers are welcome”, and the listeners approvingly applauded. Even inaction does not free one from similar reproach. Thus, the American psychologist R. May [1972] wrote that his compatriot who although objecting to the war in Vietnam continued to pay taxes, also was taking part in the “dispersed violence”. Some Postmodernist philosophers are inclined to qualify any artistic text as an act of violence (see [Flier 2006] about that).

Probably, our grandfathers would doubt about their native language competence if they were said that the meaning of the word “violence” might relate to education, persuasion and suggestion, creation of the university and even nonresistance to evil.

Besides the unprecedented sensitiveness (retrospective aberration), there are also other factors that distort the estimation of historical dynamics; I will consider them below. However, we must see the unconditionally objective reason for anxiety: the development of technologies has extraordinarily elevated the *social cost of violence*.

“Knowledge-enabled destruction”

Half a century ago, many people were not sure that the humankind would see the end

of the 20th century, and those doubts were not groundless. An all-out nuclear war could destroy our planet’s civilization and the fact that political collisions of the 1960s (the Berlin, the Caribbean and the Near East crises) did not lead to a global crash was indeed a greatest success of the humanity.

Meanwhile, it was not only a nuclear war that menaced the future. In the conclusion of modern ecologists, had aggregate human activity remained as “ecologically dirty” as it was in the 1950s, life on Earth would become intolerable by the 1990s [Yefremov 2004]. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) had conclusive importance. Even those nations that rejected the Treaty (France and China) had to gradually reduce their nuclear weapons testing under the pressure of the world public opinion, and as soon as some other nations got weapons of the kind they had to follow the worldwide requirements.

In whole, the second half of the 20th century was marked by a new and almost unprecedented in political history phenomenon: international treaties and coalitions not aimed against any outside enemy. Nevertheless, the politicians managed to escape a total collapse at the price of channeling the global contradictions into a riverbed of almost continuous local wars: humans had not yet learned to live without wars at all. True, the odious word “war” was a taboo: after 1945, there has been only one official declaration of war, the “Soccer War” between Salvador and Honduras (July 1969) that lasted six days. Yet, the ideologists’ fantasy was consoling the world by inexhaustible euphemisms like “deterrence”, “pacification”, “peacemaking operation” and “enforcement to peace” or “fraternal international aid” and so on. Up to 50 million people fell victim to those local conflicts of 1945-1991 in the aggregate. Still, that period in the world politics has been designated by a cunning journalist metaphor “The Cold War”, as far as the victims were dispersed in space and time and in the context of expected billions of victims (the worst case scenario) they looked like a kind

of a “pay off with small losses”.

However, the approved mechanism of preventing a big war by means of “vapor escape” in the far regions has become counterproductive as the technologies and methods of terror continued developing. At the turn of the 21st century, the U.S. scientist and computer engineer B. Joy [2000] suggested that the epoch of weapons of mass destruction was changing into the epoch of *knowledge-enabled destruction*. The distinctions between combat and non-combat technologies are being blurred; the newest weapons are becoming cheaper and more widely available while knowledge and habits are transcending the frontiers of states, classes, confessional cultures and even education qualifications. Respectively, the newest weaponry is slipping out of control of the nation-states and their responsible governments, whose role in handling the global processes is decreasing. The activities of new kinds of informal groups are delocalizing conflicts so that each particular conflict is more than ever before fraught with global aftereffects.

The fact that the technological development increases the role of individual decisions and actions is a direct corollary of the techno-humanitarian balance pattern. Further development of nuclear mini-bombs, hackers’ tricks, nanotech, gene engineering and so on entails increasing availability of sophisticated destructive options for the aggressive groups or individuals with “brilliant” computer abilities but no political responsibility or habits to anticipate the system consequences of their own activities. It is a big question whether or not human culture would be able to continue opportunely perfecting mechanisms of outside and inside control to prevent dangerous imbalances.

The new challenges have led to a historical complication of tasks. During the whole previous history, cultures’ pivotal functions were to *structure* violence or avert its chaotic forms as much as possible. Currently, for the first time in history humankind is facing a qualitatively new

task: to *remove* physical violence from social reality. In the new conditions, most of the habitual mechanisms (like religion and ideology) are demonstrating boomerang effect [Nazaretyan 2010].

From there the central point of this article comes, which is worth reiteration: the topical problem of the modern civilization is insufficiently dynamic decrease of physical violence. Here, however, we should pay attention to the positive effects of the illusion of growing violence around us and to the role mass media play in creating this illusion.

Gresham’s Law in information processes

Apart from retrospective aberration, there is at least one more essential factor that strongly contributes to this illusion. The factor is also closely related to the qualities of our attention, perception and memory.

In the beginning of the 1960s, as TV had achieved a highest influence on mass consciousness, the American cultural scientist D. Boorstin [1961] revealed a subtle analogy between financial and information processes. The financiers are familiar with the so called Gresham Law: “Bad (i.e. cheap) money drives good money out of circulation”. For instance, if there are golden coins and paper money of the same face value in the market, assignations soon supplant the coins.

Boorstin likened TV “pseudo-events” to the paper banknotes as their fabrication is relatively cheap. Respectively, as far as pseudo-events are much more dynamic and vivid they drive the real life events out of human attention and retention. People fail to distinctly discriminate between what they have seen with their naked eye and the images formed by means of a script, a camera, actors and arrangement.

Presence effect and eyesight primacy (I’ve seen it with my own eyes!) made TV extraordinary effective in organizing the perceptual field and respectively, in

manipulating social beliefs, moods and attitudes. A psychopathologist may even call it a controlled mass confabulation, but with one specification: the process has to do with clinical signs no more than the rest of spiritual phenomena. In fact, we are observing the acceleration of a trend, which started with the first artificial sign systems and then steadily developed. Currently, we can note how even adults are regularly confusing their immediate impressions with the on-screen imitations, while similar faults sometimes indeed take a pathological form in case of the computer-addicted youngsters.

However, what mass media give preference to is also considerably conditioned by the basic qualities of human psyche that only slightly depend on cultural and historical transformations. In spite of great diversity in individual tastes and priorities, information channels within the context of free ("market") democratic relations give prior attention to the emotionally negative messages. They better respond to the event-trigger criteria; therefore, they are more willingly perceived and valued higher. Among them, we see uppermost the messages about destructions, tragedies and disasters: "If it bleeds it leads".

In the flow of emotionally negative events, priority is given to those, which are somehow related to human conflicts (or are open to such interpretation). Among them, conflicts with participation of different macro-groups (class, race, ethnical or confessional) look more "interesting"; as soon as any signs of inter-group conflict are noticed these become central in a message.

In 1996, 100 times (!) more Russians perished of immediate alcohol intoxication (an effect of cheap fake vodka) than in the Chechen war. However, as we compare the volume of newspaper pages or TV time allocated to both topics, we get a graphic illustration of "interest" priority of inter-ethnic conflict over non-deliberate human calamity, which is more massive but not enemy-centered. We may see a similar correlation if we compare

public attention given to a terrorist attack with the attention paid to traffic accidents and other spontaneous disasters, which regularly take much more human lives.

Prior attention and memorization of emotionally negative information has its deep evolutionary roots, and it has been manifested in the work of artists and historians since long ago. It is commonly known that "negative" characters are described and performed more vividly, than "positive" ones (isn't it sublimation of the repressed aggression?). The medieval annalists wrote in details about wars, cruelties and tragedies while after the years without such events they put a dash or just laconically recorded that there had been peace, or that nothing had occurred. Respectively, we mostly read about wars, catastrophes, heroes and betrayers in history textbooks while peaceful life is in the shadow.

Those who lived in the Communist countries remember the specific practices of the totalitarian mass media. Administrative and censorial control guaranteed that negative messages from inside the Socialist camp were almost totally lacking. Even natural disasters were mostly ignored. Thus we do not find any information about the terrible earthquake in Ashkhabad (1948) in the Soviet press of that time; as to the similar earthquake in Tashkent (1965), which also completely destroyed the city, the Soviet media informed about four (!) victims. A curious *culture of whimpering* was formed in the networks of informal communication under a layer of the brilliant official reports: men and women were permanently complaining about their lives, and very frequently, an innocent question: "How are you?" made pretext for lamentation.

As soon as the gateways of M. Gorbachev's "glasnost" (publicity) were opened in the late 1980s, a flow of information about defects and misfortunes gushed out on the pages and the screens, which was not just a "political design". Journalists and mass audience longing for "the truth", now relished masochistically the

messages about hopelessness of the past, present and future. The information and the interpretations that had circulated in the rumors and confidential conversations before “glasnost” poured into the media channels, and that looked breathtaking.

In the 1990s, the Russian media began to work according to near-market principles (true, with the scarcity of legal thinking, but this is a separate issue). Since then, emotionally positive items, if they are not a political order from the top, have been treated as “advertisizing” and have had difficulties in penetrating into the media without payment.

Thus, the abundance of more or less artificially designed violence in the media is in a sense a natural and self-replicating phenomenon. But how does this influence the processes “on our side” of newspaper pages, radio receivers, cinema and television screens and monitors?

Anthropological constants

Some authors attempt to prove the destructive influence of mass media by publishing impressive figures, which testify that most TV characters have to do with war or criminality and the major part of air time is occupied by violent scenes. Meanwhile, causal dependence between virtual and “out-of-the-screen” violence is not that elementary.

Indeed, we have enough evidence that cruel scenes can provoke antisocial actions of a child or a psychopathic person [Hare 1999]. Still, in order to abstain from hasty conclusions, we may use the following analogy.

Everyone is familiar with numerous examples of medical errors. We know many cases of wrong diagnoses or unsuccessful surgeries that have damaged a patient’s health. We also know how one’s health can be damaged by the traffic exhaust or by immoderate or inadequate nutrition, hypodynamia and other defects of the modern

civilization. A conclusion easily comes to mind: medicine and “social progress” on the whole are to blame for our diseases. However, as we look at the situation in a system context we find out that the totality of modern life styles (including medicine, nutrition, ecology, etc.) has increased the average longevity of humans 3-4 times during the two centuries: according to the data of historical demographers, as late as at the beginning of the 19th century it did not exceed twenty years even in Europe [Cohen 1989; Kapitsa 1999].

We can see a similar situation in the case of mass media. Provocation incidents are indisputable; however, to evaluate adequately the system correlation of provocative and the opposite “cathartic” effects, we appeal to the conception of *anthropological constants*.

The conception claims that the level of some social spirits, such as social fears, for instance, is more or less invariable in big human populations, although their forms and stimulants modify with time and with cultures [Guggenbühl 1997]. Besides, in catastrophic situations, as fears are intensified the constant is sustained thanks to the *polarization law* discovered by P. Sorokin [1963]: social and moral pathologies, apathy and panic, anger and aggression are exacerbated on the one pole while positive will, selflessness, heroism and “altruistic transformation” are actualized on the other. (It is shown in [Nazaretyan 2008] that this mechanism had far reaching consequences in the development of the late Medieval Europe).

Most probably, social violence is one of such anthropological constants, and it is “ineffably attractive for both adults and children” [Zelensky 2000, p.198]³. This responds both to the general conception of functional needs and to neuropsychology.

Electrical stimulation of certain neuron groups in the limbic system creates respective emotional experiences, fear and rage among them [Barinaga 1992]. It is also well known that long deprivation of adequate stimuli lowers the neuron’s excitability threshold

[Lorenz 1981]. This is manifested in one's behavior by the unconscious search for dangers and conflicts. Intensified searching behavior accompanied by "disinterested risks" in the conditions of guaranteed wellbeing has been also observed in the experiments with mammals [Lorenz 1981; Rotenberg, Arshavsky 1984].

In the large, a living organism must experience all the emotions programmed in its nervous system. Wild nature ensures the balance of emotions, while the artificial conditions (in which humans normally live) causes "negative" emotions deficit driving us to seemingly senseless actions aimed at provocation and actualization of deficient experiences.

The paradoxical tendency of highly organized systems to irrationally escape excessive wellbeing is designated by a general formula in complexity theory: *provocation of instabilities*. Although a system is naturally aimed at retaining of *sustainable non-equilibrium* with its environment, as soon as super-sustainability is achieved the agent tends to deviate from it and intentionally (without an immediate external necessity) provokes risky situations that sometimes menace its own existence. This basic quality is distinctly manifested in the experiments with other mammals as well.

To all appearance, it is just a functional drive for intensive emotional experiences that is conditioning the "sinister fascination" of violence and fear. From there, we can specify one of our key theses. By the historically downward trend we only mean that social violence *has been progressively evolving* (sublimating, or "ennobling") from its primary, i.e. primitive, coarse and brute forms towards the culturally modified and symbolically mediated forms⁴. As we have seen, the semantic rows and denotata of respective concepts have been evolving as well.

In order to understand better what additional options in this respect have been provided by the modern mass media, we

will turn to another social-psychological observation.

Recreation zones

This observation is derived from the historical, memoir literature, the stories of my colleagues and my personal experience. We have got multiple proofs that usually, in the midst of the turbulent war, specific peaceful territories emerge (self-organize) more or less spontaneously on which opposite fighters can meet without a risk of mutual aggression. I call such territories *recreation zones*.

At the height of the world wars in Europe there remained neutral countries, where the armed staff of military missions were not shooting at each other and even military secret service agencies tried to escape violating local laws as much as possible. We could see something similar in other regions of war. For example, in a specific commercial district Spenzar (Kabul, Afghanistan) in the late 1980s, the Soviet soldiers and the Mujahidin fighters were neutral to each other.

In 1970-80s, an amazing country Costa-Rica peacefully flourished in Central America surrounded by the civil wars in Salvador and Nicaragua. Costa-Rica did not have a regular army and had a small police contingent, whereas the law permitted all citizens to possess firearms. Some of its citizens who felt "satiated" with their calm life used to cross the frontier and fight on this or that side in the neighboring countries and then turned back to their peaceful and law-abiding life at home. In turn, guerrillas from the neighboring countries were coming to Costa-Rican territory where they had a secured respite.

I saw a vivid evidence of the recreation zone's unwritten law in Costa-Rica in April 1989, one kilometer away from the Nicaraguan frontier.

The Sandinistas (left revolutionary) who had been in war against the right-wing

regime of A. Somoza for many years were governing at that moment in Nicaragua; now, the Somozian soldiers were waging guerrilla war against the left government. The episode I refer to took place in the deserted mountains. A group of four men who sympathized with left (three Costa-Ricans and one foreigner) were travelling in a car and met a larger group of fifteen right-wing guerrilla fighters (dressed as peaceful peasants). The car stopped, the travelers got out of it and the foreigner addressing his companions started to say loudly provoking words about the Nicaraguan “contras”. I expected that the guerrillas would get involved in the conflict (after which the offender and his friends would most probably escape with their car). However, I was rather surprised to see the professional fighters who were near their frontier and had four-fold superiority in number moving away from the place of probable conflict on the neutral territory.

The formation and sustainment of recreation zones is a classical synergetic (complexity theory) effect of “order out of chaos” [Prigogine, Stengers 1984]: the island of peaceful order crystallizes out of the chaotic ocean of violence by using its energy for self-organization process. This effect is very important for our issue to reveal the relationship between the “beyond-the-screen” and “in-front-of-the-screen” worlds.

An armed conflict with several dozens of victims now quickly becomes a subject of attention and anxiety for millions of people. A boy beaten by his parents or a woman killed by a maniac, a street fight and other events of the kind are multiply replicated in press, radio and TV in addition to the war and criminal series. In correspondence with the “Gresham Law in information”, the unfortunate cruelty on air is experienced as empirically perceived reality, which helps to satisfy the functional demand for “negative” emotions. Accumulated fatigue of cruelty creates the desire to hide from it in the recreation zone of real life, in the middle of virtu-

ally raging war. Thus, screens and monitors are absorbing a good deal of violence from the “in-front-of-the-screen” social relations and mitigating the manifestation of all kinds of social contradictions – from family to political ones.

This ought not to be interpreted as an appeal to connivance as far as the effects of screen violence are ambivalent. However, a moderate social control is to be aimed not at elimination but at optimization of both volume and forms of virtual cruelty representation. By the way, we can judge the correlation of violence volumes “on that side” and “on this side” of the screens from the situation in the regions with traditionally religious lifestyle. The sterility of mass media is severely supervised in such regions and sex is prohibited; as to the cruel scenes, one can watch by TV mostly the execution of the criminals. Meanwhile, like in the “old good times”, the gapers can contemplate public executions in the streets; landowners “educate” their farm laborers by lash and in the same manner husbands treat their wives and parents treat their children. Ethnical and confessional contradictions regularly turn out to become bloody tragedies in those regions. Although examples of the kind cannot directly prove our thesis, they look rather didactic.

I see a much stronger argument in the fact that the inverse feedback between virtual and physical violence can be traced back in the historical development.

Evolution... and a bit of fantasy

The independence of dynamic mental processes from the immediate stimuli has been progressively growing in the course of biological evolution and respectively, the specific weight of the individual images in behavior determination has been increasing. With the development of artificial world of culture this global trend has been accelerating and modern mass media now represent its logical extension.

Among the basic functions of the

mammals' games are deexcitation and regulation of intra-species contacts [Lorenz 1981]. We also know that all of human cultures have always exploited games and other compensatory activities to sublimate aggression. Art, sports and other rituals, which were sometimes amazingly cruel, served for this. Identification and empathy triggered the mechanism of psychological stress relieve, which was called *catharsis* by Aristotle. However, eventually the emotions caused by simulated conflicts became boring, the feelings lost their spontaneity and zest so that individuals and masses unconsciously experienced stronger and stronger thirst for the "not-for-fan" passions.

The new information technologies have essentially perfected and amplified this ancient mechanism of culture and thus stimulated the next leap into the "virtualization" of violence. How can we imagine further course of events?

In the end, the elimination of fatal violence from social reality presupposes a radical reconstruction of political worldviews: this is possible if the intelligence outgrows the infantile religious and ideological attitudes, rejects the macro-group identities ("them vs. us") and builds the world community according to the "network" principle [Nazaretyan 2010]. This prospect can be, in particular, provided by evolutionary transformations of the very agent. Inevitably increasing portion of artificial elements in human organisms and minds, on the one hand, and growing complexity of the artificial information systems, on the other, may entail the formation of symbiotic "human-machine" intelligence, which overcomes the inherent shortcomings of human thinking.

Yet, anyway, humans so as they are remain the leading agent of civilization in the near future. Having recognized violence as an anthropological constant, we must assume that perfecting the mechanisms of its further "virtualization" is an integral component in the scenario of survival.

We may imagine, for example, programs

for poly-sensorial immersion into the virtual reality of active war that anyone can intentionally enter but cannot then get out until the plot is completed. The evolution of the plot may essentially depend on the actors' individual and collective qualities, their will, courage and ingenuity; I may even assume that political processes would be influenced by the results of the virtual combats. In this case, however, each participant is authentically experiencing the entire complex of associated emotions: fury, fear, pain and thirst for vengeance, the grief of losses, the bitterness of defeats, desperation, the happiness of self-sacrifice, and occasionally – the enthusiasm of victory. After all, as one returns emotionally fatigued from the virtual nightmare back to the extra-computer reality, he/she feels pacified and happy with physical and psychological comfort of the "recreation zone".

I am far from being enthusiastic about this futurological fantasy. My own feelings perhaps resemble those of a savage who first in his life came to a modern megapolis (we know ethnographers' descriptions of such episodes). Anyway, the perspective of further drift of human existence towards denaturalization and virtual reality continues the evolutionary mega-trend that is the "digression from the natural condition", and I cannot find a more reliable scenario. I am sure, our sense of humor should be always switched on as we are thinking about the future; otherwise, the only other option left is sobbing.

Endnotes

¹ A much more particular fact has been demonstrated by the Russian sociologist A. Burovsky [2009]. Trying to verify the declarations about grown aggressiveness among the youth, he interviewed respondents of different ages in St. Petersburg. The survey shows that both male and female youngsters have considerably less been

subject to corporal punishment in their families and have less participated in street fights than their fathers.

² This calculation was made by V. Litvinenko using the chronology in [Handbook... 2008].

³ I think that not aggression [Markov 1997] but just violence remains constant: as was mentioned above, the growth of population density ought to progressively elevate the common level of aggressiveness.

⁴ A similar trend in the individual development has been shown by both psychologists [Piaget 1997] and ethnographers [Munroe et al. 2000]: in any culture, the number of physical conflicts decreases as children are growing up.

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Memoria e impacto de la crisis de 2001 en las biografías individuales: Argentina en el cambio de siglo

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Resumen: *El artículo que presentamos tiene como objetivo indagar en la vinculación entre las memorias históricas, nacionales y generacionales y las memorias autobiográficas a partir del análisis del impacto que la crisis económica, social, política e institucional que estalló en la Argentina en 2001 tuvo sobre las vidas individuales. La perspectiva teórica que fundamenta nuestro trabajo es el enfoque del Curso de la Vida, enfoque que posibilita el establecimiento de vinculaciones entre el nivel del contexto socio-histórico y el de las trayectorias individuales. Los interrogantes que intentaremos responder son: ¿En qué medida la crisis del 2001 forma parte de la memoria de los argentinos? ¿O se trata, más bien, de un impacto percibido diferencialmente por las distintas generaciones? ¿Cómo perciben y evalúan los individuos, ya sea la crisis en sí o el impacto que ha tenido en sus vidas? ¿De qué manera se articula el impacto contextual con las trayectorias personales? ¿Fue la crisis un “un punto de inflexión” en las vidas de los argentinos? Nos basamos en los resultados de una investigación internacional, el estudio CEVI – Cambios y Eventos en el Cursos de la Vida-, cuyo trabajo de campo en Argentina se realizó en el año 2004.*

Palabras Clave: *crisis, memorias, curso de la vida, puntos de inflexión.*

Introducción

En este artículo nos referiremos, principalmente, al impacto que la crisis económica, social, política e institucional

que estalló en la Argentina en 2001 tuvo sobre las vidas individuales desde la perspectiva del paradigma del Curso de la Vida.

Nuestra atención se focalizará en la articulación entre las memorias históricas, nacionales y generacionales y las memorias autobiográficas. Con ese propósito, indagaremos sobre la percepción que los ciudadanos argentinos tienen acerca de la crisis y de la evaluación que realizan de sus efectos. Así mismo, analizaremos similitudes y diferencias en el curso de la vida respecto de ambos aspectos y estableceremos vinculaciones entre el nivel del contexto socio-histórico y el de las trayectorias individuales.

El interés en el estudio del impacto en las vidas individuales de un hecho socio-histórico significativo en la historia reciente de nuestro país, tal como lo fue la “crisis de 2001”, nos llevó a plantearnos los siguientes interrogantes: ¿En qué medida la crisis del 2001 forma parte de la memoria de los argentinos? ¿Se trata, más bien, de un impacto percibido diferencialmente por las distintas generaciones? ¿Cómo perciben y evalúan los individuos, ya sea la crisis en sí o el impacto que ha tenido en sus vidas? ¿De qué manera se articula el impacto contextual con las trayectorias personales? ¿Fue la crisis un “un punto de inflexión” en las vidas de los argentinos?

Las respuestas a estas preguntas se basaron en los resultados de una investigación internacional, el estudio CEVI – Cambios y Eventos en el Cursos de la Vida¹, cuyo trabajo de campo en Argentina se realizó en el año 2004. El instrumento fue un cuestionario semi-estructurado que se aplicó a una muestra de varones y mujeres pertenecientes a cinco grupos de edad quinquenales.

La perspectiva del curso de la vida

La perspectiva del curso de la vida comenzó a desarrollarse en las décadas del 60 y del 70. Pero, a partir de los 80, resultado tanto del proceso de envejecimiento generacional como de la demanda creciente de estudios comparativos a nivel internacional en el marco de la globalización, se aceleró su

aceptación.

El curso de la vida es un enfoque que estudia interdisciplinariamente el desarrollo de la vida humana, estableciendo puentes conceptuales entre: a) los procesos evolutivos biológicos y psicológicos, b) el curso de la vida como institución social, en la doble perspectiva de las regulaciones sociales y culturales y de su construcción individual y c) el contexto socio-histórico y los cambios ocurridos. Puede definirse conceptualmente como “el estudio interdisciplinario del transcurrir de la vida humana (ontogénesis humana)” (Elder, 1998) y, operativamente, como “una secuencia de eventos y roles sociales, graduados por la edad, que están incrustados en la estructura social y el cambio histórico.” (Elder, 2001, en Blanco, 2003)

El objeto de estudio del enfoque del curso de la vida es una vida individual o su trayectoria. El propósito es describir y explicar el proceso social en el cual se construyen los cursos de la vida individuales en relación con otros cursos de la vida. En el macro-nivel, el tema central es reconstruir cómo se produce el interjuego entre cambios sociales y edad, a través de cohortes sucesivas.

El desarrollo del curso de la vida implica cambios y eventos que se producen en las diferentes esferas de la vida, modelando una suerte de patrón o modelo. Los eventos pueden constituirse en puntos de inflexión o pueden significar una transición normativa de un rol a otro. Es decir que las transiciones aparecen como puntos de inflexión o como experiencias clave; son parte de las trayectorias y les otorgan un sentido (Hareven, 1996). Las transiciones pueden estar de acuerdo con las normas o pueden suceder de manera impredecible. En el primer caso, se habla de transiciones normativas, esperadas a una cierta edad en un determinado tiempo y espacio (por ejemplo, de la escolarización primaria a la secundaria, de la esfera educacional a la del trabajo, el casamiento y el retiro). Son períodos de cambio y crecimiento, en

los que las concepciones del sí mismo y de la propia vida se transforman. Algunas transiciones devienen puntos de inflexión y pueden redireccionar el curso de la vida y fortalecer la identidad. Sin embargo, no se espera que ciertos roles sigan a otros en un orden fijo.

La modernización significó la institucionalización del curso de la vida. Mientras las trayectorias sufrieron un proceso de individuación, las definiciones de las transiciones y las etapas etarias se volvieron más unificadas. La totalidad del curso de la vida se volvió homogéneo, comprendiendo cuatro fases: infancia, escolarización, vida laboral y retiro (Antikainen & Komonen, 2003).

Por el contrario, en las sociedades actuales, caracterizadas por la heterogeneidad y la fragmentación, los modelos instituidos de trayectorias y transiciones se han flexibilizado. Los patrones se guían por un *timing* verdaderamente errático.

La estructura teórica del curso de vida abarca la interdependencia temporal de la trayectoria individual analizada con los diferentes colectivos interactuantes y, finalmente, la interdependencia de todos éstos con las instituciones y con los procesos más extensos de cambio social (Oddone y Gastrón, 2008).

Muchos estudios en el campo del curso de la vida incluyen una cuestión retrospectiva sobre los grandes cambios de rumbo o puntos de inflexión en las biografías individuales (Clausen, 1993; Fiske et Chiriboga, 1990; Hareven et Masaoka, 1988). Los resultados obtenidos han puesto en evidencia una cierta ambigüedad en los conceptos utilizados.

En efecto, para algunos, los “grandes puntos de inflexión y cambios en la vida” incluyen los cambios normativos o aquellos que tienen mayor probabilidad de ocurrir a lo largo de la vida (casamiento y, para la mujer, la viudez; la llegada del primer hijo o la partida del hogar, la inserción en el mercado laboral o la jubilación, etc.). En estos casos, la persona ubica las grandes transiciones de una trayectoria conforme a

un modelo general del curso de la vida.

En otras situaciones, las personas mencionan las rupturas, las discontinuidades, es decir, las bifurcaciones notadas en sus trayectorias. Estas bifurcaciones pueden ser el resultado de hechos sociales (crisis económica y pérdida del empleo, guerra y movilización, etc.) y, por tanto, reenviar a la historia, o de eventos idiosincráticos (un accidente que provocó alguna discapacidad, una crisis existencial, etc.).

Esta ambivalencia semántica es útil para la investigación. En efecto, permite examinar en qué medida una persona define su trayectoria más bien en términos de continuidad o más bien en términos de ruptura, y en qué medida la discontinuidad está explícitamente vinculada con el contexto socio-histórico.

Por otra parte, la comprensión de las trayectorias y transiciones individuales desde el enfoque del curso de la vida implica entenderlas como una cadena de eventos personales y sociales, como un fenómeno temporal e histórico, como un proceso en el que las tendencias de una época repercuten en generaciones particulares y se entrecruzan con las decisiones individuales y con las influencias de las estructuras económicas y las instituciones sociales.

En un texto clásico de la teoría sociológica, Karl Mannheim (1928) planteaba que aquellos individuos pertenecientes a diferentes generaciones que compartieron el mismo mundo en un momento histórico determinado, si bien debían considerarse contemporáneos, no lo eran en el nivel efectivo de lo vivido. Según esta perspectiva, los miembros de una sociedad dada tendrían horizontes temporales diferentes según su pertenencia a una u otra generación y compartirían, con sus pares generacionales, una suerte de “melodía” común.

Ahora bien, aunque la posibilidad de que se constituyan “generaciones históricas” está relacionada con los procesos de la memoria colectiva, nacional y/o generacional; también se diferencia de ellos.

La memoria histórica es la memoria trasmisita de acontecimientos no vividos por el individuo. La memoria autobiográfica, por su parte, es la memoria “de los eventos que se experimentaron personalmente en el pasado, surgiendo de lo vivido por las personas en el marco de su contexto social.” (Aguilar, 1996: 11) Los sujetos recuerdan sólo en tanto pertenecen a un grupo social y viven en un contexto específico; la memoria reconstruye el pasado desde el presente, desde un presente específico. (Aguilar, 1996)

La noción de memoria colectiva, introducida por Hallwachs en 1925 y reformulada en 1950, hace referencia al conjunto de recuerdos más importantes compartidos por un grupo y a la transmisión entre generaciones del conocimiento de los eventos o cambios que modificaron la sociedad de manera importante. La memoria colectiva es constructiva y no reproductiva, lo que significa que no es estable sino que es una recreación del pasado que se realiza desde las necesidades del presente. Está asociada a las experiencias vividas durante los años de formación de la identidad de una cohorte o generación. De esta manera, cada generación recuerda como importantes diferentes eventos o cambios (Oddone y Lynch, 2008). Un “efecto cohorte” o de generación que se manifiesta, bien sobre el tipo de eventos que la gente recuerda, bien sobre la visión de conjunto de la historia (Deschamps, 2001).

Una “generación” emerge cuando los eventos ocurren de manera tal que demarcan a una cohorte en términos de conciencia “socio-histórica”. El concepto “generación” se define, entonces, como una creación social. “Cohorte”, por su parte, significa el agregado de individuos que experimenta los mismos eventos durante el mismo intervalo de tiempo (Schuman y Scout, 2004). Por lo tanto, una generación puede surgir a partir del contexto y de los acontecimientos sociohistóricos que le corresponde vivir a una determinada cohorte.

En síntesis, las diferencias en el año de nacimiento colocan a los individuos en

distintos mundos históricos, con específicas restricciones y opciones, sobre todo en sociedades tan cambiantes como las actuales. Los cursos de vida individuales suelen reflejar esos tiempos (Elder, 1994). El ritmo de la historia puede producir “situaciones generacionales” propicias a la formación de conjuntos o lazos generacionales. Un conjunto generacional es portador de una memoria histórica que se forma desde la adolescencia, momento en que el ser humano se abre al mundo que lo rodea y toma conciencia de sus eventos. Esta experiencia del mundo se cristaliza en la memoria y es así como un grupo de edad se transforma en un conjunto generacional o una generación histórica (para diferenciarlo de la generación biológica o genealógica) (Cavalli, 2006). El principio de conformación de una generación histórica es la memorización compartida de episodios históricos y del sentido que llevan asociados. Así, la manera en que la gente piensa sobre el mundo que lo rodea depende tanto de lo que estaba pasando en el mundo en el momento en que estaba creciendo como de lo que está pasando en el presente (Mortimer and Shanahan, 2004).

Diversos estudios actuales sobre los eventos y los cambios históricos (Deschamps, Paez et Pennebaker, 2001; Pennebaker, Paez et Rimé, 1997; Schuman et Scott, 1989; Scott et Zac, 1993) han mostrado que los hechos mencionados como más significativos son aquellos que ocurrieron durante la transición del individuo a la vida adulta, confirmando la temprana intuición de Mannheim sobre la apertura al mundo y a la historia en la adolescencia, proceso que constituye a la memoria como principio diferenciador de las generaciones. El hecho de que un determinado grupo otorgue mayor importancia a un hecho histórico que a otro, también dependerá de las necesidades y motivaciones presentes de dicho grupo (Pennebaker, 1993: 49).

Ahora bien, la definición de los eventos históricos importantes parece ser un proceso psicosocial, en el que intervienen tanto las memorias autobiográficas como colectivas

y en el que colaboran las familias, las instituciones, los gobiernos, los medios de comunicación y las prácticas culturales (Pennebaker, 1993).

El pasado deja huellas que deben ser evocadas y ubicadas en un marco que les de sentido para convertirse en memoria. Las memorias son simultáneamente individuales y sociales porque están mediatisadas por los discursos culturales, que siempre son colectivos.

“Sin embargo, no se puede esperar una relación lineal o directa entre lo individual y colectivo. Las inscripciones subjetivas de las experiencias no son nunca reflejos especulares de los acontecimientos públicos, por lo que no podemos esperar encontrar una ‘integración’ o ‘ajuste’ entre memoria individual y memoria públicas, o la presencia de una memoria única” (Jelin, 2001).

Aspectos metodológicos

Este artículo presenta resultados parciales del estudio CEVI – *Cambios y eventos en el curso de la vida*. Específicamente, nos ocuparemos de la percepción de los entrevistados argentinos acerca de la crisis económica, política e institucional que estalló en 2001, de la evaluación de los efectos mencionados y de su articulación con la conformación nacional y/o generacional de la memoria histórica. Haremos referencia, así mismo, a la vinculación de estos hechos con las biografías individuales.

El trabajo de campo en la Argentina se realizó durante el año 2004 en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires y en localidades de provincia de Buenos Aires. La muestra, de tipo intencional, se estratificó en cinco grupos de edad quinquenales, abarcando el total de la vida adulta: 20-24, 35-39, 50-54, 65-69 y 75-84. Este recorte, que responde a una aproximación cronológica de posiciones típicas en el recorrido de vida, circunscribe, al mismo tiempo, cinco cohortes distintas, nacidas entre 1920-1924, 1935-1939, 1950-1954, 1965-1969 y 1980-1984. Quedó constituida por 572 casos.

Los resultados que presentamos en primer término surgen del análisis de la respuesta brindada por nuestros entrevistados a la pregunta: “*Consideremos ahora los grandes eventos y cambios que se produjeron en su país y en el mundo en el curso de su vida. ¿Cuáles son los que más le impactaron?*”. El individuo encuestado debía describir cada evento (cuatro como máximo), situarlo en el tiempo y el espacio, indicar la edad que tenía al momento de ocurrir el hecho evocado y, finalmente, dar las razones por las cuales esos eventos habían sido significativos.

Operacionalmente, entenderemos por “memoria histórica” la codificación selectiva de episodios socio-históricos. Hablaremos de “memoria colectiva” cuando una fracción calificada de las personas se refiere a los mismos acontecimientos. Esta memoria colectiva será “generacional” cuando una fracción calificada de los miembros de una cohorte dada comparta la referencia a uno o varios episodios y se separe así de las otras cohortes. La memoria será “nacional” cuando una fracción calificada de los miembros de cada cohorte existente al momento de ocurrencia de un episodio histórico, lo menciona (Oddone y Lynch, 2008). Siguiendo a Lalíve D’Epinay y colaboradores (2008, 2009) hablaremos de fracción calificada cuando la mitad aproximadamente de las personas del conjunto considerado mencione un mismo cambio.

Expondremos, a continuación, algunas características de la “memoria histórica” de los argentinos y de las “memorias colectivas generacionales”.² Luego, analizaremos en profundidad el impacto diferencial de la crisis que estalló en 2001 en la Argentina en las cohortes seleccionadas, la percepción, evaluación y reconocimiento que de ella hacen los diferentes grupos y su interpretación en términos de “puntos de inflexión” en las biografías individuales. Sin embargo, antes, será necesario relatar el proceso que hemos denominado “crisis de 2001”, proceso que involucra una serie de sucesos que se extendieron entre 1999 y

2004.

La crisis del 2001

La sociedad argentina atravesó reiteradas crisis a lo largo de su historia, todas ellas resultado de la combinación de la fragilidad de los equilibrios políticos y de los vaivenes de la economía. Sin embargo, ninguna de ellas puede compararse con la que estalló en los comienzos del siglo XXI debido a que fueron de diferente naturaleza.

En efecto, las crisis características de la segunda mitad del siglo XX aparecían luego de períodos en los que se había estimulado el crecimiento económico por medio de la emisión de dinero. El resultado era un proceso inflacionario acompañado por un déficit de la balanza de pagos, cuya resolución implicaba un ajuste o devaluación que derivaba, a su vez, en una recesión. En cambio, la crisis de 2001 estalló tras varios años de recesión, con deflación de precios. Veamos, a grandes rasgos, cómo fue el proceso.

Entre los rasgos principales del escenario internacional de los años 90 pueden mencionarse: la caída del muro de Berlín y del bloque soviético y sus consecuencias políticas e ideológicas y un proceso de globalización financiera, impulsado por cambios tecnológicos y por la expansión de los mercados especulativos.

La ideología neoliberal o neoconsevadora que se consolidó a partir de la caída del muro –cuyo fundamento es la teoría que sostiene que los estados no deben intervenir en la economía, en tanto es el libre juego de las fuerzas del mercado el mejor asignador de la riqueza, los recursos productivos y el trabajo – promovió el conjunto de principios y reglas propuestos en el llamado “Consenso de Washington”. Sus recomendaciones (convertidas en imposiciones en el ámbito de los organismos multilaterales de crédito, FMI, BID, BM, etc.) se organizaban alrededor de los siguientes postulados: control del gasto público, disciplina fiscal, liberalización del comercio y del sistema financiero, fomento de la inversión extranjera, privatización

de las empresas públicas, desregulación y reforma del Estado.

En ese contexto, el conjunto de reformas económicas y monetarias (entre las que se destaca el establecimiento de la convertibilidad en 1991 con un tipo de cambio fijo: un dólar igual un peso) implementadas por el gobierno nacional presidido por Carlos Menem (1989-1999) dio lugar a un proceso de crecimiento basado, fundamentalmente, en el endeudamiento externo. Dado que en los países desarrollados había sobreabundancia de capitales, éstos se dirigieron a países como Argentina, eran considerados “economías emergentes”.

Así fue como la deuda pública, que era de alrededor de 60 mil millones de pesos al inicio de la década, subió a unos 90 mil millones en 1994 y a unos 120 mil millones a fines de 1999, cuando concluyó su período el presidente Menem. Las debilidades del modelo se hicieron evidentes cuando finalizó el proceso de privatizaciones que, junto con lavanta de empresas privadas nacionales, representó una pérdida del patrimonio nacional y una consecuente extranjerización sin precedentes de la economía argentina.

Las tasas de crecimiento relativamente altas de comienzos de la década del 90 resultaron ser muy frágiles, tanto por su impacto social parcializado y desigual como por su insostenibilidad. En efecto, al mismo tiempo que la economía crecía, aumentaban la exclusión, la marginalidad, la pobreza y el desempleo como resultado tanto de la nueva matriz productiva como de la desarticulación definitiva del Estado del Bienestar (iniciada por la dictadura militar, 1976-1982).

Hacia mediados de la década, la economía comenzó a desacelerarse a raíz de problemas internos y externos. Las crisis internacionales de México, Brasil, Rusia y del Sudeste asiático agravaron la situación debido a la baja de los precios de las exportaciones y al cambio de la tendencia mundial respecto del flujo de capitales hacia los países emergentes.

Así, a fines de 1998 comenzó una larga

recesión que presentaba características novedosas para la sociedad argentina. La nueva administración, que asumió en 1999, intentó ganar confianza en los mercados internacionales para obtener tasas de interés más bajas. Con ese fin, y siguiendo los lineamientos impuestos por el FMI (Fondo Monetario Internacional), tomó un conjunto de medidas cuyo resultado fue una acentuación de la recesión que se tradujo en menor actividad y menor recaudación.

En 2001, y tras una serie de intentos fracasados para sostener la situación fiscal, se cerraron todas las posibilidades de obtención de créditos internacionales y la crisis se hizo imposible de detener.

Durante todo ese año, se registraron vastos movimientos de protesta, encabezados por las organizaciones de desocupados y acompañados por trabajadores privados y estatales y docentes y, posteriormente, por productores agropecuarios, comerciantes y pequeños industriales, asambleas barriales, grupos de ahorristas, etc.

La protesta social devino general, manifestándose en los ámbitos económicos, políticos y culturales, dando origen, así mismo, a una suerte de reivindicación de la soberanía nacional frente a la subordinación del gobierno nacional a las imposiciones de los organismos internacionales.

En diciembre, se produjo un movimiento de extracción de depósitos por parte de los ahorristas, que se detuvo impidiendo los retiros en efectivo (*corralito*), lo que provocó un recrudecimiento de las protestas y manifestaciones en las calles (*cacerolazos*). Finalmente, se arribó a una explosión social, el 19 y 20 de diciembre de 2001, que produjo por primera vez la caída de un gobierno, el de la Alianza, sin que hubiera habido intervención militar alguna. El presidente de la Rúa – sucesor de Menem – abandonó la casa de gobierno en medio de violentos enfrentamientos entre los manifestantes y la policía que dejaron un saldo de 30 muertos.

Durante los meses que siguieron a la renuncia de la Rúa se sucedieron varios gobiernos interinos,³ hasta que fue designado

como presidente provvisorio el Dr. Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003) quien inició su gestión con una ley de emergencia económica. Se decidió abandonar la convertibilidad con nuevos y disímiles tipos de cambio, a los que se convertirían los créditos y depósitos en los bancos y todas las obligaciones públicas y privadas. Como consecuencia de esta devaluación, los precios subieron y cayeron los salarios reales, lo que permitió una baja del gasto público. Al mismo tiempo, el déficit externo disminuyó porque no se pagaron las deudas.

Los organismos internacionales, con la anuencia del gobierno de los Estados Unidos, retiraron cualquier tipo de apoyo al gobierno nacional, ya que interpretaron que, contrariamente a lo acontecido anteriormente (en México, sobre todo), el de Argentina no había sido un caso de crisis del sistema financiero internacional, sino un ejemplo de comportamientos irresponsables.

En 2003, y sin que se hubiera superado la crisis, se realizaron elecciones generales, resultando elegido como presidente el Dr. Néstor Kirchner. La situación social y política comenzó a tranquilizarse lentamente, mediante la creación de una multiplicidad de planes de asistencia social destinados a paliar la difícil situación de más de la mitad de la población que, como resultado de los procesos hasta aquí descriptos, se encontraban sumergidos en la pobreza y en la indigencia. Sin tomar en cuenta las variaciones de la deuda, el gobierno logró un superávit de caja y se estabilizó el cambio. Se inició así un nuevo ciclo económico en el país, cuyos primeros síntomas favorables comenzaron a evidenciarse en 2005.

La memoria histórica de la crisis del 2001

Con el fin de describir la “memoria colectiva” de los sucesos relatados en el apartado anterior y a los que denominamos genéricamente “crisis del 2001” tomamos como universo el total de eventos mencionados (1469) por los 572 entrevistados que constituyeron la

muestra.

La cantidad de personas de cada cohorte que mencionó determinados acontecimientos socio-históricos, nos habla de la “memoria

nacional” de los argentinos y nos brinda interesantes indicios acerca de la posibilidad de identificar la existencia de “memorias generacionales”⁴ (Cuadro N° 1).

20-24	35-39	50-54	65-69	75-84
Crisis 2001 84 %	Gobierno Alfonsín 51 %	Proc. Reorg. Nac. 53 %	1º y 2º Gob. Perón 42 %	1º y 2º Gob. Perón 40 %
Atentados Torres 31 %	Crisis 2001 50 %	Malvinas 44 %	Proc. Reorg. Nac 40 %	Proc. Reorg. Nac.40 %
Atentados Amia 20 %	Malvinas 41 %	Gobierno Alfonsín 38 %	Gobierno Alfonsín 27 %	Malvinas 35 %
Gobierno Menem 15 %	Proc. Reorg. Nac 24 %	Crisis 2001 29 %	Malvinas 26 %	Crisis 2001 22 %
Guerra Irak 14 %	Gobierno Menem 20 %	3º Gob. Perón 16 %	Crisis 2001 24 %	Gobierno Alfonsín 13 %

Fuente: Elaboración propia

Cuadro N° 1: Personas que citan hechos socio-históricos según grupo de edad (%) [Las cifras presentadas son el resultado de calcular el porcentaje entre la cantidad de menciones que un determinado hecho posee en una determinada cohorte y el total de personas entrevistadas pertenecientes a esa misma cohorte]

El análisis de los datos obtenidos indica que los hechos más mencionados por la cohorte nacida entre los años 1980-84 son los relacionados con la crisis⁵ que estamos considerando. En efecto, el 84% hizo referencia a acontecimientos y/o procesos vinculados con la recesión económica o con la crisis social, política e institucional acontecida en ese momento histórico.

En segundo lugar, esta cohorte parece haber sido fuertemente impactada por los atentados a las Torres Gemelas en EEUU y los eventos relacionados con ellos, como la guerra de Irak. El 42% de las personas que tenían entre 20 y 24 años mencionaron uno de estos dos hechos. Otros atentados sangrientos, los perpetrados en Buenos Aires en 1992 contra la Embajada de Israel y en 1994 contra la AMIA (Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina)⁶, se encuentran, asimismo, entre los hechos más mencionados. Es decir que esta generación entró en la vida

adulta descubriendo la historia a partir de dos grandes catástrofes sociopolíticas, una internacional y otra nacional, ligadas a los efectos de la globalización.

Los miembros de las otras cuatro cohortes mencionaron como significativos aquellos eventos socio-históricos relacionados con la “dictadura militar” vigente en el país entre los años 1976 y 1983 y con la Guerra de Malvinas.⁷ Las detenciones y desapariciones de personas, el miedo omnipresente en la vida cotidiana y la muerte de jóvenes en la guerra fueron los hechos más recordados por los entrevistados. El 65% del grupo que transita los treinta años, el 97% de quienes tienen alrededor de cincuenta, el 66% de los de sesenta años y el 75% de los de ochenta mencionaron la dictadura, la Guerra de Malvinas o ambas.

Otro acontecimiento recordado, con una tendencia descendente a medida que aumenta la edad, por estas cuatro cohortes fue el

gobierno de Alfonsín (1983-1989), tanto en sus aspectos políticos (recuperación de la democracia) evaluado positivamente, como en los económicos (crisis, hiperinflación, etc.) considerados, predominantemente, de manera negativa.

Asimismo, todas las cohortes fueron marcadas, en mayor o menor medida, por la crisis del 2001: el 50% del grupo de 35 a 39 años, el 29% del segundo, el 24% del tercero y el 22% del grupo de entre 75 y 84, así lo indican.

Pero, como puede observarse en el Cuadro N° 1, además de la importancia otorgada por cada cohorte a la dictadura, a la guerra y al gobierno de Alfonsín, existen otros eventos que fueron recordados en mayor o menor medida, en función de sus propias experiencias históricas, por los distintos grupos de edad.

En conclusión, es posible observar la presencia de una “memoria colectiva nacional” identificable en los cuatro grupos de mayor edad, producto de los hechos relacionados con la dictadura militar (1976-1983) y con la Guerra de Malvinas (1982).⁸ Esta memoria nacional se complejiza por las reminiscencias de acontecimientos propios de cada grupo y por el peso dado a aquellos por todos mencionados.

Es el caso de la “crisis de 2001”, con la particularidad de que es el único cambio socio-histórico que atraviesa a todos los grupos de edad; siendo mencionado por el 84% de los más jóvenes y descendiendo hasta el 22% entre los mayores.

Es decir que pueden identificarse especificidades en el peso relativo que los eventos socio-históricos compartidos por todos adquieren al interior de cada cohorte, lo que estaría indicando la presencia de una “memoria colectiva generacional” yuxtapuesta con una “memoria colectiva nacional”.

Percepción y evaluación de la crisis en el curso de la vida

Nos interesa en este punto elucidar algunas cuestiones relacionadas con la interpretación que los entrevistados dieron a la crisis de 2001.⁹

El análisis de las razones que los individuos que mencionaron este evento evocan, indica que el tipo de impacto¹⁰ preponderante en los cuatro grupos más jóvenes es el individual; mientras que el grupo de mayor edad esgrime razones predominantemente de tipo colectivo (Cuadro N° 2).

	20-24	35-39	50-54	65-69	75-84
Colectivo	39	45	45	36	60
Individual	59	52	55	64	40
Ambos	2	3	0	0	0
Total	100 (107)	100 (60)	100 (33)	100 (25)	100 (20)

Fuente: Elaboración propia

Cuadro N° 2: *Tipo de impacto de la crisis del 2001 según grupo de edad (%)*

Sin embargo, existen diferencias importantes al interior de los distintos grupos de edad. Los grupos que se sintieron más afectados en términos personales fueron, en primer lugar, el de entre 65 y 69 años (casi los dos tercios del total); seguido por los más jóvenes (59 %).

Respuestas típicas clasificadas como

individuales fueron: “perdí mi negocio”, “me quedaron los ahorros en el banco”, “tuve miedo por mis hijos”, entre otras. Con razones colectivas designamos a aquellas tales como: “el hambre y la pobreza que afectó a la sociedad”, “la violencia desenfrenada” etc.

Respecto de la naturaleza de los efectos

de la crisis, aunque en menor medida que en el caso anterior, también se evidencian diferencias entre las distintas cohortes. Mientras que alrededor de los 2/3 de los entrevistados de menor edad, de los que

tenían entre 50-54 y de los mayores indican que sus consecuencias fueron concretas (pérdida del trabajo, de los ahorros, muertes), la cifra crece a más de 3/4 en los dos restantes grupos (Cuadro N° 3).

	20-24	35-39	50-54	65-69	75-84
Concreto	62	80	64	76	60
Simbólico	38	20	36	24	40
Total	100 (107)	100 (60)	100 (33)	100 (25)	100 (20)

Fuente: Elaboración propia

Cuadro N° 3: Naturaleza del impacto de la crisis del 2001 según grupo de edad (%)

Por supuesto, el comportamiento es inverso cuando observamos las evaluaciones que remiten a consecuencias simbólicas (pérdida de legitimidad política, pérdida de confianza en la democracia, aumento de la conciencia

cívica, reconocimiento de la necesidad de participación en los procesos de cambio).

Observemos, ahora, la distribución de las razones brindadas según la dimensión a la que hace referencia (Cuadro N° 4).

	20-24	35-39	50-54	65-69	75-84
Socio-económico (*)	36	53	49	60	20
Político-institucional (**)	14	12	6	4	25
Político-ideológico (***)	26	10	18	8	20
Psicológico (****)	24	25	27	28	35
Total	100 (107)	100 (59)	100 (33)	100 (25)	100 (20)

Fuente: Elaboración propia

Cuadro N° 4: Ámbito afectado por la crisis del 2001 según grupo de edad (%)

(*) (políticas económicas, corralito, desocupación)

(**) (gobernabilidad democrática, corrupción, renuncia del presidente)

(***) (participación ciudadana, lucha por los derechos, protestas)

(****) (muerte/ temor/ inseguridad)

La mitad o más de la mitad de las razones mencionadas por los tres grupos de edad intermedios se relacionan con la esfera socio-económica. Mientras, en los grupos extremos, este ámbito da cuenta de un tercio de las justificaciones de los más jóvenes y un quinto de las de los más viejos. El ámbito más mencionado por éstos últimos es el psicológico y son quienes parecen

estar más preocupados por las cuestiones institucionales. Los temas ideológicos, por su parte, tienen más peso entre los más jóvenes, mientras que las respuestas ligadas al miedo y la inseguridad son estables en todos los grupos, alrededor del 25%, salvo, como ya se mencionó, entre los mayores en donde alcanza un 35%.

La evaluación de los efectos de la

crisis de 2001 es, en términos generales, mayoritariamente negativa en todos los grupos de edad. Sin embargo, es de destacar que uno de cada cinco jóvenes le otorga

un sentido positivo y uno de cada diez considera que los efectos mencionados no son ni positivos ni negativos (Cuadro Nº 5).

	20-24	35-39	50-54	65-69	75-84
Positiva	21	9	6	0	15
Negativa	68	88	94	100	80
Ni una ni otra	11	3	0	0	5
Total	100 (107)	100 (59)	100 (33)	100 (25)	100 (20)

Fuente: Elaboración propia

Cuadro Nº 5: Valoración de los efectos de la crisis según grupos de edad (%)

Como contrapartida, vemos que el grupo de 65 a 69 en su totalidad, la valora en forma negativa. Este grupo parece haber resultado específicamente perjudicado por la crisis, pues son sus miembros los que más mencionaron efectos concretos, individuales y referidos a cuestiones socioeconómicas.

Contrasta, en este sentido, con el grupo

que lo sigue en edad, el de los más viejos, en el que tuvieron mayor peso las menciones a lo colectivo, simbólico y político-ideológico; alcanzando una evaluación positiva o indiferente del 20%.

Esto indicaría que según cuál sea la esfera involucrada por la crisis, la evaluación tiende a ser más o menos negativamente ponderada (Cuadro Nº 6).

	Socio-económico	Político-Institucional	Político-ideológica	Psicológico
Positiva	5	20	46	0
Negativa	94	67	37	97
Ni una ni otra	1	13	17	3
Total	100 (104)	100 (30)	100 (46)	100 (64)

Fuente: Elaboración propia

Cuadro Nº 6: Valoración de los efectos de la crisis según ámbito involucrado (%)

En efecto, vemos que aquellas razones que remiten a la esfera político-ideológica reciben más valoraciones positivas que negativas. Casi la mitad de los entrevistados para quienes la crisis del 2001 fue un hecho socio-histórico significativo, rescata sus aspectos representacionales, participativos, las movilizaciones y protestas de la población en contra de una política contraria


a sus intereses, así como el hastío de la ciudadanía respecto de la clase política. Coherentemente, dos tercios de menciones referidas a las cuestiones estrictamente institucionales de la crisis fueron valoradas positivamente, tales como la renuncia del presidente de la Rúa y el cambio de gobierno.

Por el contrario, casi la totalidad de respuestas que mencionan la esfera socio-

económica o la psicológica como las más afectadas por la crisis, implican una evaluación negativa.


Es esperable, además, que existan

diferencias en los distintos grupos de edad, en tanto la exposición a la crisis ha demostrado ser desigual entre ellos.



Fuente: Elaboración propia

Grafico N° 1. Evaluación positiva de los efectos de la crisis según esfera involucrada y grupo de edad (%)



Fuente: Elaboración propia

Grafico N° 2. Evaluación negativa de los efectos de la crisis según esfera involucrada y grupo de edad (%)

Efectivamente, la lectura de los datos nos indica que existen importantes diferencias entre las distintas cohortes. Los más jóvenes muestran más variaciones respecto de sus valoraciones de los distintos ámbitos afectados por la crisis. Así vemos que más de la mitad de los jóvenes le da un sentido positivo en su aspecto representacional, mientras que, también, uno de cada cinco evalúa positivamente sus resultados institucionales. Destaquemos, así mismo, que para un 10% de los jóvenes la crisis resultó ser positiva en términos económicos.¹¹

A medida que avanzamos en la edad, los efectos negativos de la crisis se incrementan. Así, en el grupo de 35 a 39 años, si bien se mantiene una mayoría de evaluaciones positivas de la esfera ideológica, quienes la consideran negativa aumenta a un tercio de los entrevistados. Así mismo, aunque casi un 15% de los miembros del grupo aún consideran positivo los cambios en el ámbito institucional, la valoración negativa es muy alta, al igual que en el ámbito económico, en el que alcanza un 97%.

En el caso del grupo de 50 a 54 años, la tendencia mencionada continúa, al punto de que sólo aparece evaluada positivamente en un tercio de sus menciones la esfera político-ideológica. Las demás dimensiones son consideradas completamente negativas.

El grupo de 65 a 69 años completa la tendencia; la totalidad de las razones en las cuatro esferas son evaluadas negativamente. Efectivamente, parece haber sido el grupo, si no más extensamente (ver cuadro N° 1), si el más intensamente afectado por la crisis.

Por último, el grupo de las personas mayores tiene una mirada diferente de la situación. Si bien todos sus integrantes evalúan negativamente la esfera económica, sólo un 40% lo hace de igual manera con la cuestión institucional, diferenciándose en este punto de los demás grupos. Mientras, un cuarto de los mayores piensa positivamente sobre el matiz político ideológico de la crisis.

Un comentario aparte merece la esfera psicológica, aquella que remite a los miedos, la muerte, la inseguridad, la desconfianza

que generó la crisis. Así como ocupaba un rango que iba entre un 25% y un 35% de las menciones en todos los grupos de edad, también en todos es evaluada negativamente en su totalidad, a excepción de un 8% de jóvenes para quienes ese aspecto de la crisis no es ni positivo ni negativo.

El impacto autobiográfico de la memoria de la crisis

Sabemos que el impacto de estas memorias históricas en las biografías individuales no es directo ni inmediato. Sin embargo, creamos que pueden surgir algunas hipótesis interesantes a partir del análisis de los datos referidos a la identificación de los “puntos de inflexión” realizados por los mismos entrevistados.

En ese caso, se solicitaba a los individuos que respondieran a la siguiente pregunta: *“Consideré su vida en general, ¿cuáles han sido los principales puntos de inflexión, esos momentos que hayan significado un cambio importante en su vida?”*

De las 114 personas que mencionaron algún hecho relacionado con la crisis de 2001 como cambio socio-histórico que afectó su vida, 17 (es decir, 15%) también lo mencionaron como un “punto de inflexión” en su biografía personal.

Las razones por las cuales los identificaron como “puntos de inflexión” remiten, en su mayoría, a cambios en la situación laboral. En efecto, más de la mitad (9 personas), mencionaron que “haber perdido el trabajo” había provocado trastornos profundos en sus vidas y en la manera de vivirla; tres vieron partir al exilio a hijos o hermanos en busca de trabajo, dos tuvieron que modificar sus costumbres a raíz de haber perdido sus ahorros y otros dos se sintieron profundamente afectados por la pobreza y la violencia desatada.

Siendo el trabajo una de las más importantes dimensiones del curso de vida de las personas y ocupando lugares privilegiados en los modelos de transiciones normativas; la pérdida del trabajo y la imposibilidad de

cumplir con los roles sociales y familiares que de él derivan, puede, para muchos individuos, transformarse en un acontecimiento disruptivo, dando lugar a transiciones no normativas en el curso de la vida y convirtiéndose, así, en “puntos de inflexión”.

Conclusiones

Los resultados obtenidos indican que el conjunto de sucesos y procesos que hemos identificado como “crisis de 2001” formaba parte, hacia el año 2004, de la memoria de las distintas cohortes con las que trabajamos en nuestra investigación. Se trataba de acontecimientos muy cercanos en el tiempo que impactaron en todas las generaciones, mostrando una tendencia a la disminución a medida que aumentaba la edad.

El grupo que, al momento del relevamiento, contaba entre 20 y 24 años fue el que más extensamente sintió el efecto de la crisis. Sin dudas ha sido para ellos un evento histórico poderoso, en un momento de la vida especialmente receptivo a las experiencias ligadas al cambio. Tal vez, esta impronta de la juventud explique la evaluación positiva predominante de las dimensiones de la crisis más ligadas al mundo de las transformaciones políticas y a las estrategias de movilización y protesta.

No es aventurado esperar que este grupo registre a lo largo del curso de la vida, la influencia de la exposición a un conflictivo espacio social, económico y político al momento de su “apertura al mundo”. Sin embargo, las implicaciones respecto de cambios en los “patrones de vida” o en la consolidación de una memoria generacional que evidencie las huellas de esta crisis, podrán ser registradas sólo en el largo plazo.

La cohorte de nacidos entre 1964 y 1969 también manifestó una extendida repercusión de la crisis en sus vidas individuales, sin embargo, una percepción menos ligada a sus aspectos políticos devino en evaluaciones más negativas del conjunto de sucesos. Para este grupo, no fue ésta la primera crisis: las dificultades económicas

producto de la “iperinflación” ocurrida entre 1989 y 1990 fue un hecho muy recordado por esta generación que, en aquel momento, tenía entre 20 y 24 años. La incidencia que tanto dicha experiencia como la diferencia en el lugar (y por consiguiente, el cambio en las circunstancias personales, familiares y sociales) ocupado en el curso de la vida en uno y otro momentos pudieron haber tenido en la percepción y en la evaluación de la crisis reciente, son cuestiones que deberán profundizarse en futuras investigaciones.

Los dos grupos que siguen en edad, aunque en menor medida, también registraron el impacto de la crisis del 2001, siendo muy variadas la percepción y evaluación de sus consecuencias. Las transformaciones socio-económicas afectaron de manera especial a estos grupos de edad: la privatización de empresas públicas y retiros voluntarios durante la década el noventa, el refugio en actividades por “cuenta propia” que con la recesión demostraron ser insostenibles, la privatización del sistema de retiro, la confiscación de cuestas bancarias y ahorros, etc. sin dudas incidieron en la manera en que los miembros de estas cohortes vivieron esta etapa histórica.

Los más ancianos fueron quienes menos significado asignaron a esta crisis, una más entre las tantas que les tocó vivir en sus extensas trayectorias. Y, en esta etapa, lo más importante fue el resurgimiento del miedo y la muerte.

En este sentido, es posible pensar que la persistencia de la preocupación por la muerte y la inseguridad y la reaparición de sentimientos de miedo y temor estén relacionadas con una memoria histórica nacional.

En efecto, en todos los grupos de edad (exceptuados los más jóvenes) otros hechos socio-históricos tuvieron impactos más profundos que la crisis del 2001. Sucesos terribles, que bañaron de sangre a la sociedad argentina, como lo fueron las variadas dictaduras militares, sobre todo la denominada “Proceso de Reorganización Nacional” vigente entre 1976 y 1983 y la Guerra de Malvinas, llevada a cabo por esa misma

dictadura militar en 1982 han dejado huellas de muerte y miedo permanentes en estas generaciones, huellas que se reactualizan en situaciones traumáticas como las generadas durante los sucesos que hemos analizado.

En cuanto a la articulación del contexto socio-histórico con las trayectorias de vida personales, consideramos que los resultados encontrados constituyen una importante línea de indagación que deberá ser retomada en próximos trabajos. La puesta en relación entre la percepción de eventos socio-históricos relevantes y su identificación como “puntos de inflexión” en las autobiografías parece ser un recurso valioso para indagar acerca de la forma en que se conectan las memorias colectivas y las memorias individuales.

Pero la persistencia que los eventos relacionados con la crisis de 2001 tengan en la sociedad argentina en su conjunto y en las distintas generaciones en particular, es decir, la posibilidad del surgimiento de una “memoria de la crisis” dependerá del devenir histórico y de la manera en que las periódicas y superpuestas capas deinterpretaciones y reinterpretaciones, enmarcadas en relaciones sociales y de poder, reconstruyan el pasado desde los sucesivos presentes.

Suiza y la Argentina y el de J. Oddone y G. Lynch (2008).

³ Durante una de esas breves gestiones, el presidente Rodríguez Saa anunció que el país dejaría de pagar sus obligaciones financieras, entrando en *default*.

⁴ Hemos desarrollado este tema en Oddone, J. y Lynch, G. (2008).

⁵ En este trabajo consideramos dentro de la categoría “Crisis del 2001” eventos que en trabajos anteriores fueron considerados de manera independiente: “Gobierno de la Alianza” y “Post-Alianza”.

⁶ Estos atentados produjeron más de un centenar de muertos.

⁷ Recordemos que la Guerra de Malvinas fue declarada en 1982, durante el Proceso. La hemos considerado como un evento específico por la envergadura de su impacto.

⁸ La última cohorte (1980-1984) es posterior a la dictadura; algunos de sus miembros no habían nacido y otros sólo podían tener tres años de edad al momento del retorno a la democracia.

⁹ De las 251 menciones a la crisis del 2001, 6 entrevistados no brindaron razones que explicaran su elección, de allí que en esta sección se trabaje con un N= 245.

¹⁰ Para una profundización de las categorías de análisis utilizadas, tanto desde un punto de vista teórico como metodológico, ver Aeby, G. (2007) En este trabajo, nos basamos en las categorizaciones allí presentadas aunque hemos realizado algunos ajustes en beneficio de la claridad expositiva.

¹¹ Recordemos que es uno de los dos grupos que mencionó más efectos individuales, junto con la cohorte 65-69.

Notas al pie

¹ El estudio CEVI – *Cambios y eventos en el curso de la vida* – tiene como objetivos estudiar la articulación entre la historia y la biografía, la dinámica de los cambios y eventos propios de una sociedad determinada y las trayectorias de vida de los individuos que participan en esta historia. Responsables Internacionales: C. Lalive d’Epinay y S. Cavalli (Universidad de Ginebra). Para acceder a la información completa sobre este proyecto ver <http://cig.unige.ch/recherches/cevi.html>.

² Para profundizar estos temas ver los trabajos de C. Lalive D’Epinay y S. Cavalli (2007) en el cual se presenta un análisis comparativo entre

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Understanding of Globalization in Narratives of National Identity: the Case of Belarus

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Abstract: *The article presents the results of research on national identity with regards to the issue of globalization. Four versions of globalization are identified, that of normative liberal unification, Westernization, glocalization and hybridization. The latter is taken as a point of departure for the empirical study by means of narrative analysis separately focusing on the content, structure and the interpretation of meanings of the corpus of collected narratives. The case of Belarus offers a possibility of considering the allegorical mode of narration of national identity. Allegory, defined as uniinterpretational imagery, transcends the boundaries of both ethnic and civic types of nationalism and between historical and ahistorical. These findings lead to a conclusion that not only supranational institutions may be modeled after a nation-state, but also a nation in the globalizing world may be narrated following the standard of the world history. As a result, globality may become more familiarized for late modern individuals than nationality, and 'the end of history' on the individual level might coexist with 'the clash of civilizations' on the level of international relations.*

Keywords: globalization, national identity, narrative analysis, allegorical mode of narration.

The issue of globalization since 1990's has maintained its status of the central subject of discussion in social sciences, not only as a general background of virtually every contemporary social phenomenon and event, but also as a forefront motif of the late modernity. It is generally agreed that globalization is a complicated multifaceted process, but, despite the intensive debate, there exists

so far no agreement with regard to the prevalent versus supplementary sides of globalizations, so theoretically all its manifestations deserve equal scope of attention (D.J. Boudreax, 2008). However, in practice the globalization studies are primarily represented by economical, political and legal aspects, which are supplemented by cultural effects, while psychological dimension of global-

ization remains almost entirely in the dark. This aspect comprises a range of issues like the features of the new vision of the world, changing attitudes towards others, not only the generalized Other, and innovative ways of attaining coherence and meaning in individual life (F.J. Lechner, 2009). The importance of these issues is hardly disputable, but the conceptual framework and methodology of psychological studies of globalization are unclear.

Some general suggestions of the psychological changes in the globalizing world are implicitly present in the works dedicated to the cultural aspect of globalization. Sometimes they take form of the supposedly unchanging human nature underlying historical transformations and helping to make sense of them in broader historical context (A. Martinelli, 2005), but occasionally a more radically social constructionist perspective is adopted, and in that case the psychological changes on microsocial and intrapersonal levels constitute a part of macrosocial socio-cultural situation (Z. Bauman, 1998). Cross-cutting these two extreme viewpoints, but also partly overlapping with them, specific positions emphasizing certain psychological changes may be reconstructed. We have identified four such positions, as follows.

First, in some works, especially those focused on the normative side of globalization and its legal implementation and institutionalization, there prevails a notion of globalization as a progressive trend leading to worldwide realization of the positive potential of modernity, with rationality and inclination to prosocial behavior constituting the prevailing psychological traits of a new transculturally dominant personality type (J. Habermas, 1998). However, this position, besides lacking sufficient empirical evidence, does not clarify to what extent the psychological transformations it assumes must be regarded as prerequisites or consequences of legal and institutional innovations.

The second position, while sharing the general notion of the ongoing psychological unification, does not presume its character to

be neither positive nor rational nor universal. On the contrary, it emphasizes the negative side of cross-cultural psychological uniformization as propagation and imposing of one personality type at the cost of others by means of symbolic domination (G. Ritzer, 2010). This Westernization process, or, to use the term coined in by Ritzer, Macdonaldization, nevertheless, has not so far been confirmed by cross-cultural and cultural psychological research, which continues to reveal both quantitative and qualitative variety across cultures and nations.

It is precisely this relative stability and self-maintenance of cross-cultural differences in psychological traits that the third position takes into account. It seemingly paradoxical name of glocalization signifies the psychological resistance to symbolic domination in the form of reaffirming the old identities and autostereotype traits of the so-called national character (U. Beck, 2000). On one hand such purposeful assertion of specific attitudes, personality types and behavioral patterns may serve as a cause of national pride and a trademark necessary in order to increase the prestige of a certain nation in the global village, but, on the other hand, the same process is instrumental in bringing to the forefront both ancient intercultural controversies and conflicts and unsolved intranational problems, thus breeding the feelings of ressentiment, alienation and hostility.

The forth position, which has been initially assumed as the starting point of our own research, aims at simultaneously holding in view both unifying and specifying trends and concentrates on the potentially unlimited variety of individual coping strategies with regards to unique assembling of relevant features and resources of every particular case. The diversity of hybridized identities (A.D. Smith, 2010), while serving as the short-term means of psychological adaptation to globalization, may in the long term evolve into qualitatively new types. This position does not contain a predominantly positive or negative stance, and in its

neutrality provides a possibility to the whole range of empirical research.

In our research on the contemporary Belarusian national identity we initially adopted the view that the global context may have as great an impact on its current state as the national past, partly because the prevailing mode of narration of the national history might be dependent on the intercultural information flows as well as on the specific inherited content, and that this mode of narration is most productively conceptualized as neither a neutral medium of nor an obstacle to the content, but as a separate subject of study by means of narrative analysis.

Unlike the prevailing tradition in the studies of nations and nationalism (C. Calhoun, 1997), we presume the necessity of the differentiation between the identity of a nation as a whole on the macrosocial level and the national identity in its proper sense as one among other kinds of the social identity of an individual. According to such differentiation, national identities are not to be automatically deduced from the identity of a given nation, but studies separately in their diversity. The methods of such empirical research, its results regarding the case of the contemporary Belarus and discussion of the possible wider theoretical significance of these findings are consequently presented in the further three part of this article.

Methods and Sample

Sociopsychological research on national identity by means of narrative analysis seems both justified and promising, because this method corresponds to the central issue of the contemporary debate on identity as a logical category, which has time at the core of its famous paradoxes (R.A. Sorensen, 2005), and also because narrative analysis allows to approach the allegedly intangible intricacies of complicated psychosocial discursive formations and does so in a structured way, enabling interpretation that is at once data-oriented and theory-driven. Thus, narrative analysis escapes both one-sided

reliance on empirical data, as in the purely ethnographical research (J. Hearn, 2007), and treating the specific details as illustrative examples, rather than innovative sources, as is often, and of necessity, the case with sociohistorical overviews of nationalism studies (S. Grosby, 2005). Unlike most other research on narrating national identity (H.K. Bhabha, 1990), ours does not attempt to reconstruct great narratives and counter-narratives constituting the identity of the nation, but explores the variety of individual narratives of national identity, following the afore-mentioned distinction between the two concepts.

The narratives were collected in written form, because the pilot study revealed the fact that during the narrative interview participants persistently prompted an interviewer, whom they considered a specialist on the subject, for clues, declaring themselves at a loss when choosing particular topics related to the subject. As the selection of themes relevant to the theme of national identity, not merely discovering opinions on an imposed and predefined set of issues, was the primary object of interest regarding the content of narratives, providing such clues was undesirable. Therefore, participants were asked to produce a written narrative with the following fixed instruction: "*Compose a narrative of yourself as a representative of a certain nation or nations. You may describe your experience of initial awareness of your national identity, its role in your life, significance to you of nationwide important events, experience of contacts with representatives of other nations and any other relevant events*". The instruction was available for every participant either in Belarusian or Russian (the two official languages in the Republic of Belarus since 1995), according to one's individual choice. The equivalence of instruction texts in both languages was obtained by means of the standard procedure of multiple reverse translations. Neither the size of a narrative nor the time of its writing were limited.

In total, 500 narratives were collected

between 2007 and 2009 from Belarusian citizens of various nationalities according to self-definition, while 83% declared themselves representatives of Belarusian nation, which corresponds to the number of self-defined Belarusians in the last national census. All 6 regions of the country were represented proportionally, the same being true for other principal demographic parameters, such as gender, education, type of locality and age. With regard to the last parameter, the youngest research participants who during the pilot study proven themselves able of constructing a coherent narrative of national identity were those 11 years old. Given this considerable age variation, comparison between different age groups became one of the principal motifs of study and yielded some important results, as will be specified in the next section.

The primary data were interpreted according to the three types of narrative analysis differentiated by László (J. László, 2008). Content of the corpus of narratives was examined, which allowed to define prevailing topics and, what is also important, topics that are almost entirely absent from Belarusian narratives of national identity, but ought to occupy prominent positions according to general theories of nationality. It is the configuration of these topics, and not merely separate explicitly voiced opinions, that contains a full notion of narrator's understanding of the subject. The analysis of content was supplemented by that of the form, revealing the predominant temporal structure of narratives. The third, hermeneutical version of narrative analysis was instrumental in establishing links between formal and contentual features of the narratives, uncovering variety of in-depth meanings and placing the research results into a broader framework of relevance.

This combined model of narrative analysis involving all the three types was realized by means of two procedures. The first, corresponding to analysis of content and formal structure of the narrative, was based on dividing each text into fragments according

to explicit criteria and then classifying each fragment separately. This procedure was described in detail by Barthes (R. Barthes, 1985). In our case, the fragments were not linguistically defined lexies, but what we named temporal episodes. The transition from one temporal episode to another occurs with the change of time (past, present, future with regard to the moment of narration), tense (unique events, repeated events, complete prolonged states similar to Braudel's notion of long durations (F.Braudel, 1980), or states started in the past and continuing up to the present, regarding the moment of narration) and/or modality (real, hypothetical or imaginary, according to the narrator's own viewpoint). Each temporal episode was then classified considering its main topic (e.g. statement of one's national self-identification, attitudes towards other nations etc.), way of narrator's self-positioning (as a bearer of universal truths, defendant of subjective opinions, sufferer for one's nation etc.) and, when appropriate, stylistic peculiarities (e.g. use of quotations, fragments in a foreign language etc.). As a result, we were able to identify the most typical topics and ways of positioning and analyze their relation to the temporal aspect of narratives.

The second procedure, corresponding primarily to the hermeneutical and also indirectly to the structural types of narrative analyses, was derived from Fludernik's research program of the 'natural narratology' (M. Fludernik, 1996). It is based on the notion that modes of narration are not invented by any person in absolute isolation, but are socially constructed and then learned and, to different extents, interiorized by individuals. In this ongoing process, literature, where the form is the essential part of the message, plays the generative function, while the non-fictional field of the 'natural narratives', far from passively adopting certain modes of narration, actively reconstructs and intertwines them activating various mechanisms of metatextuality. Therefore, the analytical resources originally developed in literary theory might be applied to non-fictional ev-

everyday narratives. In our attempt to adjust the program of the ‘natural narratology’ to the psychological study of national identity we were able to identify the predominant mode of narration of the contemporary Belarusian national identity as a metaphor of a certain literary genre. This helped to develop a mutual interpretation of separate temporal episode and the corpus of collected narratives as a whole in the hermeneutical circle, as described in the next section of the article.

Results

The first significant feature of Belarusian narratives in their contentual aspect is that the issues related to globalization are raised in most narratives, even though this particular elaboration of the theme of national identity is neither necessary nor obvious, especially considering the relatively minor role contemporary globalization theories play in influential theories of and approaches to nationality. These issues include not only the topic of intercultural contacts, but also heterostereotypes of the narrator’s own nation, heterostereotypes of other nations, status of the narrator’s own nation in the world community, and future of the world of nations. Besides, some topics of a more abstract nature were introduced, like ethical principles of international relations (statements of equality of all nations, the necessity of opposing xenophobia and racism, relative unimportance of a person’s nationality in comparison with her unique personality traits among the most frequently mentioned) and generalized criteria establishing either an individual’s national identity or an identity of a certain nation.

The last topic deserves special consideration. Unlike in the theoretical discourse on the correct definition of the nation, in Belarusian narratives of national identity the features of a given community that are necessary and sufficient for recognizing it a nation are derived neither from a general perspective (which is overtly characteristic of the theoretical discourse itself) nor from the

distant past or the extended present of their own nation (which is the grassroot genesis of nationality as presented, accordingly, in primordialist and modernist theories), but instead are developed from tacit or, much rarer, open comparison of one’s own nation with other nations, which serve as a model. These results challenge the established view that nationalism as an ideology, political system and/or worldview originally developed in a certain geographical region and then exported in the form of an abstract scheme, while gradually adjusting itself to local conditions and subdividing into a very limited number of variations like Cohn’s binary opposition of Eastern and Western nationalisms or Gellner’s four climate zones of nationality. The narrative analysis proves ideas of what is a nation on the individual, everyday level to be much more numerous, intrinsically plural and logically incoherent. Far from developing a complete scheme of an ideal or prototypic nation in the cognitivist sense, and then applying them to particular cases, narrators actively reconstruct specific notions of their own and other nations which are deeply ingrained in varying contexts of national and individual histories without apparent mediating of an abstract prototype. This narrative identity of a nation makes room for subtle qualitative gradations. For instance, the Belarusian nation may be considered more or less of a nation in some historical cases, and also in comparison with certain other nations, which is not essentialist and static, but derived from a context of international relations. Therefore, we may contrast two sides of globalization – intensification of intercultural contacts vs. worldwide popularization of certain ideas and practices – and conclude of prevailing significance of the former for the contemporary national identity.

The reason and, partly, cause of this features of the corpus of narratives may be suggested by supplementing the analysis of content by considering their temporal structure. The two prototypical modes of historical narration are historicist and positivist, developed accordingly by the German and

Prussian schools of historical science. While the positivist historian regards history as coherent collection of facts of the past, in von Ranke's famous words, "wie es eigentlich gewesen ist" – 'as it really was' (L. von Ranke, 2008, 1), the proponent of historicism aims at providing an interpretation grasping the sense and meaning of a studied region or epoch, and therefore relies on a general philosophy of history providing the unity of the past, present and future. While the positivist concern almost exclusively with the past dominates historical science both in its positivist and antipositivist versions, the consistency and continuity of individual history is considered a norm in both narrative (M. Bal, 2004) and non-narrative (E.H. Erikson, 1993) psychological theories of identity.

Surprisingly, Belarusian narratives of national identity correspond to neither of these modes of narration. Only a relatively small minority of all temporal episodes describes the past, an even smaller minority refers to the future, while the majority of episodes correspond to the present state of events. Besides, in all times of narration the prevailing tense is that of prolonged states rather than events, and periodically repeated recurrent events rather than individual changes, although the last ones theoretically constitute the backbone of what is termed the "good narrative".

This narrative present, in turn, can be subdivided into two types, neither of which resembles the present time in the literal, mathematically precise sense, that is, a moment without duration. The first type of the present-oriented temporal episodes narrates the states of limited, albeit sometimes quite vaguely specified duration, with a definable beginning and end. The other and more numerous type, which might be named the ahistorical present, describes allegedly eternal states of matters, purportedly universal truths. Such parts of narratives do not provide continuity between the past, present and future, but go further up to the very dissolution of their external borders and estab-

lishing the homogenous uneventful meta-present time.

The mode of narration of Belarusian national identity with relation to globalization evolves in the ahistorical present of universally, that is, globally valid truths. Historical components of narratives are introduced in the form of miniplots with no immediate connection between them even within the same narrative. The marked absence of great narratives, be it of individual, national or world history, nevertheless, does not mean in this case the lack of unity. On the contrary, the atemporal mode of narration is present to a certain extent in all the collected narratives and is culturally shared. So are the prevailing topics. This atemporal narration of universal truths embedded in particular contexts gives impression of a coping strategy aimed at understanding of narrator's nation, as well as her own, place in the globalizing world. Instead of deriving abstract notions from everyday factual experience or, contrariwise, adjusting imported theories and values to local realities, narrators consistently try to blur the boundary between universal and particular, temporal and atemporal, national and global. This structure suggests a notion of an individual inhabiting two separate world of nationality and globality, instead of the traditional hierarchy of local, national, regional, global.

The combination of contentual and structural perspectives in narrative analysis provides a functional explanation of the strategies of understanding globalization in the corpus of narratives under consideration. Adding the hermeneutical perspective allows to analyze the significance of this particular mode of narration and its probable practical consequences.

Following the program of the 'natural narratology' offered by Fludernik, we revised the wide range of prototypical literary narratives in order to discover the genre characteristics of which most closely resemble those of the structure of narratives of Belarusian national identity. The only literary genre that shares the features of focusing on

universal truth with strong ethical stance and presents them not abstractly, but in the form of illustrative images, heroes and events, is that of allegory. Allegory can be succinctly defined as uniinterpretational imagery. This mode of narration of national identity is unusual for two reasons.

First, allegorical literature was typical in the form of long poems and novels for the medieval literature and, in the form of fables and plays, for the Classicism. Both these periods are characterized by prevalence of universalism over particularism, be it in ethnic, national or other version, and especially so in the high culture of ruling elites.

Second, the allegorical mode of narration corresponds to neither civic nor ethnic nationalism (A.D. Smith, 1991). Civic nationalism presupposes agreement on a set of nationally relevant views that construct the nation as a political unity, but, unlike in the allegory, these views are primarily abstract and rational, with imagery playing a small and occasional part, mainly because the agreement on their truthfulness is developed in the process of open discussion, not narratively retold and enacted. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, represents the nation as an ethnocultural unity and is characterized by deep symbolism opening via national identity the way to metaphysical truths. Both the symbol and the allegory share the form of images, but, unlike the allegory, the symbol presupposes the potentially illimitable variety of interpretations, with its initial image serving as a starting point for multiple and diverse content. The allegorical image is at once a beginning and an end of interpretation and, unlike a symbolic image, it can be either understood or misunderstood, but not interpreted in various ways. Allegory relies on a shared cultural code and reaffirms already known and accepted notions, without putting forward new ideas or offering new justification.

The following narrative fragment provides an example of such allegorical mode of narration.

“When I was 19, during artistic practice

in Latvia, when returning with my university group from etudes, I heard “Russian swine” addressed at us. I did not think myself Russian and could not accept it. After that event we all started speaking Belarusian, and then they took us for Poles or Ukrainians”. The narrator gives no evaluation and no comment. She does not explain why the group of Belarusian students initially spoke Russian, why the derogatory remark made them turn to the Belarusian language instead of, for instance, ignoring or opposing it, and why even that measure did not lead to recognition of their true nationality. The understanding of the bitter irony conveyed by the outcome of the story requires not only the through acquaintance with the linguistic situation in Belarus and its historical background, but also viewing it from the committed insider’s perspective. The allegorical narrative relies on a shared cultural code and presupposes initial mutual understanding, therefore it may serve for presenting the globalized world to other members of one’s own nation, but not vice versa.

Discussion

The issue of extrapolation of results of any sociopsychological research to a broader context of potential relevance has to be approached in a very cautious way. In this article, we did not aim to exhaust the subject of Belarusian national identity, nor to derive from it some general rule, but to broaden the understanding of the variety of ways of narrating national identity in the context of globalization by means of empirically proving the possibility of cases non sufficiently explicable by existing theories. The Belarusian case is likely to abound in such examples, because Belarus still remains underrepresented in many fields of research, especially on the global level.

The allegorical mode of narration of narrative identity, which diffuses historical and ahistorical, transcends the limits of civic vs. ethnic nationalisms and presupposes understanding instead of its intersubjective

construction, reminds of an anecdotal figure of a Belarusian who enters a bookshop and demands a globe of Belarus. Not only Belarus and the global world are presented in the narratives as two separate realities, but Belarus is constructed as a model of the world, with the same level of representation of universal truths and the same self-sufficiency. In the past, the nation, or, more precisely, the nation-state served as a prototype for supranational structures like the European Union, transnational corporations with their elaborate organizational culture and the projects of the unified world. The results of our research show that in the near future it is possible that, contrariwise, the structure of the global world may become a prototype, so much so that the nation might be psychologically and, as a result, even institutionally reconstructed according to that model. Having inherited the mental image of one's own nation against the background of transcendent reality, we may create the limited, imminent world which familiar unity contains and hides on the opposite side the unfamiliar multitude of nation-worlds instead of nation-states (Fabrykant, 2009). This order of things may lead to increasing individualism in the form of transworld identity, moving freely from one historical narrative to another, which reproduces 'the end of history' on the microsocial level of global citizens and 'clashes of civilizations' on the level of international relations. Such perspective is merely a suggestion and for its detailization and verification requires much further research.

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Global Self in local Worlds. Romanian students' Environment Protection Values

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Abstract: Using “cultural creatives” concept (Ray & Anderson, 2000) and the idea of self-actualized individual suggested by Maslow (1954), we predict that people with high self actualized scores would be more ecological values’ oriented. The research was based on an omnibus questionnaire applied on 705 convenience student sample. The results suggest that Romanian students are in the process of adapting new global ecological values to their self identity so they are willing to pay more for products and utilities in order to pollute less. However their interest in environment protection issues is moderate, below the mean EU level. The article argues about some possible explanations on such paradox: on the one side students are more concerned about new job creation and less concern about environmental issues, on the other side they express their willingness to pay for things that pollute less.

Key words: cultural creatives, self-actualization, ecological values

Ever since '70 we talk about the postmodern individual, who is looking for self-actualizing and self-enhancing to the greatest potential, constantly re-model his own values so to include those concerning general preoccupation to the humanity well-being and to the environment protection. There is a great pressure for contemporary individuals to include in their self-identity ecological values and this became clear when the ex American vice-president, Al Gore received The Peace Nobel Price in 2007 due to his interest in ecological issues.

The idea of a global self as a way to include global preferences and values as well

as to redefine the existing ones in relative terms is quite new (Robertson, 1992, 25). However the public discourse has the mark of a global conscience: we use the word “global order” or “international economic crisis” to describe current economic and political problems, “global product” or “global human rights” and we also refer to “saving The Planet” when we claim the necessity of convergent ecological measures.

In 2007 an environmental protection organisation suggested for the first time the celebration of *Earth Hour* in Sidney, Australia to draw the attention on global warming issue. Approximately two million people took part and turned

off the electricity in their households for one hour, but this was only the beginning. Next year, in 2008, the last Sunday of March, between 20:00-21:00 officially became *Earth Hour* and 50 million people from all around world, in 35 countries and 370 cities agreed to turn off entirely electricity in their houses and offices. The most important media companies broadcasted the event and cultural, sports and political leaders offered their support, while concerts accompanied the event in the largest participant cities. Such a impact of an ecological manifest was not expected and even created a competition among cities concerning the amount of saved energy. Probably having still bad memories about forced turning off the electricity in communistic period, Romanians reacted with scepticism to the *Earth Hour* event and only few cities, including Bucharest and Timisoara, partially took part and turned off electricity within the main institutional buildings.

The *Earth Hour* event is a good illustration of the way individuals could proceed in rebuilding their selves so to include global values. Time and space compression (Harvey, 1989) meaning to reduce time of individual behavior outcome and to reduce distance among different community actions could be seen as the main challenges to our self-identity. Individual is facing the action concentration on global level and the localization of value spectrum (Giddens, 1990) and he has to adjust to both of them.

The anthropologist Paul Ray and psychologist Sherry Ruth Anderson (2000) are talking about a new value spectrum that emerges on global level, called cultural creatives. They described a new cultural group expanded in US and West Europe, aside to the traditional oriented and modern individuals, who shares a common life style and preferences about spiritual, ecological, consumption and relational aspects. In terms of values, cultural creatives are described by the need to rebuild communities, concern about families and human rights,

exotic places and simple life styles attraction, increased concern about nature and ecological issues, voluntary behavior and altruistic actions, self actualization and interest to new spiritual or religious movements. In fact, the focus on ecological values is a core factor which differentiates between cultural creatives and moderns. Ray and Anderson argue that environment protection values are core values shared by cultural creatives. Although environment protection movements are generally accepted and embraced, cultural creatives group exceeds not only by accepting ecological issues as important in their lives but also by acting according to such values willing to engage themselves in environment protection actions.

Cultural creatives are not necessarily better at tuning in to ecological needs than anyone else, but they want to be. In their personal lives and in the social ventures they are creating, they are eagerly – sometimes awkwardly and haltingly – making room to learn wholly new ways of working. And they are taking time, or trying to, to listen to how their consciousness and their conscience respond (Ray & Anderson, 2000, 164).

The values surveys conducted in US by Ray and collaborators estimate the percentage of those very much concerned about environment issues from 79% to 85%. These are the individuals who value a life change in order to become environment friendly. Although such percentage are higher in European surveys and especially during past ten years, between 70% and 90%, Ray and Anderson (2000) noticed that almost all (96%) of the respondents from the cultural creatives group appreciate and are willing to embrace an environment friendly life style, proving that ecological values are core values to this group. Cultural creatives value nature as scarce and treat ecological values similar to religious or spiritual ones. The relationship between us and The Planet changes, in their opinions, the way we react

toward everything else.

Identifying themselves with ecological values, cultural creatives are changing their perspective over self-actualization process including patterns of ecological behavior as a way to achieve maximum potential and ecological values within values spectrum shared with significant others:

they are concerned with redesigning every aspect of our culture to be ecologically sound: how our cities and towns can be laid out; how our transportation system could work; how new technology can be used in products, businesses, and industrial processes; how business can be organised; how to measure the value of a company or the cost of a government project; how we live in our homes; how we can get our clubs and associations involved in a new way of life; how we live in community, or fail to; and how we participate in civic culture, or not (Ray & Anderson, 2000, 166).

We predict that the probability to find cultural creatives' values are higher among those with actualized-self and particularity, the ecological values are predominant among the individuals who are looking for individual enhancing and spiritual development.

The idea of self-actualized individuals belongs to Abraham Maslow (1954), describing individuals that, in a process of achieving their maximum self potential, tend to judge others more objective and accurate, are less affected by cognitive errors and stereotypes, accept the complexity of human nature, are centered on external problems more than on individual problems. "They think about themselves as having a mission, a role to play in solving humanity problems so they follow a broader value spectrum, not necessary local but universal and general" (Maslow, 1954/2007, pp. 263-276). It is similar to fully functioning individual, concept suggested by the humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers (1959), although Maslow associates sincerity, lack of hypocrisy, and natural non-deceitful

behavior to the self-actualize concept. Later in the literature (see Yonge, 1975) self-actualization is associated with spontaneity and creativity, simplicity in everyday life and lack of inhibition or concern about social conventions reinforcement. Thus, the self-actualized individuals are willing to adopt the emergent values so we expect to find them among the cultural creatives. Even though Maslow is talking about individual personality while Ray and Anderson are talking about value orientation, a research conducted on a homogeneous sample (similar social-demographic characteristics) would reveal whether cultural creatives' values, particularly the ecological ones are to be found among the self-actualized individuals. Such a hypothesis is supported also by the fact that cultural creatives is described as a militant, activist group, always involved in social or environment protection actions they believe in.

Interestingly, the Ecologists often recognize their interdependence with other new social movements [...] many Ecologists were, and still are, engaged in the women's movement, the peace movement, and other movements (Ray & Anderson, 2000, 166).

Other contemporary researches (Sijuwade, 1996) have proved experimentally that self actualized individuals prefer intimacy and autonomy and also they are more internalists than externalists. Cultural creatives are also described by Ray and Anderson as looking for unicity in consumer behavior and generally speaking individualised goods and services.

"The innocent look" Maslow is talking about when he refers to self actualizing individuals denotes pleasure for simple things, for "natural beauty" or for what individuals considered to be beautiful and also ethical behavior using a clear means-purposes separation. Such attributes are common to cultural creatives group who are also described as nondiscriminatory individuals, feeling the connection with others and the rejecti-

on of profit oriented corporations in favor of environment protection actions. In other words we expect that democratic values and respect of others to be common features for self-actualized individuals.

Self-actualized individuals are also described as strongly connected with others, preferring strong ties instead of numerous weak ties, so similar to cultural creatives ones who are preoccupied to rebuild communities and to return to community life style. Maslow argues that self-actualized individuals resist enculturalization process, rejecting dominant culture and its values. This particular form of cultural resistance practically defines them as a group sharing the same values, while neither following the dominant trend, nor caring about wearing fasionable clothes or leading fashionable lives in general, since such things are of less relevance to them. Nevertheless, they are preoccupied with creating their own style of simplicity and indifference to trends. Such a portrait of self-actualized individuls is similar to the one constructed by Ray and Anderson when defining cultural creatives, especially on the consumerism dimension: they are interested in clothes' functionality and are generally reluctant to embrace an opulent lifestyle.

Regarded by Ray and Anderson as a dimension of cultural creatives concept and relatively ignored in their data analysis, self-actualization may well be the aspect differentiating various degrees of ecological valules orientations, especially in homogeneous research groups. All the more so, since the term "self-actualization" has been much under discussion in the social-psychological literature for over half a century, standardised scales have been used to measure it.

With these two concepts defined as such, we hypothesize a correlation between the level of self-actualization and ecological valules orientation, meaning that individuals with high self-actualizing scores will integrate environment-protection values to a higher degree than those with low self-actualizing scores, especially when analysing homogenous groups. We use the term "homogene-

ous" for a sample of individuals with similar age, gender, occupation.

Method

Cultural creative values were identifying on Romanian students using a sociological survey conducted on national level. A convenience 705 students sample has been selected from the biggest five university cities in Romania. The respondents had to fill an omnibus questionnaire refer the cultural creatives dimensions explained above. As a part of ecological values dimension of the cultural creatives concept we address questions about their perceived importance of different environment protection issues (e.g. "The environment protection is less important than job creating", "A radical change in our life is needed if we want to stop the environment destruction". Additionally they were asked to express the level of concern to current environment issues debated in public sphere (e.g. air, water and soil pollution, ozone layer destruction, global warming) and to mention the frequency of the ecological behaviors as the sorting the domestic waste, saving electricity and water, buying organic products). Questions about their willingness to pay more for certain goods and services in order to pollute less were also addressed in the end.

In order to measure the self-actualization, we used Personal Orientation Inventory (POI), released by Everett L. Shostrom (1963/1996). POI is a 14 scales a standardized instrument following self-actualization dimensions suggested by Maslow. Forgaty (1994) has proved POI validity on student samples but this is the first large scale research in Romania using POI test. A proper translation and adaptation was conducted prior to the current survey and as a result we selected only Self Actualising Values Scale (SAV) due to its validity for the sugested sample and for the research puoposes. SAV reffers mainly to a positive view towards life in general and to highly self-conscience. We expect that subjects with high self-actu-

alizing scores would be also more oriented towards ecological values .

Results

Scores for SAV have been calculated for each individual from the sample and compared to the standard ones obtained by Shostrom (Table1). Compare to Shostrom data, our sample is more homogeneous, probably due to social-professional and life style similarity of the respondents, all students, having between 20 and 30 years of age. Nevertheless the differences between self-actualized individuals and non-self

actualized individuals (using Shostrom concepts) are larger in our sample compare to the standard one. As a result, we devide the respondents in two groups, based on mean score on SAV ($M = 22,9$): non self-actualized individuals with scores lower than 22,9, called here group 1 and self-actualized individuals with scores above 22,9, called group 2. Finnally 576 students (81,6%) were placed in group 1(non-self-actualized) and 130 in group 2 (self-actualized) and we proceed to a comparative data analysis on those two groups in terms of environment protection values and behaviours (Table 1).

Self-actualized individuals				Normal scores				Non self-actualized individuals			
Shostrom sample		Romanian students sample		Shostrom sample		Romanian students sample		Shostrom sample		Romanian students sample	
Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
20,7	3,6	22,9	0,9	20,2	3,0	20,5	0,5	18,0	3,7	16,93	2,3

Table 1. Mean SAV scores on our students sample and standardized values on Shostrom sample (1996).

Both group 1 and group 2 shared moderate concerns about environment protection issues. Students agreed that environment protection is less important than creating new jobs ($F = 0,314$, $p = 0,575$). The self-actualized individuals in our sample are not necessary those who have internalised ecological values more than non-self actualized individuals. The data are not what we expected, since we predict a large number of cultural creatives especially among students. However, when we look to last five years Eurobarometers – survey periodically conducted in EU on national representative sample – the data reveals also a moderate Romanians' interest towards environment protection issues, bellow the mean EU percentages. Less than half of the Romanians answering the question "How important is for you the environment protection", have chosen "very important" and Romania has constantly one of the lowest percentage of "interest" individuals in ecological issues among the 27 member

states. While ecological values seem to be among the core European values, largely share by individuals in different countries, around 8% of Romanians consider environment protection issues as "not at all important", the larger percentage from the EU of "non-interested" individuals. There is also no difference among the two analysed groups on the level of concern for the current environment issues discussed in public sphere and again the level of concern is moderate (using a five points scale, with "1" – "not at all concern" and "4" – "very much concern" as we can see in Table 2.

However, when we talk about ecological values internalization, individuals real behavior could not be neglected. The the "social responsible consumer" (Webster, 1975), the one who purchases goods with positive outcomes for the entire society could be found among the self-actualized students from our sample. Therefore we adressed questionnes related also to subjects environment protection actions as "buying products

with recycled packages”, “checking you own car toxic emission”, “recycle domestic waste”. This time self-actualized individuals declared they engage more in social responsible behaviours as “buying products with recycled packages”, “checking you own car toxic emissions” than those in non self-actualization group and the differences are significant at least for those two specific actions

(Table 3). We conclude that group 1 engage more in social responsible behaviours than group 2 or at least they believe so about themselves. However, since we did not find any differences on the level of concern on ecological issues between the two groups, we might think that such social responsible behaviours are not necessarily chosen to protect the environment.

	Group 1		Group 2	
	M	SD	M	SD
Air, water and soil pollution	2,2	0,8	2,2	0,9
Ozone layer destruction	3,1	0,7	3,2	0,7
Global warming	3,6	0,5	3,7	0,4
Deforestation	2,1	0,9	2,0	0,9
Genetical modify products	3,3	0,7	3,3	0,7
Atomic power stations and radioactive waste	3,2	0,7	3,2	0,7
Natural resources disappearance	3,3	0,7	3,3	0,7
Endanger species of plants and animals	3,1	0,7	3,2	0,7
Urban pollution (traffic and noise)	3,3	0,6	3,3	0,7

Table 2. In the present you have "very concerned", "some concern", "not much concern" or "not at all concern" about [...].

It is also possible for students in group 1 (self-actualized) to perceive themselves only as acting more as environment friendly compare to students in group 2 (non-self actualized). In such case, the nonexistent difference between the two groups in terms of level of concern with environmental issues could be explained by the fact that subjects are in the process of ecological values orientation and they are trying to adjust their selves to integrate also the global environment protection values.

Nevertheless we are worried about the

small percentage of students who declare they are saving water, electricity and sorting domestic waste (43%, 47%, respectively 30%) and urgent measures probably should be taken as such. The last five years Eurobarometers on social responsible consume for EU countries reveals also a small percentage of Romanians (18%) declaring they are sorting the domestic waste, the smallest percentage in entire EU where the mean percentage of citizens sorting domestic garbage is 59%. Similarly, 36% of Romanians are saving electricity (compare

Behaviors	Chi-square (χ^2)	df.	Asymp. Sig (2-sided)
Using public transportation	33,227	38	0,690
Buying products with recycle packages	70,678	38	0,001**
Buying organic products	35,742	38	0,574
Saving water	22,891	38	0,975
Saving electricity	30,130	38	0,815
Sorting domestic waste	34,162	38	0,648
Chekking toxic emissions of the personal car	53,202	38	0,052*

Table 3. The relation between self actualization and social consumer behavior.

* Significant for $p < 0.05$

** Significant for $p < 0.01$

to 47% mean percentage in EU) and 30% declared they are saving water, while mean EU percent is 37%. Compare to those data on national level, the percentage of students engaged in social responsible behaviors are higher in our student sample. Still simulating measures so that such behaviors would be daily routine also for Romanins have to be taken.

The social responsible consumer is also willing to pay more so that others around him will enjoy wellbeing. Therefore we asked students if they are willing to pay more for goods and services if those will pollute less. Surprisingly, students from our sample largely agreed to pay more for utilities or goods so that they would pollute less (Table 4). The data reveal a paradox: on the one

hand 63% of the respondents partially or totally agree on “environment protection is less important than creating new jobs”, and on the other hand 80% of them partially or totally agree on “environment should be protected even if jobs will disappear in such process” and are also willing to pay for goods or services that are environment friendly. We conclude that students are very much preoccupied and worried about job creation and less about environment protection but if ecological measures would be taken, they will agree to pay for them. The results reveal a positive trend for environment protection measures acceptance and urge for some policies especially in the area of domestic waste sorting, where 83% of the students declared they are willing to pay more.

Domestic running water	63,3%
Personal car	65,3%
Fuel	59,0%
Sorting and recycle domestic garbage	82,9%
Heating and electricity in households	62,0%
Food	69,6%
Airplane transportation	51,7%
Public transportation	59,7%

Table 4. Williness to pay [...] if they pollute less.

We could not identify any significant difference between din group 1 (*non-self-actualized*) and group 2 (*self-actualized*) in their willingness to pay for goods and services that pollutes less, both group showing supportive reactions especially for buying food and using cars that pollutes less and also sorting and processing domestic waste. We can wonder why subjects accept to pay more for things they are not enough worried about. One possible explanation would be that students perceived that such behaviors are social desirable due to intense media presentation of the environment protection policies and discussions. Both on national and international level have been debated about the imminence of policies implementing in environment protection area so that subjects feel the pressure not to oppose them. However such willingness to pay does not exist on the entire Romanian

population, according to last Eurobarometer data and could be more interpreted as a tendency of young academics to embrace ecological values as part of universal value spectrum. To oppose such values would probably mint for subjects to react in a traditional and not open minded way.

Discussion

The analysis presented is looking for the relation between ecological values internalization as a core dimension of cultural creatives and self actualization. Self actualized individuals, as Maslow described them, are people who accept themselves and others sharing humanistic values. Researchers (Brooker, 1976) have already proved that self actualised individuals are more social responsible than non self-actualized ones, meaning they feel responsible for others

wellbeing and are willing to pay more for goods and services that entire community would benefit from. On contrary data from our sample show that both self actualized and non self actualized students are willing to pay more for collecting and processing domestic waste, cars, food and water that pollutes less and even transportation means and fuels which are environment friendly.

The willingness to pay more is not share by the entire Romanian population since in 2008, March Eurobarometer 66% of the Romanians answered positive to the following question: "Should Romanian goverment buy only safe products for the environment, even if those would cost more?" The percentage of Romanians agree with such government ecological safe measures is bellow EU mean percentage (73%) and personally I believe that there will be even less people expressing their agreement when the question would be adressed more directly as we formulated it in the present research: "Would you agree to pay more...?"

The data colected on the Romanian student sample indicates they are adjusting the ecological universal values to their selves and they are in the process of becoming social responsible consumers starting with largerly accepting the importance of goods and services that pollute less regarless to the costs involved.

One could argues that student from our sample are young and not involved yet on the labor market so that they will share an unrealistic view on costs of environment protection public policies. However, more than on third of Romanians (not only students) are demanding infromtion about environment protection from their goverbnment, at least according to 2008 Eurobarometer. Only 30% of the Romanian citizens feel they are proper informed on ecological problems by their Government and this is the smallest percentage in the EU for 2008.

The willingness to pay more for a clean environment in case of students could not

necessarily been related to unrealistic cost estimation but to an optimistic life approach in general. Such an explanation is supported by scores on SAV scale in our students sample which are larger than standardized adult sample scores. Because of their age and limited life experience they tend to be less worried about costs in general. If they share an optimistic general view, this could explain also the moderate concern on ecological problems.

However we should not neglect the fact that the entire Romanian population is less concerned about environmental problems compare to other EU citizens and that environment protections measures are not considered a prioity as such. The absence from the public agenda of environmental issues could be a cause of such lack of concern, since ecological debates are scarcerly caught on public agenda priorities.

The data reveals that some environment problems create more concern than others, for example global warming or genetic product modification and our hypothesis is that such topics have been more on public debate than others.

The SAV scores about the level of self actuaization have dicrisciminated between those who are buying more products with recycle packages or check more toxic emissions of their cars an those who engage rarely in such behaviors. Self actualised individuls are those involved in more consumer responsible behaviors. Because we did not find any difference of concern about environement problems between the two groups we suggested that differences in social responsible behaviours could be no real but more a self projection, a part of self reconstruction to intergrate the emergent ecological universal values.

If indeed the self actualized individuals are one step ahead to those with less self actualization in the proccess of ecological values internalization and self adjusting to the global world, then we expect also future different behaviour patterns from the two groups in terms of social responsibility

because values are connected to attitudes and predict behaviours.

The large percentage of those willing to pay more for collecting and recycling domestic waste (82% of the students) combined with the percentage of those declaring they are not engaging in selecting domestic waste (70%) is in the line with last years discussions in Romania when several NGO's and also media companies have presented the importance of recycling and sorting. Subjects from our research repeatedly claimed the lack of necessary facilities for people to recycle as a prohibitor factor for those willing to engage themselves in such actions. A complementary research based on structured observation would reveal if the amount recycle centers in large and small cities is a real factor who plays a role in the equation or just a easy way for the subjects to justify the non active behavior.

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Globalization and crises

CORRELATIVE PERSPECTIVES

Mondialisation, globalisation et crise: phénomènes interconnectés

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Motto :

«Dans les pays en développement, la crise commande la vie quotidienne des plus pauvres... Les effets de la crise économique et financière menacent d'aggraver le manque d'emplois; avec pour résultat une augmentation du nombre de jeunes travailleurs bloqués dans la pauvreté, prolongeant le cycle de la pauvreté au travail d'une génération au moins».

Juan Somavia, Directeur général du Bureau international du travail (BIT)

Résumé: Un débat multiple, controversé et vu toujours sous des nouveaux angles... Beaucoup de questions et de plus en plus réponses... Mondialisation et crise ? Il ne s'agit pas de dire qu'il n'y a rien de nouveau sous le soleil. À l'évidence, l'échange des marchandises et des capitaux, les formes de production, les modalités de l'intervention de l'État dans les sociétés, sans parler des techniques de communication, ont énormément changé. Les circuits esclaves-sucre-biens manufacturés du XVIII^e siècle ont eu pour le développement capitaliste un tout autre poids que le circuit diamants-armes d'aujourd'hui. Simplement je plaide pour plus de rigueur: il faut regarder en détail comment ces circuits de marchandises sont constitués, comment les connexions dans l'espace s'étendent ou trouvent leurs limites et, dans l'analyse de processus amples et de longue durée tels que le développement capitaliste, prêter toute l'attention nécessaire à leur puissance, à leurs limitations et aux mécanismes qui les façonnent. On peut bien sûr appeler cela mondialisation mais, ce faisant, on ne fait que dire que l'histoire se produit à l'intérieur des limites de la planète et qu'en conséquence toute histoire est histoire mondiale. Toutefois, si l'on veut voir dans la mondialisation l'intégration progressive de différentes parties du monde en un tout unique, alors la thèse peut être accusée d'être linéaire et téléologique. Les « globaliseurs » sont raison de nous inciter. Bien sûr, toutes les formes changeantes de connexions transcontinentales, toutes les formes d'intégration et de différenciation, de flux et de blocages, du passé et du présent peuvent être vues comme des aspects d'un processus unique mais complexe qu'on peut appeler mondialisation. Les mots ont un poids.

Introduction

Le bavardage incessant sur la mondialisation, la structure du mot lui-même, les images qui lui sont associées, les arguments pour et contre «elle», tout cela reflète et renforce la fascination pour une connectivité sans rivages. Les chercheurs ne sont tout de même pas obligés de choisir entre une rhétorique du contenu et une rhétorique du flux. Les questions, nullement secondaires, qu'il faut nous poser concernent le présent: qu'y a-t-il de réellement nouveau? Quels sont les mécanismes des changements en cours et par quoi sont-ils limités? Et surtout, est-il possible de mettre au point un vocabulaire assez subtil pour favoriser la réflexion sur les connexions et leurs limites?

Derrière la vogue de la mondialisation, il y a l'ambition de comprendre l'interconnexion entre différentes parties du monde, d'expliquer les mécanismes nouveaux qui président aux mouvements des capitaux, des hommes et des cultures, et questionnement historique ainsi que l'analyse précise de la structure des mécanismes de connexion et de leurs limites. Certes, il est salutaire de cesser de penser les processus sociaux, économiques, politiques et culturels dans les seuls cadres nationaux ou continentaux; mais, à adopter un vocabulaire impliquant qu'il n'y a pas de cadre du tout, sauf le planétaire, on risque de mal poser les problèmes.

Le monde a longtemps été – et est encore, malheureusement – un espace où les relations économiques et politiques sont très inégalement réparties; il est plein de grumeaux, de lieux où s'agglutinent le pouvoir et les relations sociales, baignant dans des zones dans lesquelles tout cela reste diffus. Structures et réseaux s'installent en certains points ou dans certaines activités, mais pour se diluer un peu plus loin. Amis et ennemis de la mondialisation discutent de ses effets. Les premiers sont en force aux États-Unis, où hommes politiques, journalistes et universitaires en vue expliquent que la levée des obstacles aux mouvements de capitaux

et l'intensification des communications et du commerce sont à la fois inéluctables et souhaitables. En chaque pays, le thème est très présent, mais «le santi» sont plus visibles que les «pro».

Il faut savoir si l'on étudie la mondialisation comme *discours*, c'est-à-dire affirmation portée sur le monde, ou bien comme *processus*, ensemble de changements ayant des effets réels sur la population de la planète. La difficulté est que nombre de ceux qui développent le discours font reposer l'essentiel de leur argumentation (normative) sur le postulat que la mondialisation *est*: réelle, inévitable, en marche. Les chercheurs qui l'utilisent de manière analytique risquent d'être pris au piège des structures discursives mêmes qu'ils voudraient analyser.

Surtout, la popularité du terme au sein de l'université¹ en dit long sur la pauvreté de la science sociale contemporaine confrontée à des processus certes gigantesques, mais non universels, et à la réalité des liaisons certes transfrontalières et transculturelles, mais fondées sur des mécanismes spécifiques à des espaces bornés. Que l'on se contente d'opposer le global au local – fût-ce pour étudier comment ils se construisent l'un l'autre – souligne bien l'inadéquation des outils actuels à l'analyse de tout le reste.

Les Français *mondialisent* quand les Américains *globalisent*, mais il ne faut pas chercher longtemps pour trouver des anglophones (universitaires, il est vrai), qui *mondialisent* et même certains qui parlent de *worldization...* En Français, le vocabulaire de l'économie recourt également au mot *globalisation*, et les articles savants ne manquent pas, qui tentent de cerner la différence entre *globalisation* et *mondialisation*.

La mondialisation, le développement durable et la compétitivité² sont trois grands défis et les jalons de notre présent. Par conséquent, ces dernières années, presque partout, est entré dans le langage courant, l'usage ordinaire de concepts tels que:

- la mondialisation, la gouvernance,

gouvernabilité, l'organisation,

- la durabilité, les partenariats, les connaissances, les performances, économique et politique
- les marchés et des formes d'intervention des pouvoirs publics,
- la restructuration, le chômage, licenciement, sociaux
- la pollution, l'écologisation, etc .et dont les significations ne sont pas toujours complètes et ne sont donc pas évalués, ou pire encore, peuvent devenir des armes avec une seule cible.

Dans le début des années 90, en affirmant les tendances de l'internationalisation de l'économie, mise en évidence par la mondialisation des marchés et le renforcement des institutions financières, l'ordre social et la politique ont subi de profondes transformations. Les forces du marché à partir dès maintenant peuvent définir les limites de la politique, les différents pays étant sous la pression des sociétés transnationales, à leur solidité financière.

Fondamentalement, la globalisation, à la suite de la mondialisation des marchés, crée de nouvelles formes d'intégration³ et encourage et développe et stimule la concurrence entre les acteurs économiques et sociaux. Mais c'est toujours elle qui peut engendrer de nouvelles formes d'exclusion qui conduisent au chômage ou des emplois précaires, à une culture du consumérisme, insoutenable à long terme.

Globalement, dans la littérature sont des avertissements sur la spécificité et la complexité sociale des processus responsables de la production de tels phénomènes. Au cours de ces processus, l'émergence du problème social est un élément clé étant associée à la pauvreté qui peut atteindre de nouveaux groupes de population et aussi conduire à une différenciation accrue dans la même société.

Sont particulièrement aggravantes dans le cadre du processus de restructuration économique qui implique, outre l'adoption de nouvelles technologies, de nouveaux

investisseurs, et en adoptant des politiques de rejeter parfois générer de graves conséquences sociales.

La mondialisation est aujourd'hui un phénomène incontournable des relations internationales; elle représente le contexte global au sein duquel se comprennent les différentes tendances et lignes de force de la planète.

Sur le plan de la typologie, on peut distinguer quatre caractéristiques de cette évolution multidimensionnelle:

Sa dimension économique: le libre échange tend à s'imposer comme système dominant, les frontières économiques s'estompent;

Sa dimension culturelle: on assiste à la rencontre des valeurs, des modèles de pensée et de comportement;

Sa dimension politique: la mondialisation se caractérise par une reconfiguration du rôle de l'État, qui doit composer avec de nouveaux acteurs et faire face à de nouveaux enjeux;

Sa dimension militaire: la tendance dominante est celle d'une régionalisation de la sécurité (OTAN- l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique du Nord), OUA-Organisation de l'Unité Africaine), avec des réussites plus ou moins avérées, et l'existence de menaces transnationales (criminalité, terrorisme)⁴.

On nous pose souvent une question, en qualité de professeur: Mondialisation ou globalisation? La distinction a-t-elle un sens, puisque l'une est la traduction française de l'autre, expression utilisée par les anglo-saxons?

Les interprétations varient, mais l'on peut en réalité donner un contenu différent à chacun de ces deux termes:

La mondialisation renvoie à l'idée d'une unification du temps et de l'espace. Elle est en quelque sorte l'ère géopolitique des années 1990, se caractérisant par le progrès scientifique et technologique ainsi que par la libre circulation des hommes, des marchandises, des idées, des capitaux. Elle participe en quelque sorte de ce que certains ont appelé «l'accélération de l'histoire» pour

qualifier l'évolution rapide de la société internationale;

La globalisation quant à elle suggère l'universalisation des enjeux, l'avènement d'un monde d'interdépendances économiques, politiques et sociales, et le recours nécessaire au multilatéralisme pour faire face à ces questions. Elle pose finalement la question de la mise en œuvre du principe de responsabilité de la communauté internationale⁵.

Les deux termes sont la plupart du temps utilisés de manière indifférenciée sans que cela prête à conséquences. Il faut simplement retenir que la mondialisation et la globalisation rendent compte de la transformation, à l'œuvre actuellement, du système international, qui se partage entre souveraineté et interdépendance, expression du droit et de la puissance.

La mondialisation véhicule un universel: la démocratie, les droits de l'homme, l'économie de marché... mais ne supprime pas les inégalités ni ne pacifie la scène mondiale. Elle tendrait même à complexifier l'expression de la violence et le schéma conflictuel, en multipliant les forces contradictoires. Les questions de la liberté et de la sécurité des personnes se posent en tout cas avec acuité, et concernent aussi bien les responsables politiques, économiques et militaires que ceux de la société civile, c'est à dire tous ces acteurs qui œuvrent à la résolution des conflits et à la construction de la paix.

Dans cette perspective, saisir la mondialisation comme un **fait total** implique de développer une approche **multidisciplinaire** à partir d'une conception extensive des sciences sociales. Il va falloir aller puiser dans ces différentes disciplines pour saisir dans toute son ampleur le phénomène de mondialisation, même ses traits essentiels.

- La dimension économique⁶ de la mondialisation;
- Les théories de la communication et l'anthropologie à sa dimension culturelle;
- La théorie des relations internationales et la science politique à sa dimension

politique;

- La littérature et la philosophie à sa dimension discursive...

Le **point de départ** est cependant socio-logique:

La mondialisation renvoie à **une perspective portée sur les sociétés humaines**.

Il s'agit de les concevoir dans leur **globalité** (élargir la perception par cercles concentriques) même de voir et de revoir les deux concepts dans la perspective du développement durable, qui englobe plus de notions en interconnexion: solidarité, intérêt collectif, responsabilité⁷, préservation de la nature, du climat de la biodiversité, coopération, participation et beaucoup d'autres, aussi importantes.

Une nouvelle approche conceptuelle, en termes d'activités durables, redirigeant – le déplacement de l'intérêt pour les entreprises responsables des stratégies – responsables socialement. La solution n'est pas novatrice, mais juste remodelée dans l'esprit éthique et civique. La réussite des entreprises du tourisme est basée sur la composante humaine et sans condition, en particulier sur son implication dans la fourniture des activités et des services d'intérêt, devenant responsables, soucieux, solidaires avec l'environnement, l'économie, les ressources, obtenant ainsi une participation totale aux enjeux sociétaux (Fig. 1).

Ce modèle de développement durable, sert souvent de guide pour les entreprises commerciales. Il inclut la culture comme un élément tout aussi important que les trois autres piliers du développement durable de la traditionnelle (sociaux, économiques et environnementaux). En outre, la démocratie, la responsabilisation et la participation responsable, civique composante transversale, levier du développement durable..

Cette notion de globalité renvoie tout d'abord à une perspective d'ensemble, concevoir l'**humanité** dans son ensemble, par-delà les différences, chercher le semblable, le commun. Concevoir l'humanité comme un ensemble interdépendant, par-delà les frontières.




Fig. 1. Modèle de Développement durable
 (adaptation des auteurs d'après Association Adequations –
 La fleur du Développement Durable <http://www.adequations.org/spip.php?article112>)

Cette notion de globalité renvoie aussi au globe, ce phénomène objectif: politique, scientifique, ordinaire, la terre, le **milieu de vie de l'humanité**, et vise ainsi à souligner aussi l'interdépendance entre l'humain et son milieu de vie, la nature. Ce sont les enjeux environnementaux qui ont stimulé la prise de conscience des responsabilités mutuelles de tous les peuples, et de la relation avec notre environnement.

Concevoir le monde comme un **système d'interdépendance, d'interactions** entre les sociétés humaines qui se trouvent insérées dans une humanité commune, mais aussi un écosystème partagé.

De comprendre ces interactions en

fonctions des divers registres de l'activité humaine: l'économique (le capitalisme mondialisé), le politique (les mobilisations sociales et la problématique incarnation du pouvoir et sa légitimité démocratique) et le culturel (la communication et la diversité dans le village global).

Tout le débat entourant la compréhension de ce phénomène de mondialisation va donc consister dans l'interprétation de la nature de ces interdépendances et de ces interactions entre les sociétés humaines insérées dans un système global, de leurs implications, de leurs conséquences sur ces sociétés. On peut ajouter que: la **mondialisation** caractérise l'ordre mondial d'après-guerre qui

visait à assurer la **sécurité**, la **justice** et le **bien-être** (prospérité) à partir d'institutions politiques nationales et internationales chargées de réguler les sociétés et les rapports entre sociétés, ce qui les pousse à intervenir dans le domaine économique. En tant que la **globalisation**: caractérise l'ordre global actuel qui ne vise qu'à accroître la **richesse** de quelques uns à discréditer et dissoudre les institutions politiques interventionnistes au profit d'une forme de régulation (ou d'autorégulation) par le marché, selon une logique libérale de marché.

Selon Brunelle⁸, l'après-guerre constitue le *moment zéro* de la mondialisation contemporaine, dans le sens où elle correspond à une période historique particulière où a été tenté un projet d'institutionnalisation (d'encadrement formel) des relations et des échanges internationaux. Ce processus d'institutionnalisation, qui consiste à créer des règles et des institutions, des autorités légitimes de régulation, supposait cependant de définir des champs de compétence distincts et clairement délimités. D'où une double distinction entre sphère privée et publique de la vie sociale (définie par les droits), et domaine national et international (définie par la souveraineté étatique), qui permettent de définir des espaces de souveraineté où certaines autorités sont chargées de faire respecter les règles dans une perspective de bien commun.

Le projet multidimensionnel de la mondialisation

C'est dans ce contexte qu'a été mis en place le cadre institutionnel de régulation de la mondialisation au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, essentiellement de 1944 à 1948:

- Charte de Philadelphie (1944) qui relance l'OIT (L'Organisation internationale du Travail);
- Les Accords de Bretton Woods qui mettent en place le FMI et la BERD (1944);
- Création de l'ONU avec l'adoption de

la Charte des Nations Unies (1944);

- Crédit du GATT (1947) et échec de l'OIC (l'Organisation Internationale du Commerce) en 1948 et la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'Homme (1948). Ce cadre est fondé sur l'impératif de la coopération internationale (État souverain) et de la solidarité nationale (État providence).

Le projet actuel de globalisation, minimise la dimension universaliste de l'ordre mondial, et tend à apparaître comme un projet américain, voire états-unien. Il y a donc dérive de la mondialisation par rapport aux objectifs de l'après-guerre.

En fait, l'élément fondamental qui permet de comprendre le passage de la mondialisation à la globalisation réside dans la transformation du rôle de l'État. En effet, l'encadrement institutionnel des échanges mondiaux qui caractérise la mondialisation de l'après-guerre repose sur la place centrale de l'État et sa capacité de régulation à la fois de sa société et de son économie nationales, mais aussi des relations internationales par le biais des institutions multilatérales mises en place. La remise en cause de l'autorité de régulation, au profit d'une vision du marché libre rend caduque la double distinction entre sphères privé / public, entre les niveaux national / international. Cela conduit à une crise du providentialisme et de la souveraineté et l'émergence de nouveaux acteurs puissants dans le monde globalisé, en marge des États, les sociétés transnationales. Dans cette nouvelle reconfiguration du monde, sur le plan économique, l'État n'a plus pour fonction de garantir la croissance d'une économie nationale, mais bien de jouer le jeu de la globalisation soit en favorisant la transnationalisation de ses firmes, soit en attirant les firmes étrangères (IDE-Investissements Directes Étrangères).

Une autre intéressante vision sur le phénomène si controversé appartient à J. Scolte. Pour Scholte (*Globalization, a critical introduction*, Londres, Macmillan, 2000), la globalisation a donné lieu à toute sorte de positions interprétatives. Il distingue

trois attitudes de la part des chercheurs:

- les **globalistes**,
- les **ultra-sceptiques**
- et les **modérés**.

Les premiers vont célébrer cette nouvelle phase de l'histoire humaine (entrepreneurs, technologues, postmodernes); les seconds vont percevoir la globalisation comme une pure idéologie, un mythe qui ne fait que dissimuler le pouvoir des Etats puissants, enfin les troisièmes vont plutôt adopter une position prudente et tenter de comprendre le phénomène en identifiant ses multiples dimensions et en acceptant sa grande complexité. Pour Jan Scholte nous pouvons distinguer 5 grandes conceptions de la *globalisation*:

- **L'internationalisation:** essor des relations transfrontalières entre les différents pays. Phénomène qui se caractérise par l'augmentation des échanges internationaux, et par le fait même de l'interdépendance des pays pris dans ce système international en interaction;

La libéralisation: un processus de réduction des entraves politiques, du moins gouvernementales ou étatiques, aux flux de nature économique entre les différents pays. Processus qui abouti à une intégration économique internationale. Création d'un marché mondial, ouvert;

L'universalisation: dimension plus culturelle qui vise une certaine synthèse globale du monde, unité du genre humain sous l'effet de ses multiples interactions.

L'occidentalisation ou la **modernisation**: donne un sens particulier à ce processus d'unification culturelle, qui apparaît ici comme un processus d'homogénéisation à partir d'un référent clairement identifié (américanisation). Imposition des structures sociales de la modernité occidentale à l'ensemble du monde (capitalisme, rationalisme, industrialisation, bureaucratie, démocratie). (Impérialisme, assimilation, colonialisme).

Déterritorialisation ou **supra territorialité**: consiste en une reconfiguration de la géographie, des espaces sociaux qui se

recomposent par-delà les délimitations, frontières territoriales traditionnelles (modernes). C'est surtout cet aspect de la mondialisation que va explorer Scholte, car il lui permet ensuite d'aborder toutes les autres dimensions.

Rétrospective analytique du phénomène:

En ce qui concerne cette analyse, Scholte distingue **trois phases dans la globalisation** sans toutefois identifier un point d'origine précis. Selon lui, jusqu'à ce que les progrès technologiques puissent enfin favoriser concrètement les échanges internationaux, à partir du milieu du 19^e siècle, la globalisation se manifestait surtout au sein d'un imaginaire global. Concevoir le monde dans sa globalité, tout d'abord avec les religions mondiales, puis la philosophie des Lumières. En fait durant cette première phase, la globalisation existait surtout dans les mentalités de certains. Les communications, les marchés, la production, les monnaies, la finance, les organisations, l'économie sociale étaient quasi inexistantes au niveau supra territorial.

Cela va commencer à changer durant la seconde phase, celle de la **globalisation émergente (1850-1950)**.

Communications: télégraphe (1850's), téléphone et radio (1890's), transport aérien intercontinental (1919).

Marchés: consolidation au niveau global des échanges de matières premières. Développement de la production industrielles de biens de consommation: conserves (Campbell, Heinz: 1880's, coca-cola en 1886), machines, publicité (1899), Cow boy Marlboro (1954), Mc Donald (1955).

Monnaie et finance: La livre sterling fut la première monnaie globale (1870-1914), puis étalon-or au lendemain de la première guerre mondiale. Mais la finance demeurait plus internationale que globale.

Organisations: que ce soit les compagnies (Colt ouvre une usine en Grande Bretagne en 1852, l'allemand Siemens en Russie en 1855, le japonais Kikkoman une manufacture de sauce soya aux USA en 1896), des organisations internationales

(UIT, 1865, UP, 1874, SDN, 1920, Interpol, 1923), des organisations de la société civile (religieuses, mouvements de travailleurs (première internationale en 1864, seconde en 1889, troisième en 1919), syndicats.

Mentalités: S'approfondit la conscience globale du fait du développement des médias de masse et des grandes célébrations mondiales (expo universelle dès 1851, jeux olympiques 1896), tourisme (1872 Cook), tout-inclus 1949.

En fait ce qui manquait dans cette seconde phase de la globalisation, c'était principalement la mise en place d'une chaîne de production transfrontalière et la conscience globale des problèmes environnementaux.

Ainsi la troisième phase identifiée par Scholte va comprendre ces deux derniers éléments, tout en approfondissant l'intensité de ceux apparus au siècle précédent du fait du développement technologique.

Depuis les années 60 s'est donc imposée une globalisation à large échelle caractérisée par:

Développement des **communications** électroniques: satellites (1962 par ATT), fibre optique (câbles transocéaniques, 1988), Internet (Arpanet 1969). ESSOR DES CAPACITÉS, baisse des coûts. TV par satellites (1962) (premier direct par satellite fut concert de Beatles en 1967), radio, transport aérien...

Mondialisation des **marchés**: la diversité sur les tablettes.

Production: commerce intra-firme mondial débute avec les productions de composants électroniques (semi-conducteurs), puis le textile, automobile et électroménagers (biens industriels). Passage actuel aux services.

Monnaie: Bretton Woods dollars monnaie globale (alignée sur l'or). Fini en 1971. Aujourd'hui, système pluraliste de monnaies fluctuantes.

Finance: essor de la finance et de la spéculation grâce aux NTIC.

Organisations: multiplication des mafias, des ONG.

Écologie: prise de conscience de

problèmes globaux: couche d'ozone, réchauffement climatique, perte de la diversité biologique.

Conscience globale, accélération grâce aux enjeux environnementaux, voyages, solidarité internationale, reconnaissance de la diversité.

Une approche anthropologique polymorphe du concept revient à J.F.Bayart. L'approche de Bayart est intéressante si on la prend dans le prolongement des deux analyses précédentes car elle établit un lien avec chacune d'elles tout en apportant un nouvel élément.

Pour Jean-François Bayart (*Le gouvernement du monde. Une critique politique de la mondialisation*, Paris, Fayard, 2004, p.97), la mondialisation correspond avant tout à un changement d'échelle des sociétés, à une compression de l'espace et du temps. Élargissement progressif de l'horizon des interactions humaines, des imaginaires (du village, à la nation, puis au globe): *une interaction mutuelle généralisée* à l'échelle transnationales. Cela correspond à la supra territorialité dont parlait Scholte⁹.

La mondialisation est le fruit de plusieurs phénomènes qui se sont conjugués tout au long du 19^e siècle (1776-1914). Bayart¹⁰ en identifie 6.

La construction d'un système international structuré, penser les relations entre États. (La première institution internationale, l'Union télégraphique internationale, 1865; l'Union postale universelle, 1874; le Bureau international des poids et mesures, 1875; l'Organisation météorologique, 1878; L'Union internationale pour la protection de la propriété industrielle, 1883; la banque internationale, les internationales socialistes, le comité olympique, 1896; les ONG, le scoutisme, les organisations ecclésiales internationales).

L'émergence du libéralisme économique du fait de la révolution industrielle qui, en perfectionnant les moyens de communication et de production, permet l'expansion du commerce mondial.

Apparition d'un nouveau cosmopolis-

tisme, conscience du monde, essor de la science.

Migrations de grandes ampleur (notamment transatlantique: 44 millions d'Européens gagnent les Amériques, mais aussi ailleurs: 3 à 6 millions d'Indiens quittent leur pays, 12 millions de Chinois). Brassage de population. Terres d'immigrations.

Expériences politiques particulières mêlant liberté (révolutions, république, démocratie, lutte contre l'esclavage) mais aussi asservissement (colonialisme, partage du monde, empires).

Développement de la société civile internationale, qui revendique le droit humanitaire (création de la croix rouge en 1863) et le droit d'ingérence.

Conclusions

Dans la société moderne on constate, sans cesse les effets négatifs du développement de la société humaine. Par conséquent, on pose la question d'une nouvelle interprétation de la notion de développement, en tenant compte des interdépendances entre les questions environnementales, bien-être général et le processus de croissance. Actuellement, une attention particulière est accordée au développement durable. Peut-être, un compromis, une connexion, un mélange entre ces perspectives de la mondialisation, la globalisation doit impérativement se réaliser dans la perspective de la durabilité... Depuis le début des années 1990, la «mondialisation» désigne une nouvelle phase dans l'intégration planétaire des phénomènes économiques, financiers, écologiques et culturels. Un examen attentif montre que ce phénomène n'est ni linéaire ni irréversible. On verra...

Notes

¹ Mazilu Mirela-Elena. Globalisation where? *European Research Studies Journal*, Vol. XIII, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 189-210.

² Mazilu Mirela-Elena, Roxana Marinescu. The Competitiviness of the Romanian Tourism – a ghost or sustainable reality? *Annals of Faculty of Economics*, Oradea, Vol. 4, Issue, 1, 2009, pp. 367-372.

³ Mazilu Mirela-Elena, The Dynamics and Manifestations of Globalisation. *European Research Studies Journal*, Vol. XI, Issue 3, 2008, pp. 83-91.

⁴ Sylvie Brunelle. Article de la rubrique «10 questions sur la mondialisation». *Mensuel*, No. 180 (special), Mars 2007.

⁵ Mazilu Mirela-Elena. Globalisation where? *European Research Studies Journal*. Vol. XIII, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 189-210.

⁶ Mazilu Mirela-Elena, Mariana Ciobanu. A New Challenge in the Current Economic Stabilization. *ISI Scientific Proceedings of the 10th WSEAS International Conference of Recent Advances in Mathematics and Computers in Business and Economics MCBE '09*, Prague, Czech Republic, 23-25 Mars, 2009, pp. 286-292.

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⁸ Sylvie Brunelle, Le Développement durable. *Puff, coll. «Que sais-je?»*, 2004, Paris, p. 23.

⁹ Scholte. *Globalization, a critical introduction*. Londres, Macmillan, 2000, pp. 123-124.

¹⁰ Jean-François Bayart. *Le gouvernement du monde. Une critique politique de la mondialisation*. Paris, Fayard, 2004, p. 78.

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Criză, personalitate și comunicare

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Abstract: If we start from the premises that any crisis, defined as a "manifestation of a balance breach" is, firstly, a crisis of communication, a critical existential stage followed cyclically by the individual, group, organization or society (in the first case: birth, adolescence, mid-life crisis, retirement, death are just a few examples), then the antagonism proposed in the title ceases to appear a simple game of words: the crisis, defined as a crisis of communication is opposed to the communication of the crisis itself and, many times, it finds its own solving in this.

Key words: crisis of communication, existential stage, language, personality.

Introducere

Dacă orice criză, definită ca "manifestare a unei ruperi de echilibru" (Norbert Sillamy, 1996, p. 88) este, în primul rând, o criză de comunicare, o etapă existențială critică pe care individul, grupul, organizația sau societatea o traversează ciclic (în cazul celui dintâi: nașterea, întârcarea, adolescența, criza de la mijlocul vieții, pensionarea sunt doar câteva exemple), dihotomia propusă în titlu încetează să mai pară un simplu joc de cuvinte: criza, într-o accepțiune generală de *criză a comunicării*, se situează în opozitie cu însăși *comunicarea crizei*, și, de multe ori, își găsește în aceasta propria rezolvare.

În fața *crizei*, fie aceasta emoțională, politică, socială ori economică, atât individul, cât și organizația, întreprinderea, pot adopta, aşa cum vom vedea, diferite strategii, mai mult sau mai puțin riscante, dintre care trei

se detașează cu pregnanță : 1. recunoașterea problemei sau acceptarea, 2. diversiunea sau proiectul lateral și 3. refuzul sau obstrucția.

Personalitate și Limbaj

În cazul *individualului*, trebuie să facem, mai întâi, deosebirea dintre conflictul intrapsihic, cel care desemnează o dimensiune constantă și diacronică a dezvoltării și criza, care este exactă și localizată, constituind o schimbare decisivă, o ruptură, un moment acut dedezchilibrul, dar și o oportunitate pentru schimbare; "noțiunea este legată de cea de continuitate sau de discontinuitate a dezvoltării și chiar de validitatea conținutului stadiilor". (Roland Doron, Francoise Parot, 1999, p. 201). Suferința, durerea, disconfortul fizic sau psihic, de la plânsul bebelușului până la depresia acută a adulțului aflat în pragul suicidului, au ca primă condiție a atenuării

ori chiar vindecării *comunicabilitatea*: o criză comunicată, împărtășită, este pe jumătate vindecată, acest principiu, fundamentat pe funcția cathartică a limbajului, stând, așa cum se știe, la originea spovedaniei și a oricărui tip de psihoterapie.

Care sunt premisele raportului dintre *Personalitate și Limbaj*? În 1986, psihanalista franceză Françoise Dolto se adresa astfel unui public inițiat, format din psihologi, medici și asistenți sociali: “Doresc să vă semnalez dumneavoastră, care vă ocupați de educația sau asistența medicală și socială a copiilor și tinerilor aflați în dificultate fizică, psihică, afectivă, familială sau socială importanța cuvintelor spuse sau nespuse asupra evenimentelor care marchează viața unui copil, adesea fără știrea lui și uneori fără știrea celor din jurul său (...) Ființa umană este, înainte de toate, o ființă de limbaj” (Dolto, F., 1987, p.7). Forța civilizatorie a limbajului acționează sincronic și diacronic, individual și transindividual; cuvântul reprezintă linia de demarcare definitivă dintre natură și cultură, mitul Genezei, ca orice mit ambivalent, putând fi citit și ca un mit al investirii simbolice: “*Și omul a pus nume tuturor vitelor, păsărilor cerului și tuturor fiarelor câmpului*” (Geneza, 2, 20). Gestul primordial al numirii, prin excelență patern, simulând divinitatea, este cel care, dând numele, instaurează ordinea simbolică: “*O frescă de Giotto – scrie M. Bydlowski – face în mod genial sinteza reprezentărilor nașterii și numirii patern. Fresca reprezintă două camere ale unei locuințe, separate printr-un perete gros. Într-o din ele, Elisabeta tocmai a născut; epuizată, se odihnește stând întinsă. Ea este înconjurată exclusiv de femei. Într-o altă cameră, la distanță, Zaharia cel mut apare prezentând copilul Ioan Botezătorul. Pe o tăblă el înscrie «Ioan», numele dictat de îngerul lui Dumnezeu. Absent la scena nașterii copilului, el îl înscrie în linia spirituală căreia îi aparține. Astfel se articulează versantul simbolic al paternității. Tatăl trece mai departe numele pe care îl poartă*” (Bydlowski, M., 1998, p. 96). Reprezentarea picturală apa-

rent naivă: “două camere ale unei locuințe separate printr-un perete gros” a dihotomiei natură vs cultură, feminin vs masculin, relevă persistența opoziției inconciliente dintre cele două arhetipuri: matern vs patern; analizându-le în *Arhetipurile și inconștiul colectiv*, C.G. Jung adaugă celui dintâi o nouă dihotomie: complexul matern al fiului vs complexul matern al ficei, descriind conotațiile pozitive și negative, benefice și malefice, intens polarizate.

Descriind minuțios efectul structurant/destructurant al limbajului asupra personalității ulterioare a ființei umane (vitalizant/devitalizant în accepțiune psicanalitică) F. Dolto denunță impactul primelor cuvinte auzite de copil la nașterea sa: ele însotesc, diminuând sau amplificând – ceea ce Otto Rank numește *traumatismul venirii pe lume*: “*Atunci când, la nașterea unui copil, epuizată de-a fi moșit alți douăzeci în ziua aceeași sătulă până peste cap de țipete, moașa, ținând în brațe copilul care poate că plângе un pic mai tare decât altul, îi spune mamei : «Of, Doamne, copilul ăsta o să-ți dea de furcă, nu alta !...»*, aceste cuvinte o marchează pe mamă, dar îl marchează, din păcate, și pe copil. Cuvintele auzite (cu valoare predictivă) îi vor induce comportamentul ulterior” (Dolto, F., 1987, p. 34).

Relația simbolică a Eul-ui cu Celălalt, ecuația Identitate/Alteritate, vor fi puternic destabilizate; moașa (aici, profet al nefericirii sau inductor al efectului Rosenthal-Pygmalion), reprezintă instanța valorizantă, primul genitor simbolic al copilului. Pe un dublu canal de comunicare: tactil/auditiv – ea face parte, temporar în aparență, din triada mamă/tată/copil, substituindu-se tatălui, opunându – se mamei și transferând inconștient asupra noii ființe toată încărcătura ei de epuizare și resentiment. Ea “cea de-a 13-a ursitoare” ale căror predicții se împlinesc întotdeauna, cu atât mai placabil cu cât momentul emiterii lor și emițătorul propriu-zis au o mai mare importanță aniversar-afectivă pentru destinatar.

Agresivitatea verbală, ca și cea fizică, este transculturală: ea comportă mode-

le identice în culturi diferite, este “culture free”, aşa cum demonstrează pe larg I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt: “...ea merge dela degradare până la dezumanizare, implicând în același timp amenințarea excluderii. De asemenea, omul poate să creeze, prin cuvinte, situații declanșatoare de agresivitate, ca de exemplu, atunci când spune: “De acum înainte nu mai vorbesc cu tine!” Cărțile verbale înllocuiesc acțiunea, constituind o **formă particulară de ritualizare** (s.n.). Ritualizarea conflictelor reprezintă unul din factorii importanți ai evoluției limbii”. (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I., 1995, p. 128). Această ritualizare este realizată metaforic, simbolul devinind principalul suport al devierii, descărcării sau sublimării agresivității; astfel, la indienii Waika din jungla Orinoco-ului superior, sau la eschimoșii de pe coasta de vest a Alaskăi, există cântece de duel al căror stil urmează un tipar tradițional, textele fiind compuse de fiecare individ în parte în funcție de ocazia respectivă: orice motiv de dispută, orice criză, cu excepția crimelor, își găsește rezolvarea în acest mod *sui generis* de comunicare interpersonală.

Versantului agresivității i se opune, simetric, cel al afectivității, iar în dualitatea freudiană Eros/Thanatos cel dintâi beneficiază dintotdeauna mai mult de auspicile metaforei: stau doavadă toate operele de artă ale omenirii, ca tot atâtea mesaje de iubire. În *Simboluri ale transformării*, Jung scrie: “Asistăm astfel la primele instințe artistice în evoluția speciilor, puse în serviciul instinctului de procreare limitat la perioada de rut (...) nu poate exista nici un dubiu în ceea ce privește apartenența originară a muzicii la sfera perpetuării speciilor”.

Există, totuși, autori (Fr. Parot, M. Richelle) care denunță drept iluzorie ambiția de a analiza conduită umană făcând abstracție de apartenența sa la o cultură specifică, arătând că antropologi ca Malinowski sau Mead au combătut acele teorii ale personalității care au pretenția de a fi universale, punând în discuție, de exemplu, afirmațiile freudiene referitoare la universalitatea complexului oedipian. “Deși

am putea crede că mecanismele spiritului uman sunt în esență aceleași pretutindeni în lume, conținuturile asupra cărora întorc pot fi diferite. Astfel, metaforele prin care concepem chiar structura gândirii noastre, sau a relațiilor cu lumea, sunt adesea împrumutate de la niște obiecte care domină activitățile cotidiene, sau care fascinează prin eficiență, eleganță și misterul lor” (Parot, F., Richelle, M., 1995, p. 215).

În *Antropologia structurală*, Lévi-Strauss evidențiază, încadrul “complexului ţamanic” bazat pe o complicitate participativă de tip psihoterapeutic, efectul benefic vs malefic al magiei asupra psihologiei primitivilor, demontând mecanismul psihofiziologic aflat fie la originea vindecărilor miraculoase ori a unor eficiente incantații Obstetricice, fie la originea unor cazuri de moarte prin vrajă sau farmece. Permeabilitatea la astfel de fenomene ale unor conștiințe aflate mai aproape de natură decât de cultură permite amplificarea subiectivă până la paroxism a efectelor bilstemului asupra celui condamnat; efectul punitiv al izolării victimei, al aboliriicomunicării, estela fel de puternic ca și o sentință irevocabilă, substituindu-se execuției fizice: “Comunitatea se îndepărtează de cel blestemat, comportându-se față de el ca și cum ar fi nu numai deja mort, dar chiar și o sursă de primejdie pentru întregul anturaj. La fiecare ocazie și prin toate comportările sale, corpul social îi sugerează moartea nenorocitei victime, care nu mai are pretenția de a se sustrage de la ceea ce consideră a fi destinul ei ineluctabil. (...) Privat mai întâi în mod brutal de toate legăturile sale familiale și sociale și exclus din toate funcțiile și activitățile (...) individul vrăjit cedează în fața intensei terori pe care o resimte, a retragerii subite și totale a multiplelor sisteme de referință furnizate prin conivența grupului (...) care, din om viu, subiect de drepturi și îndatoriri, îl proclamă mort, obiect de temeri, de rituri și de interdicții. **Integritatea fizică nu rezistă în fața dizolvării personalității sociale** (s.n.)” (Lévi-Strauss, C., 1978, p. 220).

Același complicat sistem al manipulației

psihice prin intermediul *limbajului* este abordat și de Freud în *Totem și tabu*; inventariind minuțios tehniciile și metodele influențării prin magie și vrăjitorie, părintele psihanalizei disecă sistemul de gândire animist al societății primitive, definindu-l drept primă teorie psihologică a omenirii, care, nefiind încă o religie, conține și întrunește condițiile preliminare pe baza cărora se vor construi mai târziu religiile.

Bruno Bettelheim confirmă același mecanism, de data aceasta psihorecuperator, declanșat prin forța sugestivă a *cuvântului*, prin lectura sau ascultarea basmului, evenimentele sufletești individuale devin întâmplări și personaje: “În medicina tradițională hindusă, bunăoară, celor dezorientați psihic li se impunea **meditația profundă asupra unui basm** (s.n.). Contemplând povestea, pacientul este obligat să devină conștient de natura impasului în care existența sa intrase fără voie și totodată de posibilitatea căsării unei soluții. Astfel, speranța sau disperarea omenească zugrăvite de o poveste sau de alta, cât și soluțiile sugerate, permit ele bolnavului să descopere modalitatea de a ieși din suferință (...) Calitatea terapeutică a basmului provine tocmai din faptul că pacientul își găsește propriile soluții meditând la ceea ce povestea îi spune despre el însuși și despre conflictele sale interioare într-un moment al vieții lui” (Bettelheim, B., 1976, p. 43).

Rolul limbajului în ritualizarea agresivității (agresivitatea fiind ipostaziată ca o componentă importantă a personalității umane) și în exorcizarea suferinței este completat de aspectul ritualizării transculturale a formelor de comunicare prin formule de politețe și urări. Salutul, zâmbetul, darul, urarea aniversară au pretutindeni aceeași structură fundamentală și același rol: dezamorsează ostilitatea, pacifică, sudează legăturile intra și intergrupale, constituind *ritualuri culturale de apropiere, comunicare și curățare*. “Funcția universală a salutului este aceea de a stabili sau de a menține o legătură și de a atenua

simțăminte agresive. Salutul prietenilor și cunoștințelor se face nu numai în momentul primei întâlniri din cursul unei zile, ci, adesea, după fiecare scurtă separare. Formulele de despărțire fac și ele parte din complexul comportamentului de salut. Când ne luăm rămas bun de la cineva, întărim încă o dată, legăturile viitoare prin intermediul ritualurilor prietenești” (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I., 1998, p. 185).

Vorbind despre *ritualuri de întâlnire*, Eric Berne, autorul *analizei tranzacționale*, le definește drept “serii stereotipice de tranzacții complementare”, formale sau informale, golite de orice conținut informativ și bazate pe calcule intuitive, inconștiente, făcute de partenerii tranzacției. Ceea ce s-ar putea identifica drept o formă de *limbaj dublu* – flirtul, de exemplu, în care o aparentă discuție despre vreme camuflează un dialog erotic (și în care nivelul comunicării conștiente, digitale nu este numai dublat de cel al comunicării inconștiente, analogice, ci și de un al doilea nivel verbal *“parazit”*, un fel de pseudo-comunicare, consimțit de ambii parteneri ai tranzacției) este numită de Berne *“tranzacție – duplex”* și este explicată prin nevoie de autoprotejare și evaluare până la testarea fiecărei situații sociale.

Bunele urări nu pot anula efectul agresivității din imprecații și blestemele, însă îl pot îmblânzii; să ne amintim discursul “zânei bune” din basmul lui Charles Perrault, *Frumoasa din pădurea adormită*: “*Liniștiți-vă, rege și regină, fiica voastră nu va muri. E adevarat că eu nu am destulă putere ca să desfac în întregime ceea ce zâna cea rea a făcut: printesa se va înțepa la degetu un fus, nu pot să împiedic asta, dar, în loc să moară, ea va cădea într-un somn adânc. Acest somn va dura 100 de ani, după care un fiu de rege va veni să o trezească*”; este ceea ce va spune, ulterior, și Jung : *darul* este expresia materială a *Sinelui*; ne dăruim, de fapt, pe noi însine, sau altfel spus, *darul suntem noi* și nu putem dărui ceea ce nu suntem.

Aflate în relație antagonică, blestemul, imprecația, ocara, pe de o parte și zâmbetul,

salutul, urarea, pe de altă parte, reprezintă tot atâtea proiecții ale unor temperamente și structuri comportamentale diferite: zâna cea bună va neutraliza cuvintele celei malefice tot prin cuvinte, ameliorând simptomul; este rostul oricărei terapii prin cuvânt: printr-un voaj discursiv regresiv, atinge sursa suferinței – această metaforă a corpului – și, numind-o, o aduce la suprafață, vindecând-o. Constituind interfața dintre *individual* și *social*, *limbajul* determină personalitatea și este determinat de către aceasta: *tulburările de limbaj* reflectă tulburări ale personalității. Astfel, pe de o parte, între *autism* și *schizofrenie*, ca poli extremi, putem localiza: afazia, alexia, parafazia și toate celelalte, iar pe de altă parte, atât *personalitatea prejudiciată*, cât și cea *accentuată* se trădează în și prin limbaj. Raportul de inter-determinare dintre personalitate și limbaj este tot atât de simbiotic precum cel între formă și conținut: limbajul ne dezvăluie personalitatea, contrar a ceea ce afirma, cu un atât de pitoresc paradox, Talleyrand: “*Cuvintele i-au fost date omului pentru a-și ascunde gândurile*”.

Strategii de rezolvare a crizelor organizaționale

Tinând cont de această importanță extremă a limbajului în amorsarea sau dezamorsarea conflictelor interumane, și pentru a învăța să gestioneze situațiile neprevăzute, întreprinderile, ca și politicienii, ar trebui să reflecteze în avans asupra evenimentelor posibile și să simuleze, în consecință, ca în exercițiile antitero sau împotriva dezastrelor și catastrofelor naturale, scenarii complexe al căror obiectiv să îl constituie formularea unor strategii precise de comunicare în caz de *criză*. După Didier Heiderich, consultant al site-lui www.communication-sensible.com și redactor șef al news-letter-ului *Observatoire international des crises*, deși fiecare întreprindere, fiecare situație implică o viziune diferită, se pot, totuși, discerne trei mari *strategii de comunicare a crizei*, fiecare cu avantajele și inconvenientele ei.

Recunoașterea

Ca și în situația crizelor individuale, când acceptarea faptului că ai o problemă și ai nevoie de un ajutor profesionist constituie prima și cea mai importantă soluție de ieșire din impas, în contextul organizațional, această primă strategie constă în a accepta criza și asta cât mai repede posibil. În cadrul acestei strategii, dacă presa dezvăluie criza înaintea întreprinderii, este din cauza faptului ca aceasta din urmă comunică prost și că, deja, criza nu mai poate fi stăpânită. În acest caz, întreprinderea trebuie să acționeze urgent și să fie în măsură să determine rapid gradul ei de competență în raport cu “*motorul*” crizei; cest “*motor*” poate fi intern, legat, de exemplu, de productivitatea întreprinderii, sau extern, datorat unui context aversiv, politic sau de altă natură, implicând abordări diferite ale comunicării de criză. În general, strategia recunoașterii se sprinjă pe o comunicare clară și fermă. În funcție de context, întreprinderea beneficiază de mai multe alternative:

1. Recunoașterea completă a situației de criză și asumarea răspunderii. În acest caz, asumarea recuperării prejudiciilor suportate deja aduce un avantaj atât din punct de vedere juridic, cât și mediatic.
2. Exprimarea onestă a stării de confuzie sau derivă, atunci când întreprinderea nu cunoaște cauzele care stau la originea situației.
3. Extinderea responsabilității către actori externi, cum sunt autoritățile de control.
4. Separarea lucrurilor bune de cele rele, renunțând la cei responsabili de instalarea crizei, dacă trebuie.
5. Restrângerea crizei la obiect, un loc, un interval de timp; scopul este acela de a evita extinderea fenomenului la alte produse, mărci, filiale...

Deși puțin folosită, această strategie a recunoașterii este, totuși, una dintre cele care funcționează cel mai bine, după cum susține Didier Heiderich. Dificultatea asumării eroilor și răspunderii devine mai suportabilă prin abordarea ei transparentă, care implică augmentarea credibilității față de diferențe-

le publicuri. Această strategie permite, de asemenea, evitarea unei inflații ulterioare de informații contradictorii, care să le anuleze pe cele dintâi, situație în care întreprinderea ar avea enorm de pierdut pe planul imaginii.

Proiectul lateral sau Diversiunea

Expusă pe larg de către Thierry Libaert în cartea sa *Communication de crise* (Paris, Dunod, 2001), această strategie încearcă să modifice unghiul prin care privim fenomenul de criză. Fondată pe realitatea netrucătă și pe fapte concrete, ea poate reuși să deplaseze "câmpul de luptă", după cum precizează Didier Heiderich. Pentru a derula un proiect lateral, diferite tactici sunt posibile:

1. A contra-ataca și a-i demasca pe profitorii crizei, care, cel mai adesea, sunt întruchipați de concurență sau de opoziție, în cazul politicienilor : această strategie este folosită în special de către marile întreprinderi sau companii, care găsesc în concurența internațională un perfect alibi.

2. A redirecționa responsabilitatea către exterior, dând vina întotdeauna pe ceilalți, administrație, mediu politic etc etc ...

3. A reduce la maximum comunicarea, sau, dimpotrivă, a comunica mai vehement și mai dur.

4. A sublinia faptul că ceea ce e mai rău a trecut, că situația ar fi putut fi cu mult mai gravă dacă administrația întreprinderii nu ar fi acționat în cutare sau cutare mod.

Proiectul lateral, sau diversiunea, care constă în a "deporta" criza în afara câmpului propriu-zis al întreprinderii, trebuie să se sprijine neapărat pe elemente tangibile, în caz contrar, utilizarea acestei strategii de comunicare a crizei fiind mult mai primejdioasă decât criza însăși.

Refuzul sau Obstructia

Strategia refuzului constă, pur și simplu, în a afirma că nu există nici o criză. Este echivalentul mecanismului psihic de apărare numit, în psihanaliză, *negare*, și fiind un substitut al refuzării; negarea constituie prima reacție la îndemâna aparatului psihic, prin care acesta se protejează de socrurile și traumele exterioare. Pentru a pune în practică acest scenariu, întreprinde-

rea are la dispoziție patru posibilități:

1. Păstrează tăcerea încă de la debutul crizei, strategie aleasă de către autoritățile sovietice în timpul accidentului de la centrala nucleară Cernobîl.

2. Întrerupe comunicarea la un moment dat, sperând ca, astfel, să nu mai alimenteze criza.

3. Avansează principiul verigii absente, ca în cazul Revoluției din 1989, când nimeni nu a mai știut cine a dat ordinul inițial de a se trage în demonstrații neînarmați.

4. Minimizează efectele crizei, cu condiția să fie singura care dispune de datele reale. A fost formula aleasă de către guvernul francez în timpul caniculei din vara lui 2003; statisticele furnizate de către Pompele funebre au demonstat, din păcate, acest scenariu.

Consecințele unei astfel de strategii se pot dovedi extrem de periculoase, atât din punct de vedere juridic, cât și mediatic, dacă faptele reale ies, mai devreme sau mai târziu, la iveală, propunând o nouă "lectură" a evenimentelor. Concret, acest scenariu se va traduce, în majoritatea cazurilor, prin pierderea credibilității și compromiterea brandului.

Concluzii

Personală sau colectivă, psihologică, politică sau economică, dar purtând același nume: *depresie*, *dépression*, *depression*, suprapunând conceptul de oportunitate peste cel de pericol sau de suferință, *criza* conține întotdeauna în sine nucleul schimbării, al evoluției. Ca urgență existențială, uneori devastatoare, plasată la intervale de timp suportabile istoric ori individual, criza nu trebuie mai ales ocultată, față de sine și față de ceilalți; pentru a fi depășită, ea trebuie, în primul rând, recunoscută și comunicată.

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Global attitudes on death penalty

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Abstract: *This article analyzes some of the reasons why the Romanian students agree with the death penalty. Based on the data collected through social survey ($N=177$), our research tests two main variables that are supposed to form the public opinion about death penalty: religious attitudes and conformity to majority tendencies. Statistical analyses suggested that students are holding more materialistic values than religious and their opinions regarding death penalty are consonant with those expressed by majority.*

Keywords: *death penalty, religious attitudes, public opinion.*

During time, the acknowledgment of public opinion concerning the public punishment has started the interest the collectivity as well as the one of researchers. The contemporaneousness of this theme is relevant also by the fact that at a worldwide level the policies of national states are divergent, despite the recommendations of international organisms, which suggest a humanist legislation. In the year 2001, in the whole world, the number of states which have abolished the death punishment was 111, compared to the 84 countries that still maintained the capital sentence as a juridical sanction for certain criminal acts¹. During the same year, the executions from the five

states totalized a rate of 90% of the total of capital sanctions applied at a worldwide level: The United States of America, China, Iran, Irak, Saudi Arabia². In the present, in the United States of America, 30 of 51 states still maintain the constitutional provisions concerning death penalty³. One premises with comes out for a sociological analyze would be that the attitude of the public towards death penalty is more powerful in countries in which this one is still applicable and moderate in countries that do not adhere to capital punishment: 62% compared to 42%⁴.

In the United States of America, sociological inquiries which measure the

public's attitude towards the application of death penalty have a long tradition. Studies have started in 1909 with the survey performed by F.C. Sharp and M.C. Otto⁵, and in the 1960 has already reached 80⁶. In 1936, a Gallup Survey⁷, projected on a sample of 30.000 persons, measured a percent of sustenance of capital punishment among Americans, this one being of 62%. Twenty years later, in 1953, studies reported that over half of the population of the United States had consonant opinions concerning capital punishment (68%). In 1966, the public support for capital punishment registers a descending curve: 42% of Americans pronounced themselves in favor of death penalty. Ten years later, in 1976, empirical data of NORC General Social Surveys come back to the ones from 1953: 65% of Americans declare themselves favorable for the application of capital punishment⁸.

Being analyzed from a longitudinal point of view, percents indicated during the 50s can be granted to a generation that has accumulated the experience of the Second World War. Starting from this premise, the rate of public support for capital punishment would have to decrease together with baby-boom generation: With all these, criminality rate, the mediatization of different forms of deviance and capital executions, have generated a need of social safety ⁹ and have maintained their opinions concerning capital punishment in 1976. Not by mistake, in 1989, the percent of those who pronounced themselves in favor of the capital punishment has risen to 79%¹⁰, because of the fact that during a ten years period, from 1976-1987, a third of capital punishments granted on the territory of the United States of America have been intensely mediatized¹¹.

Closer to our days, a study performed in 2003 indicates a rate of 50% for the sustenance of the capital punishment, the white population having attitudes more favorable to the punishment than with the death of some color Americans (66% compared to 33% from color Americans)¹². In exchange, the reasons for the adoption

of such an opinion are different: White Americans which the capital punishment for social order, while black Americans perceive it as an effect of aggressivity. In 1958, in European countries, the population from Belgium (59%) and Norway (52%) declared themselves unfavorable for capital punishment, while in Great Britain (79%) and the Federal Republic of Germany (78%) the agreement for death penalty was very powerful¹³. The same large consensus has been expressed in 1964, 67% from British people and 55% from west-Germans expressed themselves favorable for death penalty. Socio-demographical indicators from the survey performed by DIVO-Frankfurt am Main in 1964 has produced same answer variations in the following manner: There is a greater tendency of farmers (68%), of workers in factories (66%), of retreated persons (58%) to have some favorable attitudes towards death penalty compared to young people (53%, 25-34 years old) and business people (48%). Religion and genre have not yet been the predictors for the attitude concerning death penalty, 52% of women and 57% of men, 57% of Protestants and 54% of Catholics agree with the reintroduction of the capital punishment¹⁴.

In Romania, during the first survey of public opinion performed by IRSOP after the events in '89 during the period of the 15th-19th of January 1990 on a sample of 4.507 persons, almost 58% of the persons who were interrogated have appreciated that death penalty should not be reintroduced in the Criminal Procedure¹⁵. 20 years after the falling down of the communist regime, according to CCSB survey, performed during the period of 24-27 March 2010 at a national level (N=1.060), half of the ones investigated (50%) which the organization of a referendum concerning the reintroduction of death penalty, 44% would be against such an initiative, while only 6% from the ones interrogated have not expressed an opinion in this sense¹⁶. 90 % of the ones who sustain the organization of a referendum on this

theme agree with the introduction of death penalty and only 8% pronounce themselves as being against.

In its survey CCSB explains that “the profile of the ones who wish such a vote is in close correlation with the belonging to a majoritarian group (Orthodox, Romanians) as well as with the ownership of some material resources or status (age, education, income, residential environment, occupation”)¹⁷. From here appear also the explications advanced by the large public and researchers after the publication of the results of CSSB survey: intolerance, ambivalent attitudes during transition period, orientations towards the satisfaction of basic needs, socio-economical conditions during the period of primary socialization, religious attitudes, increase of criminality, intense mediatization of delicts.

From the history of legislation concerning death penalty in Romania

On the actual territory of Romania, debates concerning the application of death penalty for different offences date back in the Middle Ages. The oldest references to capital sentence are attested in the XVIIth century. In Moldavia, during the time of the ruler Vasile Lupu (*Romanian learning book* [Carte Românească de Învățătură], 1646) and the Wallachia during the reign of Matei Basarab (*Correction of the Law* [Îndreptarea Legii], 1652). The two documents mention the application of death penalty for actions which are extremely grave, like country treason, patricide or women kidnapping. Gratiation could be granted only at the intervention of the metropolitan bishop. But, the convicted person will lose his land in favor of the Metropolitan Church, or became asserted by this one, together with his family.

The first debates concerning the abolishment of death penalty took place during fanariote reigns, at the middle of the XVIIIth century. The most decided in this concern has been Constantin Mavrocordat, who had reigns in Moldavia (four times) as

well as in Wallachia (six times) during 1730-1769. At the beginning of the XIXth century, the political situation was tensioned in Balkan areas, fact that facilitated the growth of criminal phenomena and determined the authorities to take in discussion the reintroduction of death penalty. On the 1st of September 1818, in Wallachia *Caragea Law* entered into force, which stipulated the capital punishment in the following four cases: “precognition murder”, money falsification, murder produced in a moment of anger with the help a weapon or some sharpen instrument, and theft. In Moldavia, death penalty has been mentioned in Calimachi Code entered into force on the 1st of October 1817. This is granted for murder facts, patricide, theft, poisoning and intentional fire.

The abolishment of death penalty has been reduced in political debate with the occasion of the 1848 Revolution. The Proclamation from Islaz in Wallachia (9th of June 1848) stipulated in article 19 that the “people decree the complete abolishment of death penalty, in the work as well in the sentence”. The programmatic point has been put to law by the revolutionary government on the 14th of June – by the Decree no. 7 which eliminated death penalty. Moldavian people have been less vocal in this concern. The only one who mentioned the principle of abolishment of the capital punishment has been Mihail Kogalniceanu in his draft Constitution project. After the ending of the Revolution, the rulers have still maintained the death penalty, this one being stipulated in the Criminal Procedure belonging to Basarab Știrbei in Wallachia but as well in the similar document belonging to Grigore Nica in Moldavia.

After the Unification from 1859, governors have brought in debate the problem of forbidding the death penalty Art. 17 of the Constitution Project established by the Central Commission from Focșani which referred explicate this principle. Misunderstandings between Moldavian politicians and the ones from the mountain

have lead to the failure of the constitutional project. The first official mentioning of the abolishment of the capital punishment in Modern Romania can be found in the Criminal Procedure of Alexandru Ioan Cuza in 1864¹⁸. This important legislative reform has been also confirmed by the first Romanian Constitution in 1866, art. 18 of the documented stipulated that “death penalty will not be reintroduced again, except the cases stipulated in Military Criminal Procedure during war periods”. The constitution in 1923 has kept the principle of forbidding the capital punishment in art. 16.

Close to the time when the Second World War was about to start, general tensions at the European Level also reflected in Romania by the tightening of the regime of personal freedoms and of legislation. In February 1938, king Carol II has instaurated a personal regime, also changing the fundamental law. For the first time in the constitutional history of Romania, the capital punishment was introduced, for certain offenses of political order: “Death penalty applies during war periods according to the code of military justice. The Council of Ministers will decide the application of the stipulations of the preceding article during peace periods, for attentats against the Senate, Members of the Royal Family, Chief of States and State personalities connected to the exercise of functions that are granted to them, as well as for the cases of theft with political murder and assassinate” (art. 15).

The communist regime, fully implemented after the abdication of king Mihai I on the 30th of December 1947 has not made any reference to death penalty in its Constitution from 1948, 1952 and 1965. The section referring to the rights of Romanian people does not mention it as being forbidden or accepted. The first juridical reference to death penalty appears in Decree no. 199 of the 12th of August 1950, which made some modifications to Law no. 16 of the 15th of January 1949 concerning “murders which endanger state security”. The Decree from 1950 explicitly

stipulated death penalty for such “offences”. Stipulations concerning capital punishment have been ulterior abrogates by Decree no. 202 of the 14th of March 1953¹⁹.

Death penalty has been introduced for the first time after the communist regime in the Criminal Procedure on the 30th of September 1957 by Decree no. 469, which modifies art. 236 of the legislative documentation.

During communist years, the Criminal Procedure underlined only as a principle the capital punishment, the cases for which this one applies as a punishment being established by applicable legislation. From 1977 to 1988, 96 persons have been executed, among which 93 for severe murders. During the same period one has registered 34 commutations of death penalty to 25 years of imprisonment. No woman has been executed, during communist years, as well as previously.²⁰

The last death conviction ad judgments have been issued on the 25th of December 1989, for Ceaușescu couple. Elena Ceaușescu is the unique woman who has been executed in the Modern History of Romania.

On the 7th of January 1990, the Council of National Salvation has issued the Law-Decree no. 6 for the abolishment of death penalty, for the modification and abrogation of some provisions of the Criminal Procedure and of some other normative acts²¹. The death penalty has been explicitly banned by the Constitution from 1991, in art. 22 paragraph 3. The Constitution from 2003 maintains this provision at the same position.

Sociologic Investigation: Students' opinions concerning the introduction of death penalty

Hypothesis of the study

As we have mentioned at the beginning of this article, we will advance some hypothesis and methodological suggestions about the measurement of attitudes concerning capital punishments based on data provided by

CCSB and as a consequence of statistical transformation of obtained data (factorial analyze, frequency of answers and their expression in percents, chi-square test) from the sociologic investigation designed by us ad libitum during the May-June 2010.

Our study aimed, mainly, the measurement of students' attitudes towards the reintroduction of capital punishment starting from the following hypothesis:

1. Probably the generations born after 1989, which have experimented a level of material wellbeing during the period of primary socialization, will have moderate attitudes towards the introduction of death penalty.

2. Probably students' religious attitudes do not represent a significant factor in the expression of vote to an eventual referendum concerning the reintroduction of death penalty.

Method

Participants and design of the research.

For the testing of hypothesis we have chosen the method based on a questionnaire. To the study participated 177 students (Table 1) among which 66 (37%) of masculine gender and 111 (62%) of feminine gender, within the Faculty of Political Sciences ("Dimitrie Cantemir" Christian University from Bucharest). The questionnaire has been collectively applied by the technique of an exam during seminary classes during the period of May-June 2010. The age average of the respondents was 20 years. The investigated lot had not representativity reported to the total number of students from Romania, but allowed the testing of hypothesis and the obtainance of some results which we consider as being significant for the advance of some methodological suggestions. Data have been transformed by the means of SPSS software variant 12.0.

Subjects' gender	N	%
Masculine	66	37
Feminine	111	62
Total	177	100

Table 1. Distribution of the investigated lot according to subjects' gender.

Investigation instrument

Questionnaire. For this research we have produced a questionnaire with a number of nine questions which aimed the collection of some data concerning the subjects' interest concerning the rights and liberties granted by the Constitution (question 1); information sources concerning the provisions of the constitution (question 2); knowledge of rights granted by the constitution (question 3); if they had relatives that have been victims of capital punishment during the communist period (question 4); Romanians' actual perception concerning capital punishment (question 5); importance of rights stipulated by the constitution (question 6); opinion concerning the introduction of death

penalty (question 7); granting of some sentences according to criminal facts (question 8); religious attitudes (question 9); and socio-demographical indicators (age, gender, occupation, religion, faculty, residence environment).

Results

Religious attitudes. During the first stage, one has checked the reliability of the measurement scale of religious attitudes, the *Cronbach Alpha* coefficient that has been obtained for the five items of the scale being of 0.56 thus obtaining a decreased value, and we proceeded to a factorial analyze for the group of items in subscales. We expect that one of the items will have a greater reliability, so that ulterior

we can retain it in the interpretation of results. In Table 3 we present the factorial analyze for the five items, the method of the main component. As one can observe, if we eliminated an item, we obtain an

increase of *Cronbach Alpha* coefficient to a value of 0.59. Due to the fact that this a very little change for the initial obtained value, we will keep all the five items of the scale for the interpretation of results.

Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient According to standard items of the scale	N Items
0.565	5

Table 2. Value of Cronbach Alpha coefficient for religious attitude scale.

Items of the scale	Average	Variance of the scale	Cronbach Alpha coefficient if we eliminate one item
Believe in God	13.15	6.369	.460
Go to work on Sundays and on Holidays	11.87	6.448	.430
Love for people is a principle for me in my life	12.85	7.415	.543
I consider that I have religiously get married and Christian my children	13.32	6.460	.479
It is important that I have faith, not to go to church	13.15	7.315	.591

Table 3. Value of Cronbach Alpha coefficient if we renounce to one item in the scale

Religious attitudes and agreement/disagreement concerning death penalty

From the total of the investigated lot, 37% would pronounce themselves favorable for the reintroduction of death

penalty and approximately half of these ones (47%) will be against, while almost 16% from the subjects do not have an opinion concerning this subject (Table 4).

If a referendum concerning the introduction of death penalty, will take place on Sunday will you personally vote?	N	%
Against the reintroduction of death penalty	84	47
For the reintroduction of death penalty	65	37
I don't know/do not answer	28	16
Total	177	100

Table 4. Frequency of answers to the question concerning the agreement/disagreement concerning the organization of the referendum for the reintroduction of death penalty (N=177).

Following the results obtained after the application of the scale of measurement of religious attitudes, we can say that the total effect of

this variable in the explication of the agreement or disagreement concerning the reintroduction of death penalty is relatively small. Even if the expression of answers in frequency indicate, in some way, powerful religious attitudes – for example, 68% from the students declare themselves as being faithful and 71% consider that the religious marriage and christening is important for them – even though, for the whole of the investigated lot, the attitude towards religion is not a significant factor from statistic point of view, and will not determine the vote to the referendum concerning the reintroduction of death penalty. *Chi-square* test for the association of these variables has indicated a decreased variance which is not significant from a statistical point of view (Table 8).

It will be interesting to add that from the total of the ones who declare themselves favorable for the

reintroduction of capital punishment (N=65), approximately had agree (N=31; 48%) that religious legalization of marriage is very important (table 5). As well, from the subjects who express their agreement with the capital punishment, a fourth of them (38%) believe in a great measure in God (Table 6).

From the group of dimensions which describe the religious attitude “peoples’ love” has not registered a significant variance from a statistical point of view, fact indicated by the value of *Chi-square* test, bigger than the error level which is accepted ($\chi^2=4,70$; df=4; p=0,782>0,05). Answer frequencies, presented in Table 7 sustain the following affirmations: Only 20% (N=35) from the questioned students consider that, in a great measure, the peoples’ love is a principle which is followed in life, while 38% (N=68) have moral attitudes in this sense.

	I consider that I have to religiously get married and Christian my children.					
	I don't know/do not answer	In a very big measure	In a big measure	In some measure	Little/not at all	Total
If next week a referendum for the reintroduction of death penalty will take place, will you personally vote?	3.6%	50.0%	17.9%	25.0%	3.6%	100.0%
	6	42	18	11	7	84
For the reintroduction of death penalty	7.1%	50.0%	21.4%	13.1%	8.3%	100.0%
	0	31	17	8	9	65
I don't know/do not answer	.0%	47.7%	26.2%	12.3%	13.8%	100.0%
	1	14	5	7	1	28
Total	7	87	40	26	17	177
	4.0%	49.2%	22.6%	14.7%	9.6%	100.0%

Table 5. Vote for referendum according to the variable “attitude towards the religious legalization of marriage and christening” (N=177).

	Believe in God					
	I don't know/ do not answer	In a very a big measure	In a big measure	In some measure	Little/ not at all	Total
If next week a referendum for the reintroduction of death penalty will take place, will you personally vote?						
Against the reintroduction of death penalty	3	34	21	17	9	84
	3.6%	40.5%	25.0%	20.2%	10.7%	100.0%
For the reintroduction of death penalty	1	25	20	12	7	65
	1.5%	38.5%	30.8%	18.5%	10.8%	100.0%
I don't know/do not answer	0	15	5	5	3	28
	.0%	53.6%	17.9%	17.9%	10.7%	100.0%
Total	4	74	46	34	19	177

Table 6. Vote for referendum according to the variable "faith in God" (N=177).

	Peoples' love is a principle for me in my life					
	I don't know/ do not answer	In a very big measure	In a big measure	In some measure	Little/ not at all	Total
If next week a referendum for the reintroduction of death penalty will take place, will you personally vote?						
Against the reintroduction of death penalty	4	19	28	29	4	84
	4.8%	22.6%	33.3%	34.5%	4.8%	100.0%
For the reintroduction of death penalty	1	13	21	25	5	65
	1.5%	20.0%	32.3%	38.5%	7.7%	100.0%
I don't know/do not answer	1	3	9	14	1	28
	3.6%	10.7%	32.1%	50.0%	3.6%	100.0%
Total	6	35	58	68	10	177
	3.4%	19.8%	32.8%	38.4%	5.6%	100.0%

Table 7. Vote for referendum according to the variable "peoples' love" (N=177).

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.770(a)	8	.782
Likelihood Ratio	5.022	8	.755
Linear-by-Linear Association	.002	1	.961
N of Valid Cases	177		

Table 8. Value of Chi-Square test for the variable "peoples' love".

Death penalty and the gravity of the criminal act. In our research, we have tried to find out in which measure the vote for a referendum concerning the

capital punishment significantly correlates with the gravity of the criminal act that is performed. The control question in which one has solicited to the subjects to grant the

sanctions “death penalty” and respectively “imprisonment”, for some criminal acts (corruption, theft from national belongings, first degree murders, country treasoning, pedophilia, dilations to Security during the communist regime, breaking of ownership right) has produced some variations. From the total of the ones who declare themselves against the reintroduction of death penalty (47%), 24% would agree with the granting of the capital punishment for people who commit murders (Table 9). At the same time, chi-square coefficient that has been obtained has a significant value from a statistical point of view ($\chi^2=49,74$; $df=4$; $p=0,0001<0,05$), which means that the hypothesis concerning the association degree with the attitude towards the death penalty and the gravity of the criminal act, advanced in worldwide sociological studies, so that the criminal act is more grave, the subjects’ agreement for

the capital punishment is more powerful (Table 10).

As well, from the total of the ones who declare themselves favorable for the reintroduction of death penalty, 37% are against the application of capital punishment for persons who commit corruption acts, like the prejudice to the national treasure and 36% are for the granting of death penalty in this case. In average, the attitudes concerning the death penalty variate according to the gravity of the act. The ones who pronounce themselves for the granting of capital punishment do not express a powerful agreement concerning the application of this one for certain criminal acts like rape, theft, pedophilia (Table 9). The most little variation has been registered for the breaking of ownership right, just 1% from 7% from the total of subjects agree with the granting of the death penalty for this case.

		If next week a referendum concerning the reintroduction of death penalty, will you personally vote?			
		I don't know/ do not answer	Against the reintroduction of death penalty	For the reintroduction of death penalty	Total
Death penalty	21	25	52	98	
	21.4%	25.5%	53.1%	100.0%	
Imprisonment penalty	6	57	11	74	
	8.1%	77.0%	14.9%	100.0%	
No answer	0	0	1	1	
	.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Total	27	82	64	173	
	15.6%	47.4%	37.0%	100.0%	

Table 9. Vote for referendum according to the criminal act “murder” (N=173).

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	46.743(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	49.275	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.974	1	.046
N of Valid Cases	173		

Table 10. Value of Chi-Square test for the variable “murder” (N=173).

		If next week a referendum concerning the reintroduction of death penalty, will you personally vote?			
		I don't know/do not answer	Against the reintroduction of death penalty	For the reintroduction of death penalty	Total
Death penalty		3	4	6	13
		23.1%	30.8%	46.2%	100.0%
Imprisonment penalty		24	77	54	155
		15.5%	49.7%	34.8%	100.0%
No answer		0	2	2	4
		.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
Total		27	83	62	172
		15.7%	48.3%	36.0%	100.0%

Table 11. Vote for referendum according to the criminal act “breaking of ownership right” (N=172).

Opinion of the majority and vote to the referendum. Another ascertainment of our investigation has been the following: As more as students believe the whole of the population has consonant opinions with theirs, they are more likely to express them. The preceding affirmation is based on the

value obtained to chi-square test preformed for the probation of the statistical relation between the variable “attitude concerning the reintroduction of the referendum” and “students beliefs concerning the opinion of the majority” ($\chi^2=41,91$; df=6; p=0,0001<0,05).

		Do you think Romanians would agree with the reintroduction of death penalty in the Constitution?				
		I don't know/do not answer	No	Yes	Uncompleted answers	Total
If next week a referendum for the reintroduction of death penalty will take place, will you personally vote?		11	10	7	0	28
		39.3%	35.7%	25.0%	.0%	100.0%
Against the reintroduction of death penalty		10	58	16	0	84
		11.9%	69.0%	19.0%	.0%	100.0%
For the reintroduction of death penalty		9	18	37	1	65
		13.8%	27.7%	56.9%	1.5%	100.0%
Total		30	86	60	1	177
		16.9%	48.6%	33.9%	.6%	100.0%

Table 12. Vote for referendum according to the belief in the opinion of the majority (N=177).

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	41.913(a)	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	39.810	6	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	17.453	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	177		

Table 13. Value of Chi-Square test for the variable “opinion of the majority” (N=177).

Conclusions

We have anticipated at the beginning of this research that religious attitudes do not represent a significant variable for the expression of vote to an eventual referendum concerning the reintroduction of death penalty. In the formulation of this assertion, we based ourselves, on one hand, on the results of worldwide investigation concerning the valorical orientation of individuals, and on the other hand on the data of empirical researches which have proven that there is a correspondence between religious values of Romanian people and the option of these ones concerning death penalty. This hypothesis has been confirmed by the means of the performed study. The results that have been obtained for the investigated lot, as well as the average age of participants to the research (20 years old) prove the “generation effect”. Compared to their parents, students involved in the research have experimented during the stage of primary socialization a level of wellbeing, determined by the economical increase registered after 1989²². We could advance, with a prediction character, the fact that in the students’ valorical system, the materialistically orientations have priority compared to the religious ones.

Correlative to these conclusions, the obtaining of a significant level for variables “criminal acts” and “faith in the opinion of the majority” for the whole investigated lot does not allow us to affirm that these ones represent predictors for the attitude towards the reintroduction of death penalty. These results are consonant with the data obtained at a worldwide level, in the sense that the

attitude towards death penalty must be measured in correlation with the gravity of the criminal act that is performed.

There is nothing surprising in the action for the analyze which is specific to sociology, the degree of conformation to the opinion of the majority, in the present research, according to obtained results, has represented a significant variable from a statistical point of view. In some other words, it is possible that to a referendum concerning the reintroduction of death penalty, students will vote in consonance with their beliefs concerning the opinion of the majority.

Without having the pretention to end variables which enter in correlation with social facts that are presented anteriorly in the data of the sociological investigation, a future stage of our study will aim the design of another sample, diversified under the aspect of subjects’ gender and residence environment, fact which allows the probation of some hypothesis for the total number of students from Romania.

Endnotes

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The Polish crisis and the Soviet reaction in the early of 1980s

Petre Opriș

Abstract: In the early 1970s, the Central and East European communist countries developed a relatively economic growing period, but the attained rate of developing was not of long standing. Gradually, these states began to confront a series of problems concerning the extremely slow development of the living standard of population and this perspective became more and more visible by the end of the 1970s. For understanding the events from that period, we chose to present some aspects of the Polish Crisis in the 1970s. The Polish economy was modernized based on the credits obtained from the Western countries and the industrial and agricultural production recorded a particular progress to the full benefit of the foreign funds brought in the country by the communist government and also of the "Ostpolitik" effects. But the undertaken reforms were not sufficient for a substantial improvement of the Polish plants and private farms efficiency.

After the de-Stalinization initiated by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956 and assumed by the most leaders of the state members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), the Central and East European communist countries developed a relatively economical growing period. But the attained rate of developing was not of long standing. Gradually, these states began to confront a series of problems concerning the extremely slow development of the standard of living of the population and this perspective became more and more visible by the end of the '60s.

The tensions generated by the slow development of the standard of living of the population became intensively perceptible in Poland and Czechoslovakia foremost, these states having a standard of living higher than

other communist countries. By middle of the '60s these states started to have problems concerning the modernization of the industrial capacities, extremely necessary for the competitive growing of the products produced for the international markets. In these countries also aroused some incidents with certain members of the civil society, who were demanding a revision of the common governing system and the observance of some democratic liberalities (the right to partnership besides the structures controlled by the communist parties, the right to free expression, elimination of censorship etc.).

During the '60s the resistance against the regime led by Władysław Gomułka, first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), was maintained first of all by the

prelates of the Catholic Church who daily practiced their influence on Polish people, mainly among the students and headpieces that care for democratic liberalities (T. Parish, 2002, 121-122. D.W. Urbin, 2002, 242-243).

The posture in Poland aggravated visibly right after the victory earned by Israel against the Arab states during the “Six Days War” (June 1967). The sympathy demonstrated by many mosaic Polish citizens in these moments firmly contrasted with the attitude of the Warsaw authorities who unconditionally accepted to follow the political direction indicated by Moscow to condemn the “aggression committed by the Jewish army against the Arab states” and to interrupt the diplomatic relations with Israel.

The discontinuity of the diplomatic relations between Poland and Israel was shortly followed by the initiation of an expansive anti-Semitic campaign, many of the mosaic Polish citizens being forced to leave the country (J. Rothschild, 1997, 278). Along with them many notables of the Polish cultural society who one way or another was criticizing Władysław Gomułka’s political regime also suffered.

The epilogue of the anti-Semitic campaign initiated in the summer of 1967 completed in March 1968 when a students’ rebellion took place. Dominated by the “Prague Spring”, a group of Polish students wanted to act a patriotic play – *Ancestors Eve* by Adam Mickiewicz – in which the domination exercised in 19th Century by the tsarist Russia against Poland, was hardly criticized (J. Rothschild, 1997, 278). The repression ordered by the Warsaw authorities ended with multiple arrests and various-term convictions among the young demonstrators. At the same time, the political apparatus and the main public institutions suffered a new purification and the people considered as “revolutionary” and “politically doubtful” were removed from the governing system. Therewith Marshal Marian Spychalski, Minister of Defence, was relieved of his position and replaced with General Wojciech

Jaruzelski, Chief of the General Staff, on the motion of Władysław Gomułka and with Moscow approval (T. Parish, 2002, 152. D.W. Urbin, 2002, 282).

The impact of the economical crisis was gathering way more and more pronounced. The main causes of the economical crisis that Poland was passing through by the end of 1970 were: the over measured development of the heavy industry, especially of the machine industry that caused major difficulties in finding an outlet for the Polish industrial products and also major damages because the on stock manufacturing of some product categories; the performance of the export trades mainly with USSR, GDR and Czechoslovakia (these activities were not providing enough financial resources in order to support the Polish external balance of payments); the massive export of the Polish food products doubled by a decreasing agricultural production based on extremely small acquisition prices that were discouraging the efforts of the population working in the agricultural area to grow the production (P. Calvocoressi, 2003, 89).

In order to decrease the tensions inside the economic system, the communist authorities from Warsaw made a big political mistake, announcing on 12 December 1970, in a totally uninspired way and without a prior consulting of the population, a price increase for the food products. Such a measure, imposed only a few days before Christmas, generated a wave of violent protests of the workers from Szczecin and the main cities situated on the Baltic Sea Coast two days later. For a period of five days there have been large demonstrations in Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin, and also strikes all over the country. The workers from the Polish harbours were aware of the fact that the standards of living from the other countries around the Baltic Sea (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and GDR) were much higher unlike that one from Poland.

In return, the demonstrators were attacked in the streets by the security forces on 15 December 1970, the popular

movements being violently repressed as in 1956. The violent collisions between the security forces and revolting workers ended with at least 45 dead and about 1.200 wounded peoples among the demonstrators. The Polish Army massively interfered in the repression, using about 350 tanks and 600 armoured vehicles in Gdańsk and Gdynia but the soldiers' spirits was seriously affected (M. Kramer, 1999, 14. A. Pop, 2002, 159-160. C. Andrew, V. Mitrokhin, 2003, 273).

On December 7, 1970, just a few days before the protest demonstrations in the Polish harbours, Józef Cyrankiewicz, President of the Polish Cabinet Council, and Willy Brandt, Chancellor of Federal German Republic, signed the Polish-West German Pact entitled "Concerning the normalization of the reciprocal relations". With this occasion, the West-German Chancellor admitted in the name of his country the Polish western frontier along the Oder-Neisse rivers, as it was established at the Potsdam Conference (1945).

In our opinion Władysław Gomułka tried to make use of the external success of the Polish diplomacy and of the Polish people's patriotic feelings in order to make the 35% increasing of the food products prices much easy to impose. But the Polish communist leader took too less into consideration the fact that the respective increments were emotionally affecting the population in a strong way because the coming of the Christmas Celebration.

As a result of the workers' intense protest demonstrations, the tension generated by the Polish Army's roughly interventions against the demonstrators and also of the self physical and psychic exhaustion, Władysław Gomułka suffered a gentle stroke and was interned in a clinic pertaining to the party (December 18, 1970). Therefore he couldn't preside the PUWP Political Bureau meeting that took place one day later and where was decided his substitution with Edward Gierek from the leadership of the party, after a tense debate (T. Parish, 2002, 117. D.W. Urbin, 2002, 239. C. Andrew, V. Mitrokhin, 2003,

273-274).

Those events were followed by some years of economic straightening and limited reforms. The Polish economy was modernized based on the credits obtained from the Western countries and the industrial and agricultural production recorded a particular progress to the full benefit of the foreign funds brought in the country by the communist government and also of the "Ostpolitik" effects – the new policy promoted by the West-German Chancellor Willy Brandt for a substantially improvement of the relationships between West and East. Moreover, the Decree that generate in December 1970 the Polish workers' violent rebellions was revoked at the middle of February 1971, resuming the level of prices from the beginning of December 1970. The new amendments of the prices for the food products were applied on March 1, 1971.

But the undertaken reforms were not sufficient for a substantial improvement of the Polish plants and private farms efficiency. In Poland, three quarters of the land was in private property, but the growers' farms were small and had an extremely slow efficiency. Although a quarter of the Polish population was working in the agricultural field this was producing only a fifth of the national income (P. Calvocoressi, 2003, 89).

Edward Gierek tried to maintain the direct contact with the people by eluding the party that he cleaned during 1971-1974. At the same time, the Polish communist leader encouraged the imports of the assets, unbalancing thus and so the Poland balance of payments, in 1972 he raised the salaries and social securities asking more work and more punctuality at the place of employment instead. In these conditions the economical inter-trade between Poland and the Western countries represented in 1974 half of the total amount of the Polish export trade of that year (P. Calvocoressi, 2000, 289).

The populist policy promoted by Edward Gierek and by the Prime-Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz soon turned out to have evil effects. On the one hand the oil crisis from

the beginning of 1974 allowed the Warsaw Government to immensely borrow from the West in order to import big quantities of food products and hard-goods to satisfy the increasing needs of the population – by receiving the so called “oil-dollars” that western banks excessively detained as a result of the pronounced increasing of the oil prices. Joseph Rothschild presumed that the immensely Western and Soviet loans granted to Poland in the ’70s subsidized “an orgy of consumerism, corruption and hyper-optimistic, monumental, uncoordinated and therefore abnormal investments” (J. Rothschild, 1997, 283).

On the other hand, the workers and clerks’ salaries increased not taking into consideration the low level of the work productivity so under these circumstances the inflationary phenomenon that generated penury of indispensable goods gained momentum and the Polish people was forced to wait more and more in lines in front of the shops.

Therefore the calm from the first years of 8th decade of the last century became after 1975 a real hurricane. The dashing to the ground of the new economical dream was enough to resurrect the Polish protest demonstrations first in the centre of Poland and then in the Baltic cities. The Warsaw authorities unexpectedly announced a 40% increasing of the prices for food products (June 24, 1976), “signalizing a weird mix of euphoria and despondency” (J.F. Soulet, 1998, 284. H. Wujek, 2003, 863). Proletarian strikes and working demonstrations were immediately initiated in Płock, Radom and “Ursus” factory, close to Warsaw (J.F. Soulet, 1998, 254). The demonstrators were arrested, beaten, fired and convicted, but the regime leaded by Edward Gierek capitulated right on the next day (June 25, 1976), and the PUWP leader was forced by conjuncture to announce the recalculation/decreasing of the announced prices increments (M. Kramer, 1999, 14).

Unlike what happened during the crisis between 1956 and 1970, there were not

performed topside changes inside the party in June 1976. The entire capital of popularity of which the party was still enjoying of at the beginning of that month was ran low at the moment when the security forces violently interfered against the demonstrators and PUWP hadn’t leeway new credible political leaders to propose for controlling the people, extremely unsatisfied. The corruption and power abuses fully affected the Polish society’s spirit and all these did nothing but accentuate the crease that was separating the majority of the population with the party leadership, the latter was fully disposing of the privileges that had granted it through the last two decades.

The hard repression of the security forces against those who had the courage to participate in the anti-governmental demonstrations initiated a large action of helping the persons persecuted by the communist regime in the summer of 1976. This action was concretized by the young intellectual societies from Warsaw, Gdańsk and Lublin by setting up the “Workers Defence Committee” (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow – KOR) in July 1976 (H. Wujek, 2003, 864). The main purpose of this committee was to offer legal assistance to the workers persecuted on the ground that they had participated in the strikes and manifestations from June 1976, to help their families and also to inform the public opinion about the excesses committed by Warsaw authorities although they had signed the *Helsinki Final Act* on August 1, 1975, that contained a serial of provisions concerning the deferring to the human basic rights. Therewith KOR enunciated a democratization program of the Polish society ignored by the PUWP leadership.

Also the Catholic Church spoke up in support for the people persecuted by the communist regime. In order to unstring the situation, Edward Gierek met Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński in 1977 and asked him for the Catholic Church representatives’ support trying to calm down the population. Moreover the communist leader approved

Pope John Paul II's return in the country in 1979, on a nine days pilgrimage, although he created special problems to the communist regime during the meetings with the KOR founders and he initiated an aid fund for the Krakow archdiocese families of the arrested demonstrators (September 30, 1976) (C. Andrew, V. Mitrokhin, 2003, 508. S. Tănase, 1999, 50-56). The militancy more and more promoted and productive by Pope John Paul II for the democratization of the Polish society by the end of '70 and during next decade represents in our opinion one of the most important factor that led to the Warsaw communist regime's destruction at the beginning of 1989.

During the extraordinary meeting of the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (CC of RCP) occurred in the morning of December 13, 1981, few hours after the instauration of the martial law in Poland, Nicolae Ceaușescu wished to explicate to the members of the committee his opinion about the evolution of the Polish crisis. Because this reunion was hurriedly called, the Romanian leader had not at hand a written material especially conceived to sustain his points of view.

In order to meet the unusual situation, Nicolae Ceaușescu appealed at three main extracts from the shorthand reports of discussions he had with Serghei Kraiger, Lionel Jospin and Bettino Craxi in 1981. The opinions expressed by the Romanian leader at the respective meetings were extremely critical at the address of Pope John Paul II and the prelates of Catholic Church, who were considered the main guilty persons for the start and evolution of Poland crisis. The respective texts were read to the participants at the session of the Executive Political Committee by Ștefan Bîrlea, chief of cabinet at the Presidency of Romania and, in the same time, the Chancellery Section's chief of CC of RCP: "Economic problems have been really pretence because the situation in Poland was quite good economically. Several mistakes have been made in Poland,

of course, but have been obtained very good results in socialist development and in the economy, in general. But over the last year the situation has not improved; on the contrary, it has worsened. One could not say that we witnessing some protest against socialist construction and against the forms of socialist construction in Poland. I would say that the Polish United Workers' Party has distorted certain socialist principles, including of the principles of Party organization and in this lies a certain estrangement from the working class, a fact one can see in the past composition of Party bodies, of the Party itself, which has neglected to take the necessary measures for the strengthening of the organizational force in the ranks of the working class. This made possible the penetration of the Party by petty bourgeois, intellectual elements, and people with a petty bourgeois mentality, alien, in fact, to the working class, which caused the lack of unity, of conception, of clear orientation in the Party.

At the same time, one cannot ignore the existence of some forces that have never chimed with socialism, and here comes first the Catholic Church, which lies, in fact, at the origins and is the initiator of that movement which became "Solidarity". The action started with religious services. The "Solidarity" Congress opened, in fact, with a service in the Cathedral.

Anti-socialist forces have long existed in Poland, which have organized them, and against which the Polish Party and State have not taken any measures, but tolerated them instead.

Important concessions have been made to the Catholic Church, which play a clear reactionary role. By the election of a Pope, in the person of a Pole, the very activity of these elements from the ranks of the Catholic Church has been stimulated.

The Polish leadership encouraged to a certain degree this state of affairs and even considered that half of the Vatican was theirs when the Pope was elected in the person of a Polish citizen.

In our opinion, this constellation of factors triggered the events that have taken place. "Solidarity" is in fact the outcome of the activity of all those factors and, first of all, of the Catholic Church that had a decisive role and under whose patronage "Solidarity" was born. This proves that it is not a working-class organization, but a class, Catholic organization, combined with many anti-Socialist elements, which, due to the mistakes made by the Party, were able to influence a certain part of the working class in Poland.

If we analyze what has been said at the "Solidarity" Congress, we see that political problems come first, including of those related to the national feeling, which has always been very strong in the Poles.

All through the post-war period, the Polish Party and State have neglected the national feeling of the Poles. *The Polish Party and State, instead of being the representative of the national feeling – understood correctly, not in a narrow nationalist sense, but as a socialist and democratic feeling of the people – have been neglectful of that feeling and this carelessness was exploited by the Catholic Church, by the reactionary forces in Poland. The Church assumed the right to be the representative of the national feeling of the Poles. Hence, it is necessary for the Party, for the Polish state to pay due attention to the feelings, to the problems of national, cultural and historical interest and to ensure that they – the Party and the Government – become the representatives of these concerns, of these feelings and that they take this weapon from the hands of the Catholics and of the "Solidarity" [...]*

I was and I am an old trade-union member. I have been a trade-union member for 50 years. *The intervention of the Church in the trade-union movement has always had a clearly reactionary nature. It is difficult to accept the idea that, under the present circumstances, the Catholic Church may become a progressive force in the trade-union movement, since it has never been that, and more so now.*

Therefore, starting from the ideological basis of this movement - and Wałęsa has never made it a secret that he is financed by the Catholic Church and that he has got the blessing of the Pope - we should have seen its nature. It is difficult to speak of a movement that aims at improving and perfecting socialist development. One cannot build up socialism with the Cross! And even the first bourgeois-democratic revolutionists said this. We must always have in view palpable situations and, therefore, I said that one should take into account the realities in Poland, the strong influence of the Catholic Church, as well as the fact the "Solidarity" knew how to take advantage of the Poles' national feeling; Communist Party did not take advantage, but ignored this feeling (our underlining)" (CHNA, 101/1981, 2; 5-7).

The international economical crises and the errors committed by the Polish communist leaders regarding the industrial and agricultural politics caused great economical problems during the period 1977-1980 and determined, among others, a dramatic increasing of the Polish public indebtedness. This reached the level of 17 billion dollars at the end of 1979, and 27 billion dollars in December 1980 (CHNA, 74/1980, 58).

A new series of outbreaks of the Polish society occurred in the year 1980. The first action of protest took place in February 1980, at Gdańsk, when the workers interrupted work and demanded the improving of living standard.

On a background of an acute economical crisis, the government from Warsaw appealed again at increasing price for the food products. Thus, on July 1, 1980 a substantial increasing of prices for the meat products occurred. At that moment, it was not suspected that this price modification could provoke great social disorders.

The workers reaction was unexpectedly rapid and strong. They formed at their labour places "stationary committees" and started negotiations for the increasing of salary. Because the word "strike" was not officially

recognized by the authorities, the workers appealed at the word “stationary” to define in the discussions with the leaders of the industrial units administrations the attitude of protest they adopted; the collectives of workers interrupted voluntarily the work, but remained at their work places, “being stationary” (H. Wujek, 2003, 865).

A series of short strikes started at Warsaw, Lublin and other cities blocking the activity of some industrial units. The KOR and other groups of opposition took over the news about the strikes and published them in various illegal newspapers and on loose leaves. Also, the radio broadcast *The Free Europe* was clandestinely contacted so that the last news about the evolution of workers protests was transmitted in the entire country.

The government members and those of the communist party leadership assisted passively to the unfurl events – part of the Polish political leaders being at that moments in holiday in the Soviet Union – fact that determined the administrations of the industrial units affected by strikes to accept the satisfaction of salary claims for the discontent workers.

But the tensions continued to occur in the entire country, and at the half of August 1980 the wave of discontentment started protest movements in the city-harbours from the Baltic Sea, too, nobody knowing exactly in what way the events would develop. Among these movements was counted the strike of workers from the Naval Shipyards “V.I. Lenin” in Gdańsk, which started in the morning of August 14, 1980 in a quite banal mode: the employees defended the worker Anna Walentynowicz, who was fired because she developed not authorized trade union activities (J.L. Dufour, 2002, 159). One of the members of the strike committee was the electrician Lech Wałęsa, known at the shipyard in Gdańsk for his protesting activity unfurled even from the winter of 1970, and the first claims formulated by the shipyard workers in Gdańsk were quite modest: re-employment of Anna Walentynowicz and increasing salary (T. Parish, 2002, 298-299).

D.W. Urbin, 2002, 552. P. Milza, S. Berstein, 1998, 60).

The strike extending to the towns Gdańsk and Szczecin, and Gdańsk isolating by the authorities led to a radicalization of the protest action and on August 15, 1980 appeared for the first time the idea of forming an independent trade union (T. Parish, 2002, 266). In our opinion, the respective proposal formed an essential moment within the action of radicalization of popular protest against the leadership of the Polish United Workers’ Party.

In short time other industrial units in the area began the strike and Lech Wałęsa became the leader of strikers from Gdańsk, Gdańsk and Sopot. Under the coordination of an “expert commission” led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Bronisław Geremek, a “Strike Committee inter-Units” (Miedzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy – MKS) was formed at Gdańsk and a program of 21 claims was formulated (T. Parish, 2002, 191). A similar committee was formed at Szczecin, too, and 156 industrial units adhered at it.

Urgently returned in the country, Edward Gierek confronted with a crisis of proportions not only in his relations with the revolted workers, but also within his own party. Its leadership divided in two groups – one of them moderated, led by Stanisław Kania, and one radical, led by Stefan Olszowsky – and inevitably all sorts of scenarios appeared, with a single purpose: people calming and annihilating the leading nucleus of the strikers.

On August 16, 1980, at the initiative of some members of the Political Bureau of CC of PUWP a special intervention unit was formed, which was subordinated to General Bogusław Stachura, deputy of the Minister of Internal Affairs. The militaries belonging to that unit followed to be launched from helicopters at the shipyard in Gdańsk to arrest some of the strikers – Operation “Lato-80”. But the respective idea was rapidly abandoned because the exponential increasing of the protest movements in the

country, and also because the opposition of some party leaders (M. Kramer, 1999, 36).

Faced with a situation he could not control any longer, Edward Gierek sent firstly Tadeusz Pyka to discuss with the strikers. The failure this one suffered determined the PUWP leader to realize a change at the government leadership level, the Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz being obliged to resign. The assignment of a new Prime-Minister, in the person of Józef Pinkowski, and creating on August 24, 1980 a cell of crisis led by him did not in the least calm the situation. In the same day, Mieczysław Jagielski, the deputy of the Prime-Minister, went in the northern part of the country to discuss with the strikers from Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin. At the same time, the members of the Polish Service for Security and Information (SB) and the members of the Police tried by specific means to intervene in the crisis, generating new tensions and of course, discontentment both at Warsaw and at Moscow (C. Andrew, V. Mitrokhin, 2003, 514). All at once Lech Wałęsa became the symbol of resistance against the communist regime. A wave of strikes covered the whole country and the workers from Nowa Huta, Wrocław and Bydgoszcz created at their turn committees after the M.K.S. model.

After a series of very intense discussions, with many moments of tension and pressure from both sides, the denouement took place. On August 30, 1980, Mieczysław Jagielski signed an agreement together with the representatives of workers from Szczecin, and on the second day he signed another document with the representatives of strikers from Gdańsk ("The Gdańsk Agreements"). Thus, the workers from the two city-harbours succeeded to obtain from the government to recognize a fundamental right for the future of the Polish popular movement against the communism: the right to form independent trade unions.

After the Agreements in Gdańsk were signed, about 10 billions workers entered in the new trade unions and the "Committee for National Coordination of

the Independent Autonomous Trade Unions" was formed, known especially by the name of "Solidarity" ("Solidarność"). The purpose for which that trade union was founded was extremely briefly described by Jacek Kuron: "Instead of setting fire to the Committees (the headquarters of the PUWP – *the note of P. Opris*), form your own Committees (the Independent Trade Union Committees – *the note of P. Opris*)!" (H. Wujek, 2003, 864-865).

The Polish crisis and the decision to send the Deputy Prime-Minister Mieczysław Jagielski to Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin to negotiate with the strikers determined the members of the Political Bureau of Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC of CPSU) to form on August 25, 1980 a commission to permanently follow the events that took place in Poland. From that commission were took part followings: Andrei Gromyko, minister for Foreign Affairs; Yuri Andropov, chief of KGB; Marshal Dimitri Ustinov, minister of Defence; Konstantin Cernenko, chief of General Secretariat of CC of CPSU; Konstantin Rusakov, chief of the Central Committee's Department for Relations with the Foreign Communist Parties. On the top of that commission was named the main ideologist of the CPSU, Mikhail Andreevici Suslov (M. Kramer, 1995, 116. V. Mastny, 1998, 8-9).

Three days later, the members of the Political Bureau of CC of CPSU met in a session for listen the "Suslov Commission" conclusions and to discuss the solutions that had to be taken. In that occasion, Marshal Dmitri Ustinov was authorised to take alarm on three tank divisions (one division from Baltic Military District and two divisions from Byelorussia Military District) and one motorised infantry division from Trans-Carpathian Military District. These units had to complete their effective and means of fight according to the war states until August 29, 1980 (18.00 hours) and they formed a force group prepared to intervene at any time in Poland. Consequently, Marshal Dmitri

Ustinov ordered the immediate mobilization of 25000 soldiers in reserve and preparing of 6000 vehicles of various types. The Soviet minister of Defence was also empowered to take measures for supporting the initial group of Soviet forces with 5-7 divisions (by mobilizing another 75000 soldiers in reserve and by preparing other 9000 vehicles); these new divisions follow to intervene in Poland to support the initial forces if that was imposed (M. Kramer, 1999, 33).

More members of the Political Bureau of PUWP tried to justified in a front of Moscow's officials theirs compromising attitude which it had adopted during the crisis (August 27, 1980). These justifications succeeded to convince the Soviet leaders that ceding towards the strikers claims was at that time a good solution and there were not applied other military measures besides those established on the meeting of the Political Bureau of CC of CPSU from August 28, 1980.

Concluding of Gdańsk Agreements three days later was seen with concern at Kremlin. In the opinion of Moscow authorities, the danger represented by the apparition of independent trade unions in Poland was not only "a Polish problem, but a matter that affected the interests of the entire socialist community" (C. Andrew, V. Mitrokhin, 2003, 514). By the official recognizing of the existence of an anticommunist opposition inside a socialist country being into the Soviet sphere of influence, the myth of infallibility of the communist regime, of the political, economical and social system imposed by Josef Stalin after the Second World War in the countries from Central and Eastern Europe was collapsing, and the way to democracy was opened for the respective countries.

On September 5, 1980, the Polish authorities announced that Edward Gierek suffered a heart attack and, consequently, Stanisław Kania, who previously detained the function of party secretary, responsible with national security was appointed the PUWP leader. Such a decision was evidently

taken with the approval of CPSU leadership, who was directly interested in sustaining the party which promoted its interests in Poland. The unexpected replacement of the PUWP leader created anxiety among the leaders of the Polish army. They remembered very well the situation in which Czechoslovakia found it in 1968 and the way "The Prague Spring" was annihilated. On September 6, 1980, the Supreme Commander of the Polish Military Navy, Admiral L. Janczyszyn, declared to two Soviet admirals: "If Poland is invaded by foreign troops, it will be a blood bath. You must understand you face the Poles, not the Czechs!" (C. Andrew, V. Mitrokhin, 2003, 515-516).

The Moscow concern increased in the months that followed, because the "Solidarity" exponentially developed, development realized on the background of the pronounced worsening of the economical situation in Poland. More than this, Stanisław Kania, the leader who was sustained by the Soviets for occupying the supreme function in the Polish communist party, deliberately avoided a direct confrontation between the security forces and workers and limited him to accuse the "Solidarność" leaders for the disorders in economy provoked by the workers protest movements.

With the occasion of the reunion of ministers for Foreign Affairs from the countries members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), which took place in the Poland capital (19-20 October 1980), Stanisław Kania presented a short characterization of the political and economical situation in his country. Thus, the communist leader admitted the fact that "at the present, Poland traverses a deep political crisis" and affirmed: "The maximum wave of crisis was outrun, but we do not master yet entirely the political processes. The 6th Plenary of CC of PUWP characterized the conflict, the causes and established the ways to get out from the crisis" (S. Andrei, 2001, 50). Then, Stanisław Kania mentioned the political objectives he proposed for the next period and reminded about "the

strengthening of PUWP links with the people, against the demagogic and anarchist forces”, continuation of fight against “the socialism adversaries [...] to eliminate their influence on the working class”, reorganizing of the Polish communist party. Then the communist leader briefly presented the extremely difficult economical situation Poland traversed.

In his speech, Stanisław Kania mentioned also the fact that in the 1970s, errors were committed by the leaders of the country in the domain of economy planning and management: the agriculture and food industry neglecting, lack of preoccupation to resolve the house crisis, obtaining of “very large credits from Western, which was used in economically unjustified investments”. Also, Stanisław Kania mentioned that “the situation was worsened by the means of propaganda, too, which did not show the difficulties the country faced”, and also the fact that “lacks existed in the ideological, political education and work with intellectuals”.

At the final of his speech, the Polish communist leader affirmed in a clear and categorical manner that he opposed to the idea which circulated in various political environments regarding the necessity of a military intervention in Poland of the WTO members’ states. “We are conscious – declared Stanisław Kania – that *the problems we have must be solved only by ourselves*. There is the PUWP obligation towards the Polish working class and also towards the brotherly socialist countries (our underlining)” (Ş. Andrei, 2001, 50-51).

The speech presented by Stanisław Kania on October 20, 1980 did not yet succeed to remove the worry of Moscow political and military leaders. During the October 1980, the development of the “Solidarność” already generated, within the Polish civil society, an almost uncontrollable anticommunist movement. Therefore, the members of the Political Bureau of CC of CPSU, led by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, met to discuss especially about the evolution

of Polish crisis (October 29, 1980). With that occasion, the majority of the reunion participants agreed the idea that in Poland took place a contra-revolution, and Leonid Brezhnev affirmed: “Perhaps it will indeed be necessary to introduce martial law” (M. Kramer, 1999, 46. C. Andrew, V. Mitrokhin, 2003, 516). In our opinion, the conclusion offered by the leader of the Soviet Union Communist Party formed in an indirect mode an official admittance of the somehow unexpected success the “Solidarność” members registered against the communist authorities in Poland in the fall of 1980.

The idea of instituting the martial law in Poland was received with restraint by the communist authorities in Warsaw. Due to the fact this idea was not initially imposed with firmness to the PUWP leadership, Stanisław Kania postponed the applying of Moscow’s proposal, and this fact generated permanent reproaches from the Soviets part. The meeting between Stanisław Kania and Lech Wałęsa led only to increase the pressures exercised by the Kremlin for martial law enforcement. The Soviet leaders considered, with good reason, that, by the direct participation of the PUWP general secretary at the discussions with Lech Wałęsa, were strengthened the political positions gained by the members of “Solidarność” after the Gdańsk Agreements.

After November 10, 1980, the critics of Moscow leaders to the address of the leader of the Polish communist party sensibly hardened. At the same time, at the WTO level, preparations were started to develop some common military exercises in Poland, starting on December 8, 1980. The undeclared purpose of the respective exercises was to bring troops from states who were WTO members to support the Polish authorities, for an easier enforcement of the martial law. This law followed to be enforced immediately after the entering in Poland of the respective units, “called to help at the socialism defence”. In the case the situation in Poland would worsened, the four Soviet divisions, an East-Germany

division and two Czechoslovakian divisions initially engaged in unfurl of the military exercises (and Poland's "pacifying"), followed to be rapidly reinforced. The Supreme Commander of the WTO Unified Armed Forces was prepared to send in Poland, as force of reinforcement, 11 Soviet divisions (S. Tănase, 1999, 68. C. Andrew, V. Mitrokhin, 2003, 517).

The United States Administration had permanently precise information about the Moscow military intentions towards Poland during the year 1980 as well as during 1981. Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, deputy of chief of the Operation Department from the Polish General Staff, sent in advance to the CIA, data about the content of some top secret military plans prepared for the purpose that the military intervention in Poland of some WTO members' states successfully unfurl. The information had offered by Colonel Kukliński permitted the American secret services to form a relative exact image about the military forces and means which followed to be engaged by the WTO in Poland before and after the enforcement of martial law. Based on the obtained data, the American military annalists appreciated that, the number of Soviet, East-Germany and Czechoslovakian military units who followed to invade Poland, was not sufficient to assure the success of that operation (V. Mastny, 1998, 12).

On December 3, 1980, Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov, the Supreme Commander of the WTO Unified Armed Forces, demanded the agreement of General Wojciech Jaruzelski to start the common exercise "SOIUZ-80" (V. Mastny, 1998, 13. S. Tănase, 1999, 67). Due to the fact the military maneuvers followed to take place on the Poland territory during the period indicated by Colonel Ryszard Kukliński (December 8, 1980), it is possible that the American military annalists corroborated the data that they had at disposal and considered the application "SOIUZ-80" was the necessary cover for the Poland invasion, announced by the agent of the CIA. In such a scenario was obvious that,

the WTO group of military forces planned to execute the Poland occupation before the martial law was enforced, could enter on the Polish territory under the cover offered by the unfurl of the common application "SOIUZ-80".

On the other hand, if the situation in August 1968, in Czechoslovakia was compared with the one in December 1980, in Poland, the Western diplomats would observe some resemblance regarding the methods and means Kremlin utilized to annihilate the anticommunist movement in Poland, which were identical with those used in Czechoslovakia. In our opinion, the main similarities were the following: the precipitated and repeated convoking of the party leadership by the Soviet leaders; exercising of indirect military pressures (military advertisements launched by various official and unofficial channels) with the purpose to psychologically force the political leaders of the country which created problems, to adopt radical measures to re-establish the communist order; the unfurl of a reunion of leaders of the states which were WTO members, short time before the probable date when the military intervention would start.

But a simple resemblance was not sufficient for the Occident representatives to adopt a hard political attitude towards Moscow and Warsaw. They need clear proofs, and these were furnished at one time by Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, too (V. Mastny, 1998, 13). In our opinion, the rapid and very strong reaction which the representatives of the Western chancelleries adopted, in the first time those from the USA State Department and from the Foreign Office, in the moment when the starting of military maneuvers "SOIUZ-80" was announced, demonstrates the fact that the political leaders from Western Europe and North America were well informed about the Soviet plan for Poland invasion. They based not only on the analysis of some events occurred 12 years ago, not only on their intuition, but on conclusive proofs, too.

More than that, the tensioned situation in Poland was analyzed within the ministerial reunions of the Council and Committee for Defence Planning of NATO (9-12 December 1980) and we may presume the fact that the representatives of the American information services did not participate at the respective sessions as simple spectators.

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Social Psychology approaches

Science and Ideology: the Role of the Political Context

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Two Types of Knowledge, Two Types of Thinking

The title of this paper refers to the distinction between two types of knowledge and discourse; the scientific discourse on the one hand and the ideological discourse on the other. These two types of knowledge and discourse are by-products of two kinds of thinking that fundamentally differ from one another but which, nevertheless, necessarily co-exist. **The scientific knowledge** (individual, rational, logical, dealing with generalities and universalities) tends to differentiate itself from social, contextual and socio-affective influences, pursuing one objective: the establishment of universal truth. Although seemingly in opposition with such an approach, the **commonsense knowledge** (naive, cultural, dialogical, communitarian, transmitted through activities, language, customs and folklore) has the same objective: the increase of knowledge, cognitive progress, and the search for the truth. Although different, these two kinds of knowledge do not exclude, but complement one another. Both are based on similar cognitive processes, are often preoccupied with a set of common problems, and they pursue the same objectives (Marková, 2004). Scientific knowledge is conceived as specialized and individual, and

it appears to result from education, while common sense knowledge is dependent on, and arises from the shared heritage, practice and communitarian experience. Nevertheless, these two kinds of knowledge are by no means antinomic; they complement and sometimes overlap with each other. The two kinds of knowledge are sometimes practiced successively by one and the same individual who may act as a scientist in the laboratory, while in private life he or she is an analyst of the ways in which people relate, behave and communicate in certain groups. The lay individual acts as a true savant when he experiments with different interactional strategies, when he negotiates ways and methods of action and evaluates different practical solutions. The difference between the lay individual and the scholar is that the former does not act in a systematic way. The lay individual, taking advantage of knowledge accumulated in and through collective memory validated by experience and consensus, seeks to find a convenient solution of problems. The commonsense thinking has its own rationality; it seeks one and the same truth for everybody; it is reasonable and sensitive to expectations of others. Knowledge about common action obeys the rules of scholarly knowledge, and its laws of functioning. The commonsense individual is an **amateur-scholar**; he is,

Moscovici believes, a lay devotee of science, a novice preoccupied with metaphysical speculations (“Where do we come from?” “Who am I?” “Where do we head?”); he or she is a “realist” whose thinking depends on the context, common norms, and “accepted ideas”. Moscovici’s concept of the commonsense individual has a polemic character: to the traditional argument that “*people do not think*”, he opposes the idea according to which common people always think practically and realistically; they communicate and form relationships among themselves.

The two types of knowledge arise from two types of thinking: *scientific* and *social*. Scientists resort systematically to a rigorous organization of discourse, to arguments and logic; in other words, they resort to *scientific thinking*. Scientific thinking is characterized by four interconnected features: the logic of reasoning which is canonical; it submits everything to the test of facts, to the existence of powerful institutional regulations and to the need for reproducibility (Rouquette, 2009). The incoherent or abusive ratiocinations which arise from contradiction with scientific thinking are theoretically discarded or at least put into parentheses. The institutions (universities, academies, editorial boards of publications, scientific advisory bodies of research laboratories) define and control the canonical character of productions, while the individual subject loses autonomy when confronted with a detailed explanation of standardized procedures. The democratic principles and the State which provide for the equality of citizens and opportunities for self-expression, present the guarantee of an objective treatment of information and lack of discrimination.

In their day-to-day actions, people neither use a scientific language, nor do they resort to logical procedures in order to demonstrate their theories. Their cognitive processes are deeply influenced by *social knowledge*, their *interactions* with other subjects and stimuli coming from *the social field* (Beauvois,

1999). *Cognitions have a powerful social component* because they are attached to familiar objects, to a context and to a mode of production. These “objects” can be other people, groups, even the socially positioned individual (Haas, Jodelet, 1999). Human cognitions, therefore, possess a specific characteristic: they are not independent of the conditions within which they have formed. They are born from and develop within a characteristic social environment, in a cultural and social context in which individuals are socially inserted. Any change and any modification of the individual structure incorporate also the *status quo* of the social field which generates the entire configuration of events. The human cognitive universe translates the result of the treatment to which social individuals have been subjected; their integration into events presents characteristics which remain in the individual memory and have the exact significance which they bore when they were first incorporated. Therefore, the development of the individual cognitive structures cannot bypass those frequently employed social practices, types of social interaction, category belonging and the norms and values highlighted in the process of learning. The premise of our analysis is that cognitive development, when unfolding in certain social conditions (opposition, pressure, confrontation, and conflict), is marked by the characteristics of the social field. The scientist’s dependence on the social context, both ideologically and politically marked, produces a distortion in the scientific discourse through the dominance of the contextual social thinking.

Social thinking, a product of everyday life, is unpretentious and popular; it uses sometime a populist language and employs a discourse that is different from the one used by scientific thinking. However, scientists, especially social scientists, may glide towards compromises, letting themselves to be influenced by the “ideologically correct” discourse, whether in conversations and in certain evocation of facts in exchanging

ideas during informal meetings, or even in their scientific work. The cognitive activity of an individual is motivated and conditioned by his or her particular social setting. This could be the citizenship circumscribed to a certain type of society yielding a certain discourse, or a professional learning of certain social practices and articulating their cognitive activity. This type of thinking has its own logic but it is socially positioned, circumscribed by the socio-cultural context, to the group, space, to the here and now and to the community within which it is utilized. If the bearer of scientific thinking wants to be listened to, he or she must adapt discourse to the local norms, to the ideology and values that dominate the social field.

We can illustrate this claim by recounting a story specific to our field. The Russian psychologist Lev S. Vygotsky (1896-1934), who lived and worked during the Stalinist era, that is, in a socially unfavourable context, elaborated and developed a theory which is still valid today. He was forced to declare that he was living in "a new society and new culture" and therefore it is only natural for his model to have certain "cultural and historical" connotations belonging to that era. Despite this, he remains famous for several key concepts which opened the way to research in the field of social thinking: social contact, social cooperation, social interaction, and social consciousness. He discovered and put into practice two paradigms which act as two complementary "social functions": the social-historical context and language, viewed as a means of communication specific to a given context (Tardif, 2002). According to the Russian psychologist, individuals interact and develop socially and cognitively depending on the roles they are socially assigned, and also on the practices of the social context. His theory proved viable and can nowadays be applied to the analysis of the society he was born into: the peculiarities of the social context, the political and ideological concepts, the social practices employed (we are talking

about closed and controlled societies but we can also refer to the democratic societies in which the "correct discourse" becomes a situational criterion) all become part of the social-cognitive patterns which people use.

Serge Moscovici (1976), from the perspective of an interactional model, has come up with the term *socio-cognitive conflict*, viewed as a key notion of the socio-cognitive development and later on, in 1995, he discovered in Vygotsky his forerunner. He claims that Vygotsky was inspirational in formulating the social representation theory and that by means of his extraordinary intuition, he built up a fresco of his times and offered the possibility of understanding the nature of social consciousness (as it was seen in the epoch). Social consciousness (or social knowledge) presents itself as an autonomous social creation, as an "objective", having a public character. It is not to be inferred from the individual mental facts, but it is constructed through a combination of "forces" such as the society, culture, language and imagination. Social consciousness transforms itself into social products such as ideology, folklore, beliefs and language. The unique contribution of this important precursor, Moscovici believes, derives from Vygotsky's idea to make use of personal experience as a scientist who lives and works in a specific socio-ideological context. Vygotsky was forced to interact with his social environment and with his epoch. The "exterior", the given social context, permeates the individual, providing him with fundamental cognitive patterns and practices. Appropriating the social, the individual "learns" a certain social logic, acquires a certain social sense as well as a sense for a specific articulation of ideas. Although he came up with a theory which was consonant with his epoch, Vygotsky was considered an opposing the Marxist theory and therefore he was marginalized, isolated and ostracized.

The product we today call social thinking was first proposed by Vygotsky under a different name: *public social*

consciousness (i.e. collective, institutional). What does Vygotsky's originality consist of? By criticising the reflexological theory of Pavlov and Behterev, arguing that reflexes cannot explain consciousness satisfactorily, Vygotsky advances the idea according to which this superior mental product, that is consciousness, has a social genesis. The individual element, that is, consciousness specificity, is derived from the social basis of consciousness, as the individual lives a particular collective life and engages in relations of solidarity and social relationships. Vygotsky considers that society, the educational system and all institutions in general, influence social consciousness, social contacts, social cooperation and social interaction. The whole social context becomes a laboratory inside which *sui-generis* social learning takes place and plays the role of a determining conjunction for the future evolution of the individual as a social subject. Knowledge, normative initiation, personality formation, and even individual mental functions emerge and develop in a certain social and cultural environment and they are stimulated by the social context to which the social subjects belong. The internal construction follows the external one and therefore is stimulated from the outside. Thus, we deal with "an internal reconstruction of the external activity", Vygotsky wrote. From what we have said so far it seems that the crucial role in the cognitive and social development of the individual is determined by the social and cultural characteristics of the socio-political, ideological and cultural environment. Against this, individuals measure their efforts to adapt themselves to the environment that provides them with all the important information and enables them to internalize it. However, not only does the environment provide them with knowledge but it also offers ways to interpret it, in other words, it provides them with patterns of thought.

The Interference of Ideology

We have reached a decisive point in our presentation. The information, with which the social subject is provided, is not objective, neutral, logical, technical, "rational" or "scientific" but it is tainted with rumours, beliefs, ideologies, magical practices, and is furnished by the social context (Guimelli, 1999). It is therefore context-shaped and adapted to the peculiarities of the context. Social thinking, as a way of judging and evaluating events depending on the social context, shared experience and acquired social practices, makes its way into the scientific discourse. As it is insufficient and irrational, aberrant and marked by evaluation errors, social thinking often distorts the objectivity of the researcher. How does this happen? Catherine Garnier (2002) offers a powerful interpretation of the way in which social thinking comes to inhabit the individual: the social space, in which the individual performs, is culturally invested and permeated by social thinking. Thinking is "secreted" by the brain according to how the computer treats the information. The selection of stimuli, objectives and events with which the individual comes into contact, ties him socially, and his thinking is affected by these influences. Once localized, thinking becomes controllable, managed as if it were a mechanism, albeit a social one. The social context filters information and events and delivers them according to those ideas, social representations or practices which it favours.

The functioning of social thinking is guided, undoubtedly, by those values and ideologies which dominate the social field. Values are seen as intrinsic and absolute truths. They are embedded and axiologically established ideas which are collectively shared and they form the foundation of a common moral edifice. Transposed into action, values demand the respect for norms, defending them and passing them on. In order to be accepted and incorporated, they attach themselves to the discourse of power

which then imposes and propagates them. Ideology is seen as a form of attachment to the collective values, a form of partisanship and militanism in the service of power (Feertchak, Gamby-Mas, 2009).

There are many classic contributions to the way in which ideology acts upon both collective and individual thinking. In *German Ideology*, Marx says clearly that the production of ideas, representations, thinking and consciousness are all coming from the material behaviour, from the environment, that is, from the context. People and relationships established among them seem to be inside a *camera obscura* where the processes of their historical lives impress themselves like objects on the retina. Lenin, in his turn, saw in ideology the perfect tool to fight his enemies. Ideology, he wrote in *What Is to Be Done*, is a system of ideas and theories which the protagonists of the class struggle employ in their battles. Ideology is thus a useful tool which is not necessarily dependent on the truth it proposes. To this, we can also add Althusser's contribution. In *Pour Marx*, he maintains that human societies "secrete" ideology as an indispensable element for their breathing, for their historical life.

The conditions inside the context influence the discourse and imply actual relations, interactions and influences. The discourse, including the scientific one, is fuelled by the ideology belonging to the dominant group. Ideologically guided, the discourse "anchors" the individuals in a field and controls them. Individual biographies are sometimes histories of the ways in which the social actor became a "prisoner" of his environment, both culturally and ideologically.

What else is to be added? Ideology was and still is used by totalitarian regimes as a tool, having been assigned a utilitarian purpose. It is used to fight against opposing viewpoints and to "counsel" the actors in the social field, in order to make them understand what is the "scientific truth," evidently the one favoured and spread by the

dominant group.

Context control and the "Psychosocial Net"

The social context is responsible not only for the elaboration of the dominant social thinking which determines the social, cultural and economic orientation of a society but also for choosing the practices, including those which are active in the field of knowledge and scientific production. We shall insist on the importance of the psychosocial context because it plays a determining role in shaping the human thinking which decodes and evaluates information. We will mention some older theories, according to which cognitive development is modelled on the social relationships (Vygotsky, Piaget) and we will also invoke Doise and Mugny's theory (1997) according to which intelligence develops through the interaction and cooperation of the involved social actors, found in a specific social context. These researches prove that the cognitive development of the individual is dependent on the relationships among the involved social actors and their reference to the common values, social thinking or a dominant ideology. The social context therefore plays an important role in the decoding and processing of information and in the shaping of social thinking.

In dictionaries we find that "**context**" (*lat. contextus*) means assembly, fabric, interweaving of combined elements, providing meaning and value; it also means an assembly of circumstances in which a fact is inserted; and ambiance, environment, situation, vicinity. It also means a science of establishing bodies, a chemistry of transformation, of profound explicit, implicit or even secret changes of these bodies (their synthesis, their energy, their power). It also refers to an interweaving of norms, laws, traditions and social movements, putting pressure on social structures, as well as on social actors, demanding efforts of adjustments to the proposed and authorized

values, attitudes, relations and role-plays. A social context presents itself as a system of ideas and beliefs, norms and traditions which form the cultural and social entourage in which the individual evolves and which is transmitted through education and language. It also provides reference frameworks, brand images, behavioural models and everyday practices, ensuring the socialization and social integration of the individual (Neculau, 2010).

People and human groups form and differentiate themselves according to the cultural environment they frequent and to behavioural practices within which they develop. Surrounded by specific stimuli, the individuals discover keys with the help of which they may proceed to decipher all cultural and ideological messages. Some biographical details are also important: for instance, if someone during adolescence, youth and even later, frequents a particular group, network, and/or cultural and ideological environment of a certain orientation, they will remain marked by it for the rest of their life. Thus, it appears that through its characteristics, context induces value tables, determines the axiological system, and offers behavioural norms and styles.

Not only does context influence social thinking which it decisively marks but it also affects social practices and the production of ideas. It has a “mobilizing” role, it polarizes and provides instructions. For instance, it can determine conformity and stereotypical thinking or cognitive structures (basic cognitive schemes) which can be controlled from outside and manipulated. Moral, economic, cultural and ideological history impregnates the social thinking practiced in a certain context; it particularizes it, and anchors it. The contextual influence facilitates a certain type of communication, determines a certain type of discourse, delimits the margin of reflection and offers benchmarks for decisions.

A controlled context or a context manufactured after a certain recipe produces

a particular “social logic” which guides the cognitive activity of individuals and familiarizes them with certain “normality”. It helps them rationalize the information from the environment, subordinate it to the concept and make them reject the “anomaly”, the exception, and everything that comes in contradiction with the “scientific norms” of functioning or with common practices. It is extremely important to remark that controlled context fuels the process of building social representations and it is this social-cognitive heritage with which social actors operate.

The researchers of the phenomenon of social representations invoke the “effect of the context” on the actors in institutions and communities (Abric, Guimelli, 1998) and describe a reality expressed through norms and cultural practices as a direct consequence of the gradual evolution of democratic societies. For those who formed themselves in countries where the social control was absolute (like those in Eastern Europe), context meant even more: a coercing reality, a social marking, a body of conduct norms which did not give the social actor a chance to reject or choose among many variables. We refer to the socio-global and ideological context and to the immediate, situational context. This, together, built a certain social-historical reality which covered each and every individual as in a net, forcing them to process certain information and to form certain images, beliefs, representations and acquire certain cognitive solutions.

The ones who fuelled their representations from a certain context, “built” them according to certain coordinates, so that they “acquired” certain significations and interpretations of the social phenomena and patterns of knowledge organization. Therefore, context can determine a certain outlook of life and of the way in which the society functions. It can demand the acquisition of certain norms of conduct by controlling and affecting the situation and so determine the use of particular evaluation frames which mobilize and/or polarize the

social actors. Finally, this controlled context forms a certain socio-cognitive scheme which directs the thinking in a particular way and determines habits and adherence to standardized normalities. Closer to the reality we have in mind, Ivana Markova (1999), born in the Czech Republic, and so in Eastern Europe, says it clearly: the context is responsible for the controlled formation of social representations. They are built (elaborated, maintained) and they evolve within a socio-cultural and historical context, during a very long period of time. They are passed on from one generation to another, in various ways, be it informal (as in the case of socialization, every day practices, collective memory, individual behaviours and the interactions among them, or symbolic communication) or institutional (language, education, legal systems).

From what we have said so far it follows that individuals build up their social representations by reshaping the reality with which they come into contact and which affects them. They integrate this "objective reality" into their cognitive organization and value systems and they shape their history and the reference system by relating themselves to the given context. The expression of ideas, the production and organization of discourse and the discovery of theories, are all situated in time and space. They are fuelled by the ideological field and by the position the individual or the group in the social system. In a way, the individuals, by means of their biography, are the "prisoners" of context; they are counselled to appropriate a certain discourse which they then spread out. The significations transmitted through discourse bring individuals closer together, providing them with recognition signs. They establish relationships, they remember things, build images, speak and make people speak, summon up in a few words or sentence a cliché, or a label (Moscovici, Vignaux, 1994). The force-ideas are for the most part induced by mentalities and beliefs, that is by those representations and practices that are encouraged by the context. Often they are

productions of something that already exists, and of elaborated contents; in our case, they create and maintain identity, the collective equability, the socio-discursive cohesion, the "unity", the "front" and the "line".

Several times (2001, 2006, 2008) we advanced a model of approach and analysis of the various ways in which a context can be controlled, starting from the examination of the social field in the closed (totalitarian) societies of Eastern Europe, with a special reference to Romania. We first noticed that a context can be built according to certain ideological orientations, benchmarks, instructions and "guidelines". A social actor educated in a controlled context will react according to the images and representations formed within that context. By feeding him with a particular kind of information, by placing him in contexts which are modelled by the guardians of consciousness, by bombarding him during his life with certain types of images, interpretations and categories of thinking, that person will acquire these models and reject everything that contradicts that pattern of thought which for him represents normality. The individual does not know that he does not know anything else. In order to stimulate the elaboration and fixation of collective representations, the approach of those leaders who desire certain collective reactions is to group the individuals in artificially created and well-controlled structures, to involve them in collective activities, having common aims, imposed from the outside. Thus, they are directed to establish the expected social representations, to acquire certain cognitive schemes which are then practiced and strengthened in perfectly controlled conditions! Because he did not have the opportunity to be exposed to alternatives, he will consider his context to be the only objective, real and comprehensible. The social and ideological context, the particularities of the situation, the immediate finality, will provide him with a certain frame of interpretation of the events in a certain history and a specific

culture and with a discourse that has certain characteristics and signs. “Armed” with such knowledge, his cognitive productions will look for coherence and harmony with the germinal context.

What is to be understood by a “controlled context”? It refers to the accreditation of an “ideal” social model, the only one authorized, and the institutionalization of a system of unifying norms and practices which come to confirm it. The controlled context functions as a coercing system in which the social values are assembled in a unifying vision, in a cultural and social field which is based on value hierarchies and on appropriate moral references.

For the East Europeans it meant a combination – subordinated to a single objective that of Control – of cultural ideological prescriptions, expressed through norms and cultural practices, a socio-political “directive”, an order which could not be ignored. Both the global, ideological context and the immediate, situational one formed together a network of provisions, stipulations, recommendations, indicators, prescriptions, signs, imprints and symbols. They engulfed each and every individual, covering him in a “psychosocial net” which coerced him to think, feel and act in conformity with the authorized image-symbols, norms, solutions and rituals. This controlled context established a certain “social logic” which influenced the cognitive activity of the individual, familiarizing him with a certain type of “normality” and helping him rationalize the information inside the environment by subordinating it to the basic concept and making him reject the “abnormality”, the exception, the aberration, that came in contradiction with the “scientific” norms of social functioning provided by the controlled context. In any totalitarian regime, the context exercises a social pressure toward conformity, cognitively manipulating the formation of social representations or, in the favourite words of Communist Romania, “*the view on the world and life*”.

By analysing the case of totalitarian Romania, we have identified several ways of using the context as a means of controlled cognitive formation. We have focused upon several areas of social life, deeply marked by ideological pressure and the establishment of some new social practices, areas which shaped the formation of a certain individual profile. This type of individual remained stuck in those cognitive schemes and social practices learned within a system of social control. These individuals formed adequate representations which they activated any time when they were confronted with similar situations. These were: the ideological control of education and social formation; the annexation and loyalty to all public intellectuals, including the academia; the formation of a new, pro-established elite; the isolation and elimination of those who refused to join the new regime, the establishment of a generalized atmosphere of fear and the institutionalization of violence (arrests, deportations, work camps); the control and standardization of everyday life by establishing certain norms of authorized practices, all aiming at a generalized conformity and last but not least a pedagogy of the formation of “the new man”, an educational ideal present in all utopian systems (Neculau, 2008).

We have called *the psychosocial net*, the tool used for total control, which is a combination of psychological pressure and controlled formation. Its aim was to identify, classify, subdue and hypnotize the individual. Since everything was stipulated, controlled, censored, (the word, the gesture, the attitude, the public behaviour, the production of ideas), this atmosphere of distrust and continuous pressure encouraged duplicitous behaviours and obedience. The individual did not have other solutions except for taking refuge in a superficial conformism, faking adherence and embracing duality. Often, however, this adaptation meant an alteration of his personal life and of his cognitive production. Consequently, the individual, slowly but surely, came to identify with the encouraged

model while the social penetrated into the core of his personality smothering his own set of ideas, attitudes and practices until the convenient social roles would set in.

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Psychological characteristics of the image of politician in the consciousness of the Ukrainian electorate

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Abstract: *Psychological characteristics of politician's image perception in mass consciousness of electorate are analyzed. The results of an empirical study of modern Ukrainian politician's image are shown in comparison with an ideal image shown in literature that allows to emphasize the problems of political leadership in Ukraine.*

Key words: image, politician, leader, mass consciousness, perception, electorate.

Introduction

Political processes in the Ukrainian society are directly reflected in the political mass consciousness, because the policy refers to the sphere of life which every person is drawn in. Long time ago the scientific literature raised the issue, that in order to be involved in the political life on the highest degree, to become a political leader, person must possess certain psychological characteristics. Some scientists believe that a political leader, as a rule, removed from those he is navigating, therefore, his personal qualities for the electorate may not have a special significance, but actually leadership gets moral assessment which the politician should take into consideration. The success or failure of the politician is perceived very emotionally by mass consciousness, therefore ability to catch

mass mood becomes important to leader, to realize the real needs of people and express their interests. In this case, politician can become a symbol of movement, the party and society. However from our point of view the image of politician which consists of certain psychological characteristics in the mass consciousness is able to determine attitude to politician, his moral judgments.

In condition of political situation that we have seen in Ukraine in recent years generated and declared image of the politician becomes a way of psychological influence on the mass consciousness of the electorate, kind of political technologies. In this connection repeated attempts to compile a list of personal qualities, inherent to political leader should be noted, with the possible aim of testing them. However we agree with I. Golovneva (2002), who claims that quality

selected by western researchers can be not blindly carry on Ukrainian personality.

Regarding this our aim is not to determine the list of necessary psychological qualities for politician, but recreating the image of politician, that exists in mass consciousness of the Ukrainian electorate. Such approach would determine whether a representation of the image of politician in mass consciousness meet the public expectations about him.

Questions about image of political leaders, as well as some aspects of perception of politicians by electorate have been investigated theoretically and empirically by Russian and Ukrainian authors: O. Shestopal, A. Andreyev, M. Sivertseva, G. Diligeneskii, A. Shmelev, L. Goldberg, D. Vydrik, V. Bebik, V. Litvin, H. Pocheptsov, M. Slyusarevskiy and P. Frolov and others. Among these researches the main place was hold by psychosemantic studies of the mass consciousness, which gives possibility “to materialize” the representation of the population about political leaders by using special techniques that reconstruct deep semantic category of ordinary consciousness. However these researches give presentation, mostly about combination of personal qualities that define the presence of abilities for political activities. We are also interested in the representation of the psychological characteristics of the image politician’s in mass consciousness.

Images of political perceptions that arise in mass consciousness are the ideas which are formed by political consciousness and attitudes towards political activity and political leaders. Traditionally, political psychology is distinguished between the way of information, the way of values and the way of expected future. We are interested primarily in the image of information as the knowledge of the electorate (not necessarily true) about political figures. It is interesting in comparison to the image of meaning as the system of requirements that apply to politician. Such approach would clarify the image of the expected future, which reflects

the preferences and ideals of public life, as well as improve understanding of motives of people’s social activity.

Representing the image of politician in mass consciousness involves the selection of individual elements in the integrity study – personal and socio-psychological characteristics, which represent meaningful moments of the test image. Turning to the issue of socio-psychological characteristics as a politician, which are reflected in mass consciousness of the electorate it should be noted that among the main qualities that should be inherent to the politician researchers have traditionally included activity and sustained effort, ability to build your own image, political thought, people’s confidence and ability to use the power of authority, the ability to understand other people and to take responsibilities, the ability to enhance own credibility and political culture. There are important qualities for a politician named such as empathy, the master of persuasion, accessibility, communication skills and ability to maintain an open feedback, credibility, compliance with official status, and unacceptable are the bureaucracy, conflictability, aggressiveness, misanthropy, inability to resist the negative attitudes and stereotypes.

In the matter of the psychological characteristics of the politician the theory of leadership can serve as theoretical basis, because the psychological characteristics of the concept of the “politician” in our opinion include first of all aspect of leadership. From this perspective the theory of personality is interesting (“charismatic theory”), which implies that the leader can only be a man who possesses a certain set of personality traits or a set of certain psychological characteristics. According to this theory the structure of personality is represented as a configuration of features which are a kind of brief description, or at the same time the definition of a particular type of behavior. That is why various authors have attempted to provide these essential leadership traits or characteristics. It should be noted that there is presence of certain personal qualities of

leadership in the theory of personality traits (L. Bernard, V. Binh, O. Ted S. Kilbourn, K. Byrd and others), and in the situational theory of leadership (R. Stogdill, S. Shartle, X. Gerth and C. Mills), and compromise synthetic theory (F. Fiedler, J. Homans, J. Hemfield, etc.).

In the context of the problem it is worth to mention those characteristics which mass political consciousness of the electorate obtains. Foremost among these features is a personal interest of the subject of perception, therefore the personification of the image takes place, person goes in the forefront, not idea. Therefore, political forces of society in political mass consciousness are identified with specific political figures.

Another distinguishing characteristic of political mass consciousness is antagonisation tendency to polarize all representations, to divide them into "black" and "white", "bad" and "good", "totalitarian" and "democratic". Therefore the image of politician, which is formed in mass consciousness, always has affective, evaluative color and as a consequence, the polarization in society attributes politicians either positive or negative aspects.

In addition, mass political consciousness refers with to those images, which have relevant political content and has certain social consequences, therefore, emotional involvement in political events appears, additional conditions for the evaluation of both political forces and individual politicians are created. Typically, such estimations are extremely polarized from the adoption and support to the antagonism and may significantly influence the political choice of the electorate.

Personification and antagonization of images in mass political consciousness are associated with emotional-effective component, and therefore can not be rationally reflected. This dramatic emotional experience of real political problems of society cause widespread concern. The rational component is secondary in relation to emotional and effective components and may include estimates and expectations concerning a po-

litical figure, as well as mass opinions and feelings about him/her and the political forces he/she represents. So depending on those characteristics, by which is the image of a politician endowed attitude toward the party in whole is constructed.

Method

Analysis of the representation of the image of politics in mass consciousness is traditionally held by psychosemantic methods, which study the semantic preferences of the people participating in political process. It allows to reconstruct the system of individual values and personal meanings, and to identify individual differences in the processes of categorization. To identify the knowledge of the electorate regarding the image of the politician, the most acceptable technique is the psychosemantic Scale of Technology, which includes numeric scale for estimating the poles which are marked by verbal patterns of personal and socio-psychological characteristics. Usage of semantic differential allows to measure personal attitudes and relationships to politicians.

To identify current knowledge of the electorate relative to traits, inherent in the image of politician, we carried out research in which 120 persons of different age and formation participated, we they do not participate in political parties, that should provide impartiality of estimation. Respondents were offered to estimate a collective image of the politician by means of scales of semantic differential.

On the basis of empirical research lies positions of experimental cognitive psychology about representation of socio-political experience in human consciousness according to which in mass consciousness cognitive constructs (reference pattern) exist, they carry out function of criteria for perception politicians by the population. For definition of the list of character traits which should be presented in psychosemantic differential we have revealed characteristics which are presented in the scientific literature

(81 positions). But as they are local properties of character, they can be subordinated to more global properties. The classification of global character traits are most widely recognised in modern international editions, so-called Big five of properties (U. Norman, L. Goldberg, R. Costa, P. Mak-Krej, D. Digman, F. Ostendorf, B. De Raad, A.G. Shmelev, M.V. Bodunov), therefore we have allocated the following factors of the analysis:

- 1) Altruism, friendliness;
- 2) Good manners;
- 3) Activity, extroversion;

- 4) Self-control, consciousness;
- 5) Emotional stability.

However we have considered necessity to add this list with such global factor as “individual communicative style of dialogue, charisma”, as value of these characteristics for the politician is underlined by almost all researchers. It should be noted that selected global factors might correlated with factors that are considered most important in the theory of personality traits of a leader. In such a way, global and local properties of character are correlated in the following way (see Table 1).

Factor	Features of character of political leader
Altruism, friendliness:	ability to inspire trust, minimal use of force actions, mildness, humanness, focus on other, tolerance, peaceableness, care about ordinary people, empathy, trust in others, openness, responsiveness to other, heightened optimism, ability to think positively and treat to others the same
Good manners:	system of moral values, objective character, rationalism, loyalty to the criticism, generosity, high level of intelligence and knowledge, adaptability, good manners, common sense, competence, reliability, logicality
Activity, extroversion:	conservatism, stubbornness, motive of competition, dynamic, independence, strength, perseverance, social activity, increased demands to others, desire for unrestricted freedom, enthusiasm, impetuosity, purposefulness, exceptional organizational skills, energy, initiative, ambitiousness
Self-control, consciousness:	submission, adequacy, pliability, lack of sense of guilt for the committed errors, farsight, caution, autonomy in decision-making, strong will, concentration, alertness, sense of duty, practical mind, concrete character, excellent self-control, risk, self-discipline, honesty, ability to overcome obstacles, justice, decency, willingness to take responsibility
Emotional stability:	reticence, high degree of confidence, psychological maturity, steadiness, sensitivity, emotionality
Individual, communicative style of communication, charisma:	ability to hold the audience's attention, ability to simulate non-standard ideas in new situations, focus on success, ability to convince others, ability to predict, ability to bend others to his volition, ability to attract the special sympathy of his/her supporters and citizens, sociability, orator ability, attractiveness

Table 1. Compliance with global and local properties of character of political leadership.

On the basis of the given list-classification the questionnaire was made. Respondents' personal constructs concerning an image of the modern political leader was studied.

Discussion of Results

Calculation of a measure of a dispersion of the data was made by means of

calculation fluctuation that has given the chance to interpret variability of a data set. The importance of property of character was defined by quantity of polar extreme elections (-3, -2, 2, 3). The result which average value in sample was more than 1,25 or less than -0,25 was considered as

significant. Results of empirical allocation of the most significant properties of character are presented in table 2 (see Table 2), at the same time it is necessary to notice that expressiveness of the given qualities has statistically significant differences.

Factor	Average value of the sample	Minimum value	Maximum value	Measure of dispersion (fluctuation)
Altruism, friendliness				
Mildness (A3)	-0.27	-3.0	1.00	1.34
Good manners				
High level of intelligence, erudition (I6)	1.40	-3.0	3.00	1.57
Adaptability (I7)	1.30	-2.0	3.00	1.49
Activity, extroversion				
Motive of competition (E3)	1.67	-2.0	3.00	1.37
Perseverance (E7)	1.70	-2.0	3.00	1.26
Social activity (E8)	1.70	-2.0	3.00	1.34
Increased exactness to others (E9)	1.77	-2.0	3.00	1.36
Desire for unrestricted freedom (E10)	1.77	-2.0	3.00	1.48
Enthusiasm (E11)	1.50	-1.0	3.00	1.22
Impetuosity (E12)	1.40	-2.0	3.00	1.33
Purposefulness (E13)	2.20	-1.0	3.00	1.00
Energy (E15)	1.77	-1.0	3.00	0.94
Ambitiousness (E17)	2.27	-1.0	3.00	.98
Self-control, awareness actions				
Lack of a sense of guilt for the committed errors (S4)	1.50	-2.0	3.00	1.76
Strong will (S8)	1.47	-2.0	3.00	1.83
Sense of duty (S11)	-0.27	-3.0	3.00	1.95
Risk (S15)	1.93	-1.0	3.00	1.01
Ability to overcome obstacles (S18)	1.57	-3.0	3.00	1.36
Decency (S20)	-0.40	-3.0	3.00	2.04
Honesty (S22)	-0.43	-3.0	3.00	1.79
Emotional stability				
High degree of confidence (M2)	1.50	-2.0	3.00	1.74
Individual, communicative style of communication, charisma:				
Ability to convince others (K4)	1.47	-3.0	3.00	1.43
Ability to bend others to his volition (K6)	1.60	-3.0	3.00	1.75
Communicativeness (K8)	1.80	-2.0	3.00	1.03

Table 2. The most significant results of the survey (the parameters of the psychosemantic differential).

Analyzing distribution of values under each global factor, made it possible to note the following. Under the factor “Altruism, friendliness” almost all qualities of political leaders are on average estimation range, therefore it is possible to admit that these qualities are present at mass consciousness of politicians, but are not expressed brightly. Among them the negative perception of mildness allows to draw a conclusion on absence of the given quality among political leaders.

Under the factor “Intelligence” respondents allocate such qualities as “High level of intelligence, erudition” and “Adaptability”, however low average value of these qualities in sample testifies that in an image of the politician is not given to them of great value. From our point of view, such representation can be inherent among the majority of citizens in connection with negative image of the intellectual which has developed in mass consciousness during end XX century. Consequently intelligence is not identified by the majority with activity, resoluteness and ability to achieve the object – qualities which are allocated as necessary for the politician.

The most significant traits under the factor “Activity, extroversion” were allocated as “Motive of competition”, “Perseverance”, “Public activity”, “Increased exactingness to others”, “Desire for unrestricted freedom”, “Purposefulness”, “Energy” and “Ambitiousness”; lesser degree significant are “Enthusiasm” and “Impulsiveness”. We can admit that the importance of these traits are caused by mass consciousness which are identified with ability of the politician to reach an object in view that corresponds to electorate expectations. But it is necessary to underline that the importance of activity and activity of the person are admitted necessary to the politician, first of all, in mass consciousness of the western society (E. Egorova-Gantman, 1994).

At the same time the profile of the Ukrainian political leader can be seen in the list of the characteristics recognized as important by respondents during the investigation “A modern political situation in a public

opinion estimation” (2007): “clean hands”, high moral qualities, the attentive relation to people, organizational abilities, patriotism, the accurate political orientation, wealthy life experience. However the importance of the qualities inherent to politicians, under the factor “Self-control, consciousness”, received by us in research, testifies what qualities as are significant “Lack of a sense of guilt for the committed errors”, “Volition”, “Risk”, “Ability to overcome obstacles” and at the same time absence of Sense of duty, decency and honesty is marked. It is especially important that according to S. Nedbaevskogo, problems of morality, internal ethics of the person are the main things for the Ukrainian culture and mentality (S. Nedbaevsky, 1997). Such image of the politician, on the one hand, can be seen as a political crisis consequence in the Ukrainian society which takes place last years. However, on the other hand, we are inclined to consider that those psychological characteristics with which politicians allocates electorate, cause mistrust of a society to them. We assume, what exactly mistrust to politicians which finds reflexion in a semantic image of the politician, causes political dissociation of the Ukrainian society and in particular low level of its social capital. Moreover, this phenomenon is interagreed: deficiency of the social capital in the Ukrainian society in which researchers (F. Fukujama, J. Privalov, J. Saenko, A. Kolody) specify, is appreciably caused by a lack of trust of electorate to political institutes and their representatives. So, in sociological monitoring “The Ukrainian society” (1992-2008) fluctuation of trust level was fixed to political institutes (to the President, the Supreme body, the government. Gradual increase of level of trust to 2004-2005 was replaced by the increasing mistrust while the mean score of trust of citizens to certain social groups, such as a family, colleagues, compatriots, etc. remained stable throughout all these years.

Concerning the factor “Emotional stability” as significant trait is allocated “High degree of confidence” also other emotional dis-

plays are not identified. The given fact, from our point of view, has the double nature: it can be caused as low emotional intelligence of the respondent, and that the image of the politician in mass consciousness is created indirectly, in many respects at the expense of mass-media influence, and public statements assume certain restraint.

Under the factor "Individual, communicative style of communication, charisma" significant traits are communicativeness, Ability to bend others to his volition, ability to convince people. And as a whole categoric structure in mass consciousness of the Ukrainian electorate it is possible to present an image of the politician the following way: ambitious, purposeful, vigorous, inclined to risk, social, but with deficiency of decency and honesty.

Conclusions

As a result of the carried out research we can draw following conclusions: the image of the information of the politician which exists in mass consciousness of electorate not always coincides with expectations concerning it, designed in an ideal image and distinctions in those qualities to which the priority in the Ukrainian culture and mentality is given are especially significant. As in mass political consciousness of each population and each social group there is the stereotyped image of the politician allocated with the sum the "necessary" traits, coincidence of a real image of the politician with the list of these qualities promotes its success and popularity. In our opinion the revealed discrepancy can cause that real politicians are a successful only among a certain part of electorate, the one where these expectations mostly coincide. Besides, it is necessary to consider that for the Ukrainian political process creation of numerous movements by concrete persons who wish to head them while political forces put forward the leader extremely seldom is characteristic. At the same time in

connection with shortage of accurate political programs and parties which consistently carry out them, the electorate should be guided by concrete politicians.

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Scientific Agenda

Dixième Conférence Internationale sur les Représentaions Sociales Tunis-Gammarth, 5-8 juillet 2010 Compte-rendu

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Depuis sa première édition de Ravello (1992), la Conférence Internationale sur les Représentaions Sociales (CIRS) s'est donné pour objectif de créer l'occasion d'échanges fructueux entre les chercheurs de tous les continents sur les avancées

théoriques et les applications de la Théorie des Représentaions Sociales. Cette année, à l'invitation du comité d'organisation représenté par Jean-Claude Abric (Université de Provence), président, et Dorra Ben Alaya (Université de Tunis El Manar), organisatrice,

le dixième rendez-vous bisannuel de la grande famille des représentations sociales a eu lieu à Gammarth (Tunisie). A la suite de l'Asie, ce premier pas au sud de la Méditerranée s'inscrit dans la dynamique d'expansion de la théorie des représentations sociales, dynamique déjà initiée depuis plusieurs années et qui, dernièrement, semble s'accentuer. Notons d'emblée que cette édition s'est déroulée en présence de Serge Moscovici, fondateur de la théorie des représentations sociales, hôte d'honneur de la conférence et porteur d'inspiration pour plusieurs générations de chercheurs.

Les organisateurs de cette dixième édition ont inscrit la conférence sous le thème «représentations, transmission des savoirs et transformations sociales». Ce thème «se veut l'écho des préoccupations et des enjeux mondiaux actuels, enjeux identitaires,

économiques, environnementaux, technologiques, sociaux, culturels, etc.». L'atmosphère conviviale qui a régné durant les cinq jours et l'organisation irréprochable mise au point avec grâce et professionnalisme par Dorra Ben Alaya ont parfaitement soutenu la qualité des échanges entre les participants.

La longue liste des symposia et les trois langues officielles de la conférence (français, espagnol et anglais) reflètent le dynamisme international et le constant renouvellement des perspectives que propose la théorie des représentations sociales. Ainsi, la conférence a accueilli 267 intervenants, sans compter les participants non communicants, des origines les plus diverses, comme en témoigne le Tableau 1, ci-dessous, regroupant le nombre de communicants par pays et par continent.

Afrique (10)	Algérie (2)	Europe (158)	Autriche (3)
	Côte d'Ivoire (2)		Danemark (1)
	Kenya (1)		Espagne (6)
	Mauritanie (1)		Portugal (11)
	Tunisie (4)		Finlande (2)
			France (86)
Amérique (80)	Argentine (9)		Grande-Bretagne (10)
	Brésil (30)		Grèce (2)
	Canada (2)		Italie (21)
	Etats-Unis (7)		Malte (1)
	Mexique (25)		République Tchèque (1)
	Porto Rico (1)		Roumanie (6)
	Venezuela (6)		Suède (5)
			Suisse (5)
Asie (19)	Chine (2)		
	Corée du Sud (1)		
	Indonésie (6)		
	Israël (1)		
	Japon (1)		
	Taiwan (8)		

Tableau 1. Répartition des communicants à la dixième CIRS en fonction de leur pays et continent d'origine.

Ainsi, pas moins de vingt symposia, dix tables rondes, dix groupes de discussion thématiques, trente sessions de communications libres, une session de communications affichées et cinq conférences plénières eurent lieu dans un intervalle de quatre jours. L'ensemble de

ces contributions a été regroupé selon douze thématiques théoriques, méthodologiques et appliquées. Ainsi, outre la présence de thématiques générales telles que les questions théoriques et méthodologiques ou encore les liens avec les relations intergroupes et les enjeux identitaires ou le genre, on a noté

la mise en lien des représentations sociales avec des thématiques d'actualité (e.g., les problèmes sociétaux, l'environnement, la mondialisation, la santé, le domaine éducatif ou économique). Dans la logique du thème de cette dixième conférence, certaines questions ont été assez largement développées. Ce fut notamment le cas des transformations et mutations sociales ou encore du domaine éducatif.

Au-delà de sa thématique, cette dixième conférence a été placée sous le signe de l'ouverture. Cette perspective a été d'emblée confirmée par Toshio Sugiman (Université de Kyoto) dont la conférence inaugurale a traité de l'émergence des représentations sociales. C'est au travers d'exemples tirés de l'histoire de populations spécifiques du Japon et selon une perspective originale que l'auteur a abordé cette problématique. L'intervention de Toshio Sugiman a permis de découvrir un point de vue alternatif proposant une théorisation différente des approches classiques des représentations sociales. D'autres communications ont été inscrites dans cette perspective d'ouverture théorique.

Plusieurs symposia, mais aussi des communications libres, ont permis de faire le point sur les recherches les plus récentes concernant les représentations sociales et de débattre des futures orientations que connaîtra cette théorie ainsi que ces articulations. Dans ce cadre, rappelons notamment le symposium organisé par Silvia Gutiérrez (Université de Guadalajara) «*Some theoretical discussions on the study of social representations*» et celui organisé par Ivana Marková (London School of Economics) «*Epistemological issues in individual and social representations*», ou encore le symposium «*Implication et représentations sociales : bilan et perspectives nouvelles*» organisé par Christian Guimelli (Université de Provence) et Michel-louis Rouquette (Université Paris Descartes). Ce dernier symposium a porté sur les avancées

récentes au sujet de la notion d'implication personnelle, variable explicative majeure de la pensée sociale, et illustré par des travaux empiriques et expérimentaux la distinction entre l'implication «culturelle», induite par la sociabilité même, héritée, caractéristique d'un groupe social, engagée sur le long terme et se trouvant sous l'emprise collective, et l'implication «factuelle», activée par une situation, ancrée dans l'instant présent, et se trouvant sous l'emprise individuelle. On a également pu voir des avancées méthodologiques, notamment celles de Gregory Lo Monaco, Christian Guimelli et Jean-Claude Abric (Université de Provence) sur l'analyse des correspondances appliquée au questionnaire de caractérisation ou encore celle de Lionel Dany (Université de Provence) sur la distance à l'objet.

L'ensemble de la conférence a également été ponctué de plusieurs conférences plénières. Saadi Lahlou (London School of Economics) a ainsi présenté une communication intitulée «*Représentations sociales et objets réels : mécanismes d'évolution*», Pedro Humberto Campos (Université de Rio de Janeiro et Université Catholique de Goiás) a, pour sa part, traité des effets de contexte et de l'adéquation normative dans le cas de la représentation sociale de l'indien au Brésil. Faisant écho aux nombreuses contributions axées sur des problématiques liées à l'application, la conférence plénière de Jean-Claude Abric (Université de Provence) abordait la question de l'application de la théorie du noyau central des représentations sociales. Notons également le bel hommage rendu au regretté Gerard Duveen prononcé par Annamaria De Rosa (Université de Rome, La Sapienza).

Les applications de la théorie des représentations sociales ont eu une place de choix dans l'ensemble de la conférence. On a noté les études empiriques portant notamment sur le marketing, la protection routière, la santé, l'environnement et la

didactique, comme celles des symposia de Paula Castro (ISCTE de Lisbonne), Denize Cristina De Oliveira (Université de Rio de Janeiro), Sandra Jovchelovitch (London School of Economics), Nikos Kalampalikis (Université de Lyon 2), Alain Legardez (Université de Provence, UMR ADEF), Patrick Rateau (Université de Nîmes). Ces communications ont souligné l'importance de l'étude des représentations sociales pour comprendre les phénomènes sociaux et sociétaux.

En définitive, l'ensemble des contributions témoigne du fait que même après cinquante ans d'étude, le champ de recherches fondamentales et appliquées reste actif, l'émulation est certaine, et de nombreux progrès sont à venir, notamment sur le plan méthodologique.

Cette dixième édition de la Conférence a aussi été l'occasion de rendre un hommage chaleureux et émouvant à deux illustres chercheurs et néo-retraités, à

qui l'on doit des avancées majeures de la formalisation de la théorie des représentations sociales : les professeurs Jean Claude Abric (Université de Provence) et Michel-Louis Rouquette (Université de Montpellier, et Université Paris Descartes depuis 2002).

Enfin, cette dixième édition s'est terminée par la mémorable conférence de Serge Moscovici (Paris, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme), intitulée «Une nouvelle représentation du social». Cette intervention a été l'occasion pour l'ensemble des participants d'entendre l'initiateur de la théorie des représentations sociales rappeler l'origine de son intuition, revenir sur les auteurs qui l'ont influencé, et exposer ses préconisations concernant les futures recherches sur les représentations sociales.

Rendez-vous est maintenant pris pour la onzième édition de la Conférence Internationale sur les Représentaions Sociales, à Evora au Portugal en 2012.

Latin America and politic psychology of the XXI century

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Recently, in Ixtlahuaca, a little town situated at one hundred kilometers of Mexico City 70 guests – teachers and researchers from Latin America’s countries and some Europeans gathered for the Fourth International Congress of Psychology. Forty six universities, specialized associations and institutions were represented, all contributing to the success of this manifestation managed by Jose Rogelio Diaz Salgado, Margarito Ortega Ballestros and Marco Eduardo Murueta Reyes. The theme of the congress – “Psychology in 21st century: Social Compromise and Modernity” – proved to be generous for a variety of concerns and interests of the participants. Thought both as a symposium for the attending specialists and large scale teaching, the scientific meeting gained the connotations of an important social fact in the student populated area.

Some few contextual details customize the relationship between the organizers of the scientific manifestation, the research and the psychology study. In the University of Ixtlahuaca there are about ten thousand students. By the number of students the university is inferior in comparison with the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico-UNAM) where 300.000 students are learning. At Ixtlahuaca the “queen” specialization among others is psychology.

The University of Ixtlahuaca has 1.200 students studying this course, many of them opting to specialize in forensics. From the start, the program of the Congress was made to satisfy the aims and expectations of at least for two topical plans – scientific research and university education in intercultural and interdisciplinary context. That’s why in those three days while the Congress took place, each guest was the protagonist of several activities. First of all, each guest sustained a presentation on a decided theme in a masterly manner. The presentation was attended by a large number of students. Guests also took part at a round table, debating with other colleagues – in front of many people- subjects who captured the interest of everyone; any guest was also an active part of a thematic session with other young local professors and students who were at the beginning of the research work. Also, each guest presented a mini-lecture of four hours in front of a group of students. On the whole, both guests and organizers took advantage of the congress in the classic manner of the objectives of a scientific international meeting. Furthermore, the managing body of the University of Ixtlahuaca offered to students studying psychology a great module of study that complete the educational program of 2010-2011.

Strictly referring to the plan of scientific meeting, I can notice from the beginning the extraordinary breadth of the Latin America's researchers in psychological approach of the individual and current social phenomenon, and also the interest for the well-known themes who generated the new discipline of political psychology. Eloquent in this case are the themes of the round tables as "Power, aggressiveness and the theory of peace", "Emerging issues for the family surroundings in 21 century in Latin countries", "Social psychology and ambient informal education: the massive induction of ecological behaviors", "Social ethics and compromise in forming psychologists from Mexico and Latin America", "Psychological epistemology, the health psychology and social psychology". On the same side , I noticed the conferences presented by Edgar Anibal Galindo Cota ("Psychology and diplomacy"), Edgar Barrero Cuellar ("Dispute, political violence and psychological war in Columbia"), Barbara Zas Ros ("Practices of the social transformation in community context"), Jose Antonio Lara Peinado ("Power psychology in Mexico"), Jose Luiz Valdez Medina ("The theory of peace and stability"), Patricia Paula Arriaga Fereira ("The influence of video games on aggressiveness"), Santa Parrelo ("Who writes our history? Compromise and narrative paths").

My presence at the Forth International

Congress of Psychology from Ixtlahuaca, Mexico was, over many aspects, a great professional experience and also an affective one. As a European guest, I felt it was overwhelming because I realized the intense forces and issues for the Latin America's countries on psychological research in the world of today. It, also, was a good way to reevaluate my own researches over the effects of communist ideology and institutions in the societal project of forming the "new person". Because of the historical and political background of the countries from Latin America the study of psychosocial transformations due to mentalities and beliefs is required with obstinacy. Otherwise, the dominant themes of Latin-American psychology are: the power, identity and aggressiveness.

I end up with the idea the political psychology is opening here great ways of explorations.

Note on the brink of participation of the forth International Congress of Psychology managed by the University of Ixtlahuaca (Mexico): „The psychology of the 21 Century: Social Compromise and Modernity (22-24 September 2010).

Translation: Paula Tomi.

Debate on Political Psychology

Serge Moscovici: La recherche c'est un travail d'artiste

Interview par **Lavinia Betea**
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L.B.: Les sujets politiques font de plus en plus l'objet d'étude de la psychologie sociale. On peut croire dans un brillant avenir pour la psychologie politique. Quel est votre avis?

S.M.: Je pense, comme je vous l'ai déjà dit, qu'il faut d'abord se définir. C'est-à-dire, ce que les gens faisaient dans les années dix ou dans les années vingt du XX-ième siècle, quand ils ont créé la psychologie des foules, la psychologie des sexes. Or, il s'agit, comme je le crois, de psychologiser la psychologie sociale. C'est-à-dire que la psychologie sociale ne s'est jamais occupé auparavant du politique, donc il faut rendre politique une science qui ne l'est pas. À ce moment ce sont deux choses différentes puisque à ce moment là vous ne vous occupez pas de théories politiques. Vous ne donnez pas une théorie psychologique ou de psychologie sociale au phénomène, au domaine politique.

Je pense que par rapport avec la psychologie de l'individu et la psychologie sociale, on peut parler d'une psychologie politique dans la même mesure dans laquelle, à un moment-là, on a pu parler d'une psychologie de la famille. Parce que dans la psychologie de la famille nous utilisons les théories de la psychologie individuelle et même de la psychologie sociale. Ni la psychologie de la famille n'a pas des

theories spécifiques mais elle existe ...

Mais je suis d'accord. Ce n'était pas une critique. Il s'agit d'une réorientation et il faut bien avoir en tête cette différence d'orientation. On fait pas l'une et l'autre en même temps.

J'ai remarqué pendant la dernière conférence sur les représentations sociales (RS)¹ que beaucoup des les psychologues qui travaillent avec et sur les théories des RS sont préoccupés par les sujets politiques. Même si penser et analyser un phénomène psychologique en mouvement est extremement difficile...

Oui, oui, d'accord. Mais le politique est une forme de vie et une forme d'action. La politique ce n'est pas la connaissance, c'est l'action.

Et l'action est aussi la projection de nos opinions, de nos attitudes, de notre comportement...

Qui, oui, d'accord, mais il faut encore que je prenne une attitude et une opinion et que je les mette en action. C'est-à-dire, changer les autres, changer leur façon de penser, leur façon d'être ensemble ce qui est important pour la politique. Il faut faire des groupes, il faut créer des mouvements, des minorités, des majorités, il faut créer des mouvements. Par exemple, moi j'ai

commencé des recherches sur la minorité comme résultat de ce que j'ai fait quand on a commencé le travail dans le mouvement «vert». Je me suis alors mis à réfléchir et je me suis dit: mais la psychologie sociale ne parle pas du tout de ça. Donc c'est ça. Je n'ai pas essayé de convertir les gens à l'écologie mais je me suis demandé quel type de mouvement doit être l'écologie et comment la psychologie sociale peut apprendre à un mouvement d'agir.

Finalement vous avez crée une théorie utile pour les gens politiques et pour celui qui analyse la politique: la théorie des minorités actives.

Oui, peut le faire. Mais je disais que, en tant que chercheurs, les psychologues sociales doivent se poser cette question. C'est pas la même chose, vous voyez?

Je comprends. J'ai assité récemment à une conférence de psychologie sociale sur la crise actuelle. Elle a suscité beaucoup d'opinions de la part des participants, même parce que c'est un phénomène en mouvement. Dans quelle mesure les psychologues ont un mot à dire dans des situations comme ça?

Nous sommes des chercheurs et donc on n'a qu'à travailler sur le sujet et il faut encore que ce soit «sexy». Il faut qu'il soit intéressant. Sinon il n'y a pas de recherche. Si non e verro, non trovato. Ça c'est un problème. C'est-à-dire, par quel côté intéressant je peux aborder la crise? Et que la psychologie puisse y apporter quelque chose. Alors la psychologie ne peut pas travailler sur tous les phénomènes. La psychologie n'est pas une science économique. Donc elle ne peut pas donner une réponse à l'économie. Mais, en revanche elle peut étudier certains phénomènes, par exemple, l'argent, la passivité et l'activité des gens. Leurs confiance dans l'avenir ou dans le passé. Il y a toute une série de choses que les psychologues peuvent faire en matière de crise, mais pas tout. C'est même pas intéressant de le faire parce que,

pour savoir combien de gens tolèrent la crise, par exemple, ce sont des démographes qui le font automatiquement. Donc il y a la crise sous une certaine lumière. Par exemple Keynes dit que la bourse, la finance c'est un point de la psychologie des foules. Il n'y a pas de théorie de ça. Il dit que les gens qui disent qu'ils peuvent vous organiser l'argent et qu'ils sont des spécialistes de la bourse, ça n'existe pas. On a montré ça expérimentalement aux États-Unis. Donc, il y a des phénomènes de ce genre qui jouent à la fois de l'aléatoire et de la croyance. Ici, la psychologie sociale marche, mais elle ne marche pas partout. Et, par exemple, en ce qui concerne la crise, pour moi, la chose la plus importante serait d'étudier tout ce qui tient de la RS, de la croyance concernant l'argent. Sur laquelle on a peu de choses.

Je pensais, en vous écoutant, que les médias ont produit une RS sur les banquiers comme groupe minoritaire qui a produit la crise: voilà une autre minorité active qui a changé l'équilibre du monde.

D'accord. Mais on ne répond pas à la question. Que faut-il faire avec l'argent? On dit effectivement qu'ils sont coupables. Mais avec ça on ne résoud pas la crise. De toute façon, il y a un problème que nous avons depuis toujours: l'argent est mauvais. Même au Moyen Âge on pensait ça. «L'argent travaille quand on dort». Le Goff a fait une étude sur l'argent au Moyen Âge. De nos jours aussi, Mitterand dit: «L'argent travaille quand on dort». Donc il y a toute une série de représentations qui relèvent de l'imaginaire de l'argent. Maintenant, là aussi on peut identifier la position du bouc émissaire. Donc, celui qui a de l'argent, est posément le bouc émissaire. L'homme politique, même s'il est dans une tribu africaine, il peut aussi occuper une position de bouc émissaire.

Ont-ils les politiciens un meilleur «visage» que les banquiers?

Pas toujours. De tout façon ils sont menacés de ça. C'est-à-dire que si la crise

ne marche bien, ce sont eux les boucs émissaires de la crise. Le rôle de l'homme politique c'est d'ailleurs le rôle du bouc émissaire.

Le monde a cru dans le progrès universel conformément auquel tout sera de plus en plus bien. Cette crise a détruit cette croyance? Quelle serait l'hypothèse pour faire des recherches sur la pensée collective des gens?

Vous savez, il y a trois niveaux. C'est vrai qu'il y a une croyance générale que l'histoire est du progrès. Mais nous savons que le mouvement historique ne fait pas du progrès. Il avance, il se transforme. C'est l'inverse de la croyance conformément à laquelle l'on croyait que le passé est bon et le futur moins bon. Il y a des gens qui disent qu'il y a un développement durable et cela, à l'infini. Mais il y a des voix contre cette assimilation entre l'histoire et le progrès. Mais ça c'est une croyance. On n'y peut rien faire. Les gens peuvent pas vivre sans. Mais, attention, je n'ai pas dit que le futur ne puisse pas être meilleur que le présent. Je n'ai pas dit ça. Mais la croyance que le futur est nécessairement, mathématiquement meilleur, ça c'est une croyance.

**Vous êtes un cas unique...
Il n'y a pas de cas unique!**

Autrement dit, un cas différent dans le monde des chercheurs. Vous avez fondé et diffusé une théorie. Et maintenant, après cinquante ans de ce moment-là, vous êtes dans la situation d'assister à un développement de cette théorie partout dans le monde et dans les domaines d'une grande diversité. Avec quel sentiment?

Je suis content. Ça m'a fait des amis. Une théorie, ça fait des amis. Pas seulement ceux que vous voyez ici mais aussi ceux qui savent pas cette théorie. J'ai quand même un métavers que j'ai pas pensé que ça m'arrive. J'ai fait ça sans me demander: est ce que cela va être bon, mauvais, ça réussira? Ça on peut pas le prédire. J'ai travaillé parce que c'est

ça que j'ai fait le mieux dans la vie. Je suis content aussi parce que au moment où j'ai commencé mon travail il n'y avait même pas de psychologie sociale. Il n'y avait même pas de professeurs à la Sorbonne. Ils sont venus d'autres pays. C'est la vida... C'est la vida... On est comme des acteurs.

Mais si vous recommenciez ces recherches initiales - sur la psychanalyse, son image et son public - vous travailleriez de la même manière?

Vous savez, moi je pense que la recherche, ça ne change pas tellement. C'est un travail d'artiste. En fait, c'est quoi? On prend des choses, on prend des idées, on prend des faits et puis on essaie d'inventer quelque chose par rapport aux phénomènes qui existent, qui manquent. Peut-être je ferais plus ça parce que c'était à cette époque là, c'était l'après-guerre et le monde était très politisé.

Et maintenant?!

C'est pas tellement politisé. Alors l'Europe se sentait menacée par la Révolution et l'URSS était persuadée qu'elle avait l'histoire avec elle. Et la psychanalyse, l'histoire de la psychanalyse a eu d'autres raisons. Mais il y a eu un fait très important qui était la bataille, à Paris – parce que Paris était un centre intellectuel mais aussi un centre politique très important –, il y a eu donc cette lutte entre la science capitaliste et la science bourgeoise. Qui était en fait la bataille entre la psychanalyse et le marxisme. Et c'était important parce que tout le monde y était: les philosophes, les gens qui faisaient des sciences sociales et je ne sais pas pourquoi, en fait, je le sais, je me suis intéressé à ce problème là. Et c'est parce que je m'intéressais à l'histoire des sciences. Et ce n'est pas un truc fabriqué par la tête, c'est parce que, en effet, je me suis toujours intéressé aux phénomènes sociaux.

Etre psychologue a beaucoup changé par rapport à ce qui se passait à votre début?

Oui, ça a beaucoup changé, bien sûr. Ce

qui a changé, tout d'abord, vous savez, c'est peut-être ce monde universitaire. Il n'exista pas. Et, de deuxièmement, on est maintenant dans une période très XIX-ème siècle: la science positive. Il n'y a plus d'Einstein qui avait cette vision un peu différente. Il y a les gens qui ont crée l'Internet, par exemple. Maintenant la science est la vérité. C'est une science très différente de l'épistémologie et on tente d'accorder à cette science une importance en tant que telle dans la vie courante, mais pas tellement la technique.

Et pas tellement les médias...

Mais ils n'y a pas de moyen de diffusion de la science. Je vous assure. Si vous regardez votre télévision il y a très peu de science. L'Internet non plus. Vous savez cette idée, il faut être moderne. J'utilise l'Internet mais moi, par exemple, je ne prendrai pas de téléphone mobile parce que je ne parle que trois ou quatre fois par jour.

Et la condition du chercheur a beaucoup changé, elle aussi?

Oui. Toutes les universités, en Europe, font de la recherche aujourd'hui dans une crise économique énorme. Je n'ai pas dit que ce soit mal. J'ai dit que c'est un changement. Puis, il y a un deuxième phénomène que je crois juste et qui a été prédit par Weber, c'est la bureaucratisation. Donc, dans le passé, il ne s'agissait pas de ce que Weber annonçait: hiérarchie, rationalisation, pas de valeurs

etc. Weber appelait tout cela: la cage d'acier. Je pense que nous sommes un peu dans la cage d'acier, même à l'Université. C'est pas justement des valeurs, c'est justement des faits.

Voilà, vous venez de faire une évaluation sur un demi siècle. Mais quelle prediction avez-vous pour l'avenir?

L'avenir est imprévisible. Les sciences sociales ne peuvent pas prévoir. L'économie ne peut pas prévoir. Fastinger disait: on ne prédit que le passé. Mais, si vous voulez, la seule chose que l'on puisse faire, je ne peux pas dire que ce soit mauvais, beaucoup de gens le font: comme ils ne peuvent pas prévoir, ils font de la prophétie. Parce que les gens en ont besoin et pas seulement les gens, nous, on a besoin de ça. Mais il ne faut pas dire: ça c'est une prédiction. Vous voyez, là, on est dans la psychologie politique.

J'aime ce que vous avez déjà écrit dans vos mémoires sur la Roumanie: il y a des questions ou l'arbre de la science porte des fruits secs.

Notes

¹ Interview réalisé à Gammartin (Tunisie), 8 juillet 2010.